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FOREWORD.
This thesis was submitted as master's thesis to the
Graduate School of the University of Georgia in December
1990 in order to obtain the degree of Master of Laws
(LL.M.).
It attempts to elucidate an important concept in the
area of choice of law, namely party autonomy. In addition
to a general approach of this subject, emphasis is
particularly put on choice of law clauses in consumer
contracts. In this respect, the legal situation in the
United States of America and in the European Economic
Community (EEC) is described.
The introduction provides a general setting of the
problem. The basic issues are outlined and the various
concepts and notions determined. The field of research is
marked out, the subject is described within the larger
framework of consumer protection and a justification for a
comparative study is given.
The first chapter deals with the freedom to choose the
law applicable to a contract in general. Both this freedom
and the grounds for its denial are examined.
In the second chapter, the focus shifts entirely to
consumer contracts. First, a theoretical model is
elaborated which contains the different levels of consumer
1
2
protection private international law1 can grant. Secondly,
the situation in the United States of America is discussed.
Four states, Illinois, Georgia, California and New York,
are examined in particular. Basically, these states were
chosen because they reflect the major approaches in
contemporary American conflict of laws. For each state,
attention is given to its conflict of laws method in
general and to the freedom to choose the applicable law in
consumer contracts in particular. Thirdly, the situation
in the EEC is explained.
In this respect, the 1980 EEC Convention on the Law
Applicable to Contractual Obligations received the lion's
share of the consideration. The Convention's special
provisions concerning consumer contracts, mandatory rules
and public policy are examined in particular and its
applicability in the EEC Member States is checked. The
second chapter ends with some comparative conclusions.
A general conclusion, finally, summarizes the
highlights of this thesis.
1 The terms "private international law" and "conflict
of laws" are used interchangeably in this thesis. For a
discussion concerning the name of this field of law, see P.
North & J. Fawcett, Cheshire & North's Private
International Law (11th ed. 1987), at 12-13 [hereinafter
cited as Cheshire & North].
INTRODUCTION.
A. Description of the problem.
The idea to write this thesis arose in the aftermath of
the 1989 Session of the Hague-Zagreb-Ghent Colloquium on
the Law of International Trade (Knokke, Belgium 8-12 May).2
The author participated in this Colloquium and in the
student competition organized in connection with it.3
That competition was concerned with a choice of law and
a choice of forum clause4 in an employment contract.s The
2 See Hague-zagreb-Gent Essays on the Law of
International Trade, vol. VIII (to be published).
3 For the winning student reports of the three
participating countries (The Netherlands, Yugoslavia and
Belgium), see ide
4 Contrary to the subject of that competition, this
thesis will deal exclusively with choice of law clauses.
However, the effectiveness of a choice of law clause can
depend to a certain extent on a choice of forum clause.
S For the factual situation and the legal questions
involved in this student competition, see supra note 2.
Basically the setting was as follows. An American engineer,
employed by an English· subsidiary of a Dallas oil company,
was dismissed instantaneously for reporting too late at the
workshop. Under Belgian law, being too late once did not
constitute a ground for instant dismissal and the employee
could, consequently, sue his employer for compensation.
Under American law, though, it was assumed that this event
justified an instant dismissal without any compensation. The
employee was thus in a strong position if he could bring his
employer before a Belgian court and if Belgian law would be
applied. A suit before an American court with application
of American law would favor the employer. Most importantly,
the employment contract contained a choice of forum and a
choice of law clause designating Texas courts as having
3
4
basic question was whether such clauses could deprive an
employee of the social protection enjoyed under the
normally applicable law, i.e., the law applicable in the
absence of a choice of law clause. It was concluded that
some socially protective provisions are so important that
their application cannot be avoided easily.6 It would be
useless to protect the employee on the one hand, and to
allow a simple escape from this protection on the other
hand by inserting a choice of law clause in the employment
contract.
Since employees cannot really negotiate the terms of
their employment contract, employers enjoy a boundless
freedom to insert whichever clause they desire in an
jurisdiction and selecting Texas law to be applicable.
6 See aenerally C. Gamillsheg, Labour Contract, in
International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (K. Lipstein
ed. 1972); F. Morgenstern, Les Conflits de Lois en Droit de
Traivail: ~tude de la Loi Applicable a la Relation de Travail
Internationale (1986); Van Heeke, Sianification et Limites
du Principe de l'Autonomie de la Volonte dans les Contrats
Internationaux, 1955 Rev. de Dr. Int. et de Dr. Compo 81;
Rigaux, Loi d'Autonomie et Contrat de Travail en Droit
International Prive, 1985 Journal des Tribunaux de Travail
453; Goffin & Forges, Determination de la Loi Applicable au
Contrat de Travail en Droit Belae, 1984 Croniques Sociales
573; Fallon, Le Nouvel Aaencement des Reales de Conflit de
Lois en Matiere de Contrats, 1988 Journal des Tribunaux 469;
Hanotiau & Fallon, Chroniaue de Jurisprudence: Les Conflits
de Lois en Matiere d'Obliaations Contractuelles et non
Contractuelles (1965-1985), 1987 Journal des Tribunaux 103;
Erauw, De Internationale Arbeidsovereenkomst:
Arbeidsrechteli1ke en Procesrechteli1ke Aspecten, in
Tewerkstelling van Belgische Werknemers in het Buitenland (C.
Saelaert ed. 1989) and Lenaerts, Kroniek van het
Internationaal privaatrecht (1980-1985), 1987 Rechtskundig
Weekblad 1857.
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employment contract.' It is self-evident, consequently,
that a party in a superior bargaining position will opt out
of social protective laws. Such a loophole would render
social protection illusory.
The mechanisms to prevent the evasion of socially
protective laws include legislation prohibiting the
selection of less protective laws, and case law
restricting the freedom to choose the applicable law.
Indeed, in the absence of adequate legislation, a judge can
disallow a strong party to impose a choice of law that
would lead to an unjust result towards the weak party.
This is a common feature of employment contracts and
consumer contracts. The consumer and the employee are both
contractually weaker parties, endangered by choice of law
clauses designating less protective laws. This would be
unjust, unfair or unreasonable. And no matter how the
problem is approached, the basic argument and the
fundamental concern is that justice should be done.8
, Of course, this freedom is limited in fact in the
case where a labor union negotiates with the employer. Such
a form of collective bargaining puts both parties on a more
equal stand. The contractual freedom can also be restricted
through socially protective legislation. Such legislation
could prohibit choice of law clauses if application of the
chosen law would deprive the employee of the greater
protection he enjoys under the normally applicable law. See,
~, Article 6 of the EEC Convention on the Law Applicable
to Contractual Obligations. See Appendix 5.
8 Juenger, Some Critical Observations on the EEC
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations,
22 Va. J. Int'l L. 123, 141 (1981): "Conflicts law must share
the burden of delivering justice." On justice and conflict
of laws, see Brilmayer, Rights. Fairness. and Choice of Law,
6
But justice is a vague concept. It has more faces and
arguments can be advanced in several directions. That is
the case at hand: the business world requires freedom of
contract, but the consumer needs protection. In such a
case justice is a matter of balancing interests. The
question to be answered thus becomes: how are party
autonomy and social policy considerations reconciled in the
area of consumer contracts? How far do both reach and to
what extent are they restricted? This thesis tries to
answer these questions.
An example illustrates the problem:9
In North Carolina, insurance company Delta issues a life
insurance policy insuring the life of Ms. Jones. Delta is
incorporated and has its "home office" in North Carolina
while Ms. Jones is domiciled in Tennessee. The policy,
which is delivered to Ms. Jones in Tennessee, contains a
standard provision stating that the rights of the parties
under the policy shall be determined by North Carolina law.
In her application for the policy, Ms. Jones made a
misstatement which under the local law of North Carolina
would serve as a complete defence to the insurer in a suit
98 Yale L.J. 1277 (1989); Zaphirion, Basis of Conflict of
Laws: Fairness and Effectiveness, 10 George Mason U.L. Rev.
301 (1988) and Gerger, Eaualitv and the Conflict of Laws, 73
Iowa L. Rev. 893 (1988).
9 This example is based on Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws (1971) §187 Comment g.
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on the policy, but would not have this effect under the
local law of Tennessee.
In accordance with the Restatement (Second), effect
should not be given to the choice of law provision in such
a case. It would be unjust for Ms. Jones to loose the
protection she enjoys under the law of her domicile when
she contracts for a life insurance policy in her own state
with an insurance company from another state, and this
merely because of the choice of law clause. The protection
Tennessee affords Ms. Jones would be useless if a simple
reference to the law of North Carolina could bypass its
application.
B. Function of choice of law in consumer protection.
It may be questioned whether choice of law should have
any function but the mere designation of the applicable
law. 10 At first glance, the selection of the law
applicable to a given legal relationship, seems to be the
sole purpose of choice of law rules. But it is
questionable whether this choice should be made independent
from the content of the various laws available. A clear
distinction between substantive legal rules and choice of
law rules could justify such an independent choice. Where
the former provide a solution for a particular case, the
10 See Sauveplanne, Consumer Protection in Private
International Law, 32 Netherlands Int'l L. Rev. 100 (1985)
[hereinafter cited as Sauveplanne, Consumer Protection] and
pocar, La Protection de la Partie Faible en Droit
lnternational Priv~, 188 Rec. des Cours 339, 353-57 (1984)
[hereinafter cited as Pocar, Weak Party].
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latter limit themselves to providing the judge with the
legal system in which he should find the solution of the
particular case.
The authors advocating this distinction are aware that
a neglect of policy considerations can influence the doing
of justice, but "one must be ready to accept the concept of
a specific justice of conflict of laws, as distinguished
from the justice of substantive law."ll In this train of
thoughts it is not necessary that justice of the
substantive law and justice of the choice of law coincide.
Consumer protection, though undoubtedly corresponding with
the notion of justice, will thus stay outside the field of
choice of law. This field will only determine which law is
applicable to a consumer contract, but it is the selected
law that has to take care of the protection of the
consumer. 12
But this opinion fails to appreciate the role of
private international law in the modern legal world because
"today's private international law is not a purely
11 Kegel, The Crisis of Conflict of Laws, 112 Rec. des
Cours 185 (1964), cited in Pocar, Weak Party, at 354.
12 Criticizing article 7 of the 1980 EEC Convention on
the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations it was argued
that "the protection of the weak is primarily a matter of
substantive law rather than of conflict rules. The fact that
the law of a third state thinks it right in a given situation
to protect the weak does not by any means permi t the
conclusion that this is necessarily a sound policy which
others must respect." Mann, Contracts: Effect of Mandatory
Rules, in Harmonization of Private International Law by the
EEC (K. Lipstein ed. 1978), at 35, cited in pocar, Weak
Party, at 354.
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intellectual legal exercise, but it forms part of the
living law and it fulfills its social function in close
connection with other branches of the law." 13 Al though it
is basically correct that a solution for a legal question
must be found in the substantive law and that the choice of
law rules designate in which substantive law system this
solution should be found, it is debatable whether the
distinction between the functions of the two categories of
rules has to be drawn so rigorously.14
In the author's opinion, it cannot be upheld that the
choice of the applicable law is completely distinct from
the substantive solution the chosen law provides. Choice
of law is not neutral: it is the product of the same
society in which substantive rules are made and it leads
eventually to a solution of the same problems the
substantive rules deal with. The selection of the most
appropriate law cannot disregard the social, economic and
political values that form the basis of the substantive
rules.15 In modern legal systems, social values like
consumer protection are recognized to a growing extent. A
new tendency is discernible: judges are not led blindly to
the application of a law that does not defend the promoted
social values.
13 Sauveplanne, Consumer Protection, at 103.
14 See Pocar, Weak Party, at 355-57.
15 In pocar' swords: "La justice conflictuelle doit
s'harmoniser avec la justice mat~rielle." Id. at 355.
10
As a result, this thesis has to be seen in the larger
framework of consumer protection. The real concern is
consumer protection, the choice of law issue is but a
technical aspect through which this protection is achieved.
Choice of law is a means not a goal in itself. Of course,
consumer protection encompasses a broad variety of subjects
from consumer credit laws to product safety standards. The
subject discussed here interacts only with a smaller part
of the area of consumer protection, namely the terms of
consumer contracts. But in this part, choice of law has an
important function since it can prevent the evasion of a
large part of the consumer protective provisions. It also
serves the basic policies of consumer protection: conflict
prevention. 16
C. The reasons to carry out a comparative studV.17
It seems that anyone who proposes a comparative
conflicts study bears the burden of persuasion. It has to
16 The aim should be to make protection of the consumer
interest more effective by preventing or deterring
businessmen from imposition on weaker contractual parties
through choice of law, and if such conduct is taken, to
restore the balance between the parties. See M. Eisenstein,
Consumer Protection in the United States, Procedural Consumer
Protection Programs and Devices in the United States (1982).
17 See aenerally, Juenger, Lessons Comparison Miaht
Teach, 23 Am. J. Compo L. 742 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Juenger, Comparison]; Von Mehren, Choice of Law Theories and
the Comparative Law Problem,23Am. J. Compo L. 751 (1975);
MCDougal, The Comparative Study of Law for Policy Purposes:
Value Clarification as an Instrument of Democratic World
Order, 1 Am. J. Compo L. 24 (1952) and Balogh, Le Role du
Droit Compare dans Ie Droit International Prive. Academie de
Droit International, 57 Rec. des Cours 664 (1936).
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be questioned whether comparison in this field of law can
teach us anything at all. Juenger's answer is a clear
"yes" •18 His argument is that "since Solon's times it has
been known that comparative law has one incontestable
virtue: it shows a greater range of possible solutions to a
specific problem than any particular legal system can boast
of. Those who are prepared to descend from the ideological
tower to the market place of pragmatism may find that
comparative shopping can reveal the existence of better
mousetraps. ,,19
The question whether students can derive any insight
from studying theories and solutions utilized by various
other legal orders is reformulated by von Mehren. He
wonders whether it is possible at all for a system of
private international law to exclude comparative law
considerations.2o
The comparative law answers to a growing need of the
administration of justice in the world as it is coming to
be.21 A lawyer should not only have a general culture but
a culture in his own vocation which calls today for a
learning beyond the system he is to practice.22 And in the
18 Juenger, Comparison, at 743.
19 d~
20 Von Mehren, supra note 17, at 751.
21 Pound, Introduction to the American Journal of
Comparative Law, 1 Am. J. Compo L. 1, 8 (1952).
22 Id. at 8-9.
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course of general practice it is not unusual nowadays that
a fair knowledge of a foreign legal system is required.23
Therefore, it seems that there are reasons enough to carry
out a comparative study in the area of private
international law. 24
D. Definition of "consumer contract" .25
If special choice of law rules apply to contracts
concluded with consumers, the question is raised which
contracts must be regarded as consumer contracts deserving
protection, and which standards must be applied for the
purpose of delimiting these contracts from others. This is
one of the most complex and controversial questions in
consumer law. 26
Here, the notion of consumer contracts will be defined
and limited for the purpose of this study so that a
reasonable degree of comparability is achieved. The
definitions of the various applicable statutes and
conventions are looked at in order to formulate a common
denominator for what a consumer contract is.
23 Id. at 9.
24 "Historically, since the very beginning of the
independent development of American law, comparative law has
become an influence." Id. at 2. In the author's opinion
this tradition should be respected.
25 See aenerallv Brack, De Bearippen Consument and
Consumentenkoop [The Concepts of Consumer and Consumer Sale],
1982 Nederlands Juristen Blad 646.
26 Sauveplanne, Consumer Protection, at 107.
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First, the term "consumer" has to be defined. A
consumer is simply one who consumes i.e. "an individual who
purchases, uses, maintains and disposes of products and
services. ,,27 It is consequently "someone who is affected
by pricing policies, financing practices, quality of goods
and services, credit reporting, debt collection, and other
trade practices for which state and federal consumer
protection laws are enacted"; 28 in other words, all of us,
who in the course of daily life buy groceries, insure cars,
borrow money and so on. The British Unfair Contract Terms
Act states that "a party to a contract "deals as a
consumer" in relation to another party if: (a) he neither
makes the contract in the course of a business, nor holds
himself out as so doing; and (b) the other party does make
the contract in the course of a business ••. ,,29 Consumers
are to be distinguished from manufacturers, who produce
goods, and wholesalers or retailers, who sell goods, and
from those who provide services.
A consumer contract could simply be defined as "any
contract a consumer concludes as a consumer." Epstein uses
the term "consumer transaction" and defines this as "a man
27 Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979).
28 d~
29 Article 12(1) of the Act of 26 October 1977,
reprinted in Hartley, Consumer Protection Provisions of the
EEC Convention, in Contract Conflicts - The EEC Convention
on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations: A
Comparative Study (P. North ed. 1982), at 134.
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or woman obtaining credit, goods, real property or services
for personal, family or household purposes II .30
Various statutes and treaties dealing with consumer
contracts contain the following definitions:
- The 1980 EEC Convention on the Law Applicable to
Contractual Obligations31 states in Article 5(1) that a
consumer contract is "a contract the object of which is the
supply of goods or services to a person (lithe consumer")
for a purpose which can be regarded as being outside his
trade or profession, or a contract for the provision of
credit for that object. II The 1968 Convention on
Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters contains a corresponding definition.32
30 Epstein, Consumer Law in a Nutshell (2d ed. 1981), at
1. About consumer transactions, Epstein writes that lithe
fact that a transaction is a consumer transaction does not
usually cause a general statute or common law to be
inapplicable ..• but it does, however, often cause special
consumer protection statutes to be applicable. II Id. at 2.
31 For the relevant articles of this Convention, see
Appendix 5.
32 Article 6. See Appendix 6. The definition of this
Convention and of the 1980 Convention have been coordinated
to provide optimal consumer protection. A more precise
definition was undesired, though, in order to avoid conflicts
with the various definitions already given by national
legislation. See Giuliano & Lagarde, Report on the
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obliaations,
23 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. C 282) 1 (1980), Comment on Article
5(2).
15
- The Hague Convention on Uniform Law of the International
Sale of Goods (ULIS) 33 provides in Artic Ie 5 (2 ) "a contract
which contemplates the purchase of goods by payment of the
price by in~tallments".
- The U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods (CISG)34 defines consumer sales in Article
2(a) as "sales of goods bought for personal, family or
household use, unless the seller, at any time before or at
the conclusion of the contract, neither knew nor ought to
have known that the goods were bought for any such use."
- The Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to certain
Consumer Sales35 contains a definition in Article 1:
"contracts for the international sale of goods bought
primarily for personal, family or household use, where the
seller acts in the course of his business or profession and
where at any time before the contract was entered into, he
knew or ought to have known that the goods were being
bought primarily for any such use.
33 This Convention was concluded in The Hague on 15 June
1955 and has entered into force on 1 September 1964~ it is
reprinted in Reaister of Texts of Conventions and Other
Instruments Concernina International Trade Law, vol. I, ch.
I, in U.N. Sales Publication No. E.71.V.3.
34 U.N. Document A/CONF. 97/19 and U.N. Sales Publication
No. E.81.VI.3. This convention was concluded in Vienna on
11 April 1980 and has entered into force as to the UnitedStates on 1 January 1989.
35 Extract of the Final Act of the Fourteenth Session,
signed on 25 October 1980, in Acts and Documents of the
Fourteenth Session (1980), Book II, Consumer Sales, at 178.
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- The American Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC)36
contains a definition of consumer credit sales,37 consumer
leases38 and of consumer loans.39 Each definition
emphasizes the personal, family or household purpose of the
contract.40
- The Georgia Code defines a consumer transaction as "the
sale, purchase, lease, or rental of goods, services, or
property, real or personal, primarily for personal, family
or household purposes." 41
A simple definition containing all the basic elements
would be: a contract "for the supply of goods or services
to a person for a purpose outside his trade or profession
(or a contract for the provision of credit for this
purpose) • ,,42 This definition applies the standard of the
use for which the performance is intended in a negative
sense. The positive requirement that the performance must
have a "personal, family or household use" is identical to
36 Official Text of the UCCC, drafted by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law and approved




40 An identical emphasis is found in the consumer credit
provisions of 15 U.S.C.A. 1602(h).
41 O.C.G.A. §10-1-398(3) (1989).
42 Hartley, supra note 29, at 125.
43
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the negative requirement that the purpose of the contract
should be outside the consumer's trade or profession.
With regard to the supplier, the Hague Convention on
Consumer Sales requires him to act in the course of his
business or profession. The text of the EEC Convention
remains silent on this point but the memorandum explains
that, according to the majority of the drafters' view, the
article ought to apply only when the supplier has acted in
the course of his trade or profession, and that contracts
between purely private persons fall outside its scope.
Since the consumer only has to be protected against parties
with a presumably stronger bargaining position, it is
logical that a contract between consumers should not
receive special protection.
A problem arises when a supply is made partly for
personal use, partly for business purposes.43 The solution
depends on the use for which the supply is intended
"primarily"; special choice of law rules are only
applicable if the supply is intended "primarily" for
personal, family or household use •. Another problem is
whether the special rules should continue to govern the
contract when, although as it turned out the supply was for
consumptive use, the supplier sincerely believed it to be
intended for business purposes and, consequently, to have
Sauveplanne, Consumer Protection, at 107.
Sauveplanne's example is "the sale of a car to a doctor who
uses it to visit his patients, but which is also used by him
and by his wife for shopping and pleasure."
consumer sales, small loans, transportation contracts,
contracts for insurance and other services.47
47 This thesis only deals with international or
interstate consumer contracts, not with purely domestic or
intrastate consumer contracts. This is simply because party
autonomy is not allowed in such contracts. Since most
consumer contracts are adhesion contracts, this subject will
also be dealt with.
44 Id. Sauveplanne' s example here is "the sale of a car
to a person whom the dealer knows as a businessman and whom
he firmly believes to need the car for business purposes,
whereas in reality the car is only intended for private use."
45 Although the text remains silent on this matter, it
is mentioned in the memorandum and can therefore be regarded
as implied.
46 The fact that the supplier knows the purpose of the
contract will probably not influence his contractual behavior
importantly. If he can abuse his bargaining power when a
private person buys a car for consumptive purposes, he can




Convention on the Law Applicable to Consumer Sales and the
EEC Convention protect the supplier's good faith: the rules
do not apply if he shows that he neither knew nor ought to
have known that the supply was primarily intended for
consumptive use.45 It is disputable though that in such a
case the consumer should not obtain the protection he would
normally enjoy. 46
It is concluded that several types of common contracts
qualify as a consumer contract, the most important being
d .. I t t . 44entere ~nto a commerc~a ransac ~on.
I. PARTY AUTONOMY IN GENERAL:
'l'BEFREEDOM: AND ITS RESTRICTIONS.
A. Definition.
Party autonomy is a basic doctrine in the field of
contracts choice of law. The doctrine holds that the
parties to a contract can choose the law that is applicable
to their contract.48 The most obvious means to express
their intent is to insert a choice of law clause in the
contract. This is a contractual provision pointing out
which law the parties want to govern their contract, in
whole or in part.49 A typical choice of law clause reads:
"This contract shall be governed by and interpreted in
accordance with the law of X." The doctrine is so widely
accepted that it belongs to "the common core of the legal
systems", differences only exist concerning the l~its of
48 See Rigaux, Les Situations Juridiques Individuelles
dans un S steme de Relativite Generale: Cours neral de
Droit International prive (Ch. V: La Clause d' lection de For
et la Loi d'Autonomie en Droit International prive Etatique),
213 Rec. des Cours 1, 169 (1989); Johnston, Party Autonomy
in Contracts SpecifYing Foreian Law, 7 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 37
(1966); Note, Conflict of Laws: "Party Autonomy" in
Contracts, 57 Colum. L. Rev. 553 (1957) and Yntema,
"Autonomv" in Choice of Law, 1 Am. J. Comp. L. 341 (1952)
[hereinafter cited as Yntema, Autonomy].
49 The phenomenon that parties can choose different laws
to govern different aspects of their contract is called
"depec;age". This allows parties.to split the contract and
to subject the different parts of it to different laws.
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the freedom of the parties.50 A distinction can be drawn
between an express, a tacit, and an implied or presumed
choice of the applicable law. Normally, however, a choice
of law will be respected in all instances~ a problem of
proof of tacit agreement or intent can nevertheless
arise. 51
A further distinction can be made between party
reference and incorporation of foreign law.52 A party
reference is a choice of law which aims at subjecting the
contract to a foreign law. This is done through a choice
of law clause which connects the contract with a foreign
legal system. To render the chosen foreign law applicable
is a feature of the conflicts rules of the forum.53 But
parties can also, in the case where their contract is
already governed by a legal system, incorporate foreign
legal provisions in it by just referring to them. This is
50 Lando, The Conflict of Laws of Contracts: General
Principles, 189 Rec. des Cours 225, 237 (1984) [hereinafter
cited as Lando, General Principles]. o. Lando, Contracts,
in International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, III,
Private International Law (1976), at 3 [hereinafter cited as
Lando, Contracts].
51 On tacit choice of law, see Lando, General
Principles, at 306: "Most systems of private international
law admit that a choice of law can be exercised not only
expressly, but also tacitly." On implied choice of law, ~
Giuliano, La Loi Applicable aux Contrats: problemes Choisis,
158 Rec. des Cours 183, 215 (1977): "Le choix des parties est
admis normalement meme s'il resulte de manifestations
implicites. II
52 Lando, General Principles, at 255. See also Yntema,
Autonomv, at 343-44.
53 Lando, Contracts, at 13.
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merely a use of their contractual freedom, restricted by
the mandatory provisions of the legal system governing
their contract.54 This distinction is relevant when it has
to be determined whether mandatory rules of a legal system
that normally would apply under the choice of law rules of
the forum shall be disregarded if the parties agree to
apply the law of another system. 55
54 Lando gives the following example of incorporation of
foreign law: "Parties contracting under French law as the
proper law of the contract may shape their contract as they
desire within the limits set by the mandatory rules of French
law. This they may do either by defining the desired
conditions in express tenns or, more succinctly, by referring
to the provisions of a foreign legal system, e.g. English
law, which they seek to apply wholly or partially. The
latter is an incorporation of foreign law. It presupposes
a proper law different from that to which the reference is
made and derives its validity from the provisions of the
proper law, here French law, not from the conflict rules of
the forum." Id.
55 For a parallel distinction, see §187 of the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971) where (1)
issues which the parties could have resolved by an explicit
provision in their agreement (in this case there would be
incorporation) and (2) issues which the parties could not
have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement (in
this case there would be reference) are clearly
distinguished. A similar distinction is that between the
construction and the validity of the contract. The former
could have been resolved by the parties by an explicit
provision in their agreement while the latter could not. See
Weintraub, Functional Developments in Choice of Law for
Contracts, 187 Rec. des Cours 239, 272-73 (1984) [hereinafter
cited as Weintraub, Functional DeveloDments]. Lando,
Contracts, at 13-14 explains: "If there is a party reference,
the mandatory requirements of legal systems other than that
selected by the parties are disregarded; if there is an
incorporation, the mandatory rules of the proper law of the
contract designated by the conflict rules of the forum apply,
and the provisions of the law selected by the parties apply
only to questions which in the proper law are regulated by
directory rules."
22
56B. Historv of the concept of party autonomy.
"Whatever damage the past's dead hand may have done, it
appears worthwhile to look at the subjects of conflicts law
from an historical point of view, if only to shed some of
the exaggerated reverence for concepts and dogmas that are
responsible for the confused state of current American
conflicts law. ,,57 Party autonomy may be such a concept.
Furthermore, the present cannot be thoroughly understood
without a fair knowledge of the past.
1. Antiquity.
a. Greece.
Although split up in separate city-states, the Greek
world did not suffer a pressing need for choice of law
rules in general. This was due to the basic unity of Greek
law.58 In general, the principle of freedom of contract
was recognized widely.59 This was necessary for and the
56 This part is primarily based on Friedler, Party
Autonomy Revisited: A Statutory Solution to a Choice of Law
Problem, 37 Kansas L. Rev. 471, 474-79 (1989) [hereinafter
cited as Friedler, Party Autonomy]; Parra-Aranguren, General
Course of Private International Law: Selected Problems, 210
Rec. des Cours 9 (1988); Cheshire and North; Juenger, A paae
of Historv, 35 Mere. L. Rev. 419 (1984) [hereinafter cited
as Juenger, Historv];Lando, General Principles, at 240-45;
Yntema, The Historic Bases of Private International Law, 2
Am. J. Compo L •.297 (1953); M. Gutzwiller, Geschichte des
Internationalprivatrechts (1977) and E. Meijers, ~tudes
d'Histoire du Droit International prive (1967).
57 Juenger, History, at 419 and Juenger, Comparison, at
743-44.
58 •Juenger, H~story, at 420.
59 Id. at 421.
See,
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logical result of the Greek tradition of "far-flung trade",
continued certainly after the conquests of Alexander the
Great.60 This may have led to what some believe to be the
earliest conflicts rule ever discovered:
A mummy found in a crocodile cemetery was stuffed with
a papyrus that contained a series of edicts promulgated in
120-118 a.c.,61 one of which dealt with the respective
jurisdictions of Greek and Egyptian courts. Lewald62
asserted that the edict, which permitted Egyptians to sue
Greeks on contracts drafted in the Egyptian language in
Egyptian courts, implied a choice of law rule. He argued
that using language as the pertinent connecting factor for
jurisdictional purposes amounted, by implication, to a
recognition of the principle of party autonomy: by choosing
the language, the parties designated the court and thereby
they selected the applicable law.63
60 d.L..:..
61 These are the so-called "Fayoum papyri".
Yntema, SUDra note 56, at 300.
62 See, Lewald, Conflits de Lois dans Ie Monde Grec et
Romain, 57 Rev. Crit. de Droit Int'l prive 419 (1968).
63 Yntema, SUDra note 56, at 300-301: "These
institutions, however, fail to indicate that the cardinal
principle of conflicts law, the application of foreign law
to foreign cases, was accepted in antiquity. They are to be
regarded as precursors that mark an advanced stage in the
amelioration of relations among different political groups."
See also Juenger, Historv, at 421: "This legislation amounted
to a political gesture: it was designed to preserve a minimum
of business for the Egyptian tribunals which increasingly had
been los ing sui tors to the royal courts"; so maybe "the edict
hardly supplies evidence of conflicts legislation."
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This is at least an early expression of a concept akin
to party autonomy. It is significant that this early
choice of law rule involved party autonomy. But that may
be logical in the light of the trade, commerce and
navigation carried on in those days and in the light of the
general freedom of contract referred to above.
b. Rome. 64
The Romans did not develop a system of choice of law
rules either. This was due to the supremacy and the unity
of the Roman law as such. Since 241 B.C., however, a
special administrator, the "praetor peregrinus", was
administered to deal with litigation involving the
peregrines.6s A general resemblance between the Greek and
the Roman approach to cross-border transactions can be
detected: "Instead of constructing an elaborate system of
choice of law rules, they empowered special tribunals to
deal with multistate problems and accorded them a fair
measure of freedom to find appropriate solutions. ,,66 No
special consideration of party autonomy is found.
64 See aenerallv Parra-Aranguren, supra note 56, at 58-
59 and Cheshire & North, at 15-16.
6S Juenger, Historv, at 422. Apart from slaves, Romans
distinguished three categories of persons, depending on their
geographical origin: (1) someone from the city of Rome was
a "Roman citizen"; (2) someone from what we now know as Italy
but outside of Rome was a "peregrine"; and (3) someone from
the conquered territories outside of Italy was a "barbarian".
66 Id. at 423.
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2. The origins of choice of law rules.
a. The personal laws of the middle ages.
After the barbarians overthrew the Roman Empire and
settled tribe after tribe in the territories where hitherto
Roman Law had prevailed, there arose what is called a
system of personal laws. There ceased to be a territorial
law applicable to all persons living within a certain
defined space. Instead each tribe retained its own tribal
law.67 This provided a fertile ground for choice of law
problems since several legal systems were applicable
simultaneously in the same territory. In this early post-
Roman period another instance of early recognition of party
autonomy can be detected in the "professio iuris". This is
a declaration originally used to specify the parties'
actual ethnicity and it may have been employed in a
fictitious manner to stipulate the law they wished to
govern their transaction.68
b. The Italian School.
The revival of the study of Roman law in the 12th
century meant the true beginning of what now is known as
choice of law.69 This happened under favorable conditions
67 Cheshire & North, at 16. The germanic tribes that
destroyed the Roman Empire, introduced their own laws in the
conquered territories, but never eradicated the laws of the
conquered. See Juenger, History, at 424.
68 d~
69 Id. The basic activity of legal scholars of that
time consisted in commenting the Justinian Code (Codex
Justinianus). According to the period in which they were
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for transborder conflicts between different legal systems.
The different city states of Northern Italy had their
own laws and it was normal that in their interactions
choice of law problems arose.70 To solve these problems,
glossator Aldricus called for the application of the
"better and more useful" law.7l Party autonomy was not
recognized: Bartolus a Sassoferrato (1314-1357), the famous
post-glossator, asserted that the law of the place of
active they are called "glossators" or "post-glossators".
The basic method, however, remained unchanged namely the
"glossa". This a short remark, addition or explanation of
a part of the Justinian Code, written in the margin of the
text. Some of these so-called glossae became almost a whole
booklet on their own. Glossator Accursius, for example, is
believed to have written the famous "Glossa Cunctos Populos".
This addition, dating from about 1228, argues that if a
citizen of Bologna is sued in Modena, he is not to be judged
according to the statutes of Modena, to which he is not
subject. See Yntema, supra note 56, at 302.
70 These laws were called "statuta "• Three types of
statuta were distinguished. Each type led inherently, i.e.
due to their very nature, to a determination of the
applicable law. First, the "statuta realia" (real laws)
applied territorialy, depending on where the legal relation
was situated. Secondly, the "statuta personalia" (personal
laws) applied depending on the nationality of the subjects
involved. Finally, since these two categories did not cover
the whole realm of the legal reality, the "statuta mixta"
(mixed laws) whose application depended on different
criteria. Yntema, supra note 56, at 303-304. Although this
method may seem primitive, "we should not lose sight of the
remarkable achievements of those who first pondered conflicts
problems in Upper Italy and Southern France. Unlike the
Greeks and the Romans, these medieval scholars invented
methods designed to resolve multistate problems by means of
a principled choice among contending local rules." Juenger,
Historv, at 429. "It is to the credit of the jurists of
those days that a search for some reasonable principle on
which daily clashes could be composed was seriously
instituted." Cheshire & North, at 17.
71 Juenger, History, at 426.
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contracting governs all questions concerning the form and
72substance of the contract.
c. The French School.
A notable French scholar of that time was Dumoulin
(1500-1566).73 Maybe, much of his ideas could already be
found in the writings of Bartolus but Dumoulin's
originality lies in his emphasis of the concept of party
autonomy. 74 This was of course not his own invention since
choice of law clauses were already used in the Middle
Ages.75 But he stressed the subject "when others still
tried to fit every problem in the stiff mold of an analysis
geared to the divination of the reach of local laws.
Moreover, Dumoulin stretched the principle of party
autonomy to encompass situations in which the parties had
failed to designate the law they wished to control their
agreement. ,,76 His hypothesis of a tacit consent was a
precursor to the English proper law approach, which in turn
inspired such current notions as the most significant
72 Lando, Contracts, at 5.
73 See F. Gamillscheg, Der Einfluss Dumoulins auf die
Entwicklung des Kollisionsrecht (1955).
74 Juenger, History, at 431.
75 See, ~, the choice of law clause in the marriage
contract of EI Cid described inA. Miaja de la Muela, Derecho
Internacional privado (6th ed. 1972), at 88 and E. Van
Kleffens, Hispanic Law Until the End of the Middle Ages
(1968), at 141-43, quoted in Id.
76 rd. at 431. This was an important aspect since most
contracts in those days did not contain an express choice of
law.
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relationship formula of the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws.77 For these reasons Dumoulin truly can
be called "the father of party autonomy".78
Another important French writer, d'Argentre (1519-
1590), was essentially territorially minded: he did not
support the autonomy of the parties but the "autonomy of
the provinces".79
77 Cheshire & North, at 20 and Juenger, Histo~, at 431.
78 Lando, Contracts, at 6. Yntema, supra note 56, at
304-305 writes: "Dumoulin declares the intent of the
contracting parties, express or tacit, to be a source of law
that in its sphere of application transcends the mere
authority of a statute as such, limited to its territory.
In this category of cases, the circumstances surrounding the
will of the parties, such as the law of the place of
contracting, the domicil, past and present, of the
contracting parties, and similar factors, are to be regarded.
This principle, covering a substantial part of the law and
obviating more artificial grounds of choice, was employed by
Dumoulin to liberalize the treatment of contracts and
matrimonial settlements. It anticipates important modern
doctrines of conflicts law." Lando, Contracts, at 6 puts
Dumoulin's contribution to conflict of laws in perspective
where he writes that "the idea of party autonomy in the
modern sense of the words, however, can hardly have crossed
Dumoulin's mind; it is not probable that he intended the will
of the parties to decide which law to apply in matters of
contract when mandatory provisions of substantive law were
involved. The intention of the parties was mentioned by
Dumoulin in a context where he discussed those parts of
substantive law where the intention and will of the parties
prevailed, and all the examples which he used were taken from
parts of the law where the rules were directory."
79 Cheshire & North, at 20. Since his approach
emphasized that the territorial nexus should determine the
applicable law and since realty in those days was still the
main element of wealth, legal disputes were mostly
adjudicated by the court at the situs of the property. This
promoted of course the application of forum law. See
Juenger, History, at 431-32.
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d. Dutch authors.
The eminent Dutch jurist Max Huber (1636-1694) laid
down three maxims, from which he considered a sufficiently
comprehensive system for the reconciliation of conflicting
laws could be evolved. 80 Huber's "De Conflictu Legem"
(1689)81 has had "a greater influence upon the development
of the conflict of laws in England and the United States
than any other work. ,,82 This is important since Huber was
a proponent of party autonomy. He favored that contracts
be governed primarily by the law that the parties had
80 These three maxims are: (a) the laws of a state have
absolute force within, but only within, the territorial
limits of its sovereignty; (b) all persons who, whether
permanently or temporarily, are found within the territory
of a sovereign are deemed to be his subjects and as such are
bound by his laws; and (c) by reason of comity, however,
every sovereign admits that a law which has already operated
in the country of its origin shall retain its force
everYWhere, provided that this will not prejudice the
subjects of the sovereign by whom its recognition is sought.
Cheshire & North, at 20-21. Juenger, Historv, at 435
attributes to Huber four distinct contributions to conflict
of laws: he heralded the demise of statutory theory, found
a basis for the discipline of conflict of laws in
international law, anticipated the vested rights doctrine,
and introduced the notion of public policy.
81 For the unabridged Latin text and a translation of
the "De Conflictu Legem" and for an account of Huber's
influence, see E. Lorenzen, Selected Articles on the Conflict
of Laws, ch. 6 (1946).
82 Juenger, History, at 435: "It is all printed in five
quarto pages. In the whole history of law there are probably
no five pages which have been so often quoted, and possibly
so much read. They are distinguished by clearness, practical
judgment and a total absence of pedantry." Huber's view that
comity and the pressure of international commerce require
that acts duly performed in one jurisdiction shall be
sustained in other jurisdictions made a deep impression on
early common law writers. Cheshire & North, at 21.
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contemplated, an idea that closely resembles Dumoulin's
notion of "tacit agreement".83 In Huber's words: "The
place .•• where a contract is entered into is not to be
considered absolutely; for if the parties had in mind the
law of another place at the time of contracting the latter
will control. ,,84
3. The English deviation.
The first English case to show Huber's influence was
Robinson v. Bland. 85 Lord Mansfield stated: "The general
rule ••• is that the place where the contracts is made, and
not where the action is brought, is to be considered in
expounding and enforcing the contract. But this rule
admits of an exception where the parties at the time of
making the contract had a view to a different kingdom. ,,86
Huber was doubtless the most influential purveyor of these
maxims, and his influence is still felt today. For
instance, his idea of selecting the law of the place the
"parties had in mind" to govern their contract, became, as
mentioned above, the basis for the English "proper law"
83 Juenger, History, at 440.
84 Translated by E. Lorenzen, supra note 81, at 162-80.
85 (1760) 1 W. Bl. 257.
86 Id. at 258-59. This is an example of what Westlake
called "the reception in England of continental maxims on
topics of private international law." J. Westlake, A
Treatise on Private International Law (6th ed. N. Bentwich
1922), at 10.
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doctrine. 87 The 19th century English laissez-faire policy
supported of course the adoption of party autonomy.88
4. Conflicts law in the United States.
Like medieval Italy, pre-revolutionary France, the
Dutch Provinces in the Golden Age and 19th century
Germany,89 the United States fulfills the conditions to be
a "natural setting for legal conflicts. ,,90 In each of
these instances, the concerns of more or less autonomous
political units have been for the most part fairly
recognized and appreciated on the background of a common
legal culture. 91
A great jurist, Joseph Story (1779-1845), advocated the
comity approach in his huge treatise, in which he also
87 The case of Robinson v. Bland, which is based on
Huber' s theory, is considered the "fons et origo" of the
proper law doctrine in the English conflict of laws. J •
Morris, The Conflict of Laws (3d ed. 1984), at 267.
88 Lando, Contracts, at 15.
89 Yntema, sUDra note 56, at 299.
90 Juenger, Historv, at 441.
91 Yntema, sUDra note 56, at 298-99 further contends
that "The basic assumption of conflicts law is that the legal
order provides unity in diversity, or in other words the
appropriate recognition of special local interests and
practices as expressed in local legislation, integrated in
,terms of a basic community of common standards in the choice
of the applicable law. [This] offers a more realistic basis
for the necessary adaptation of law to the changing needs of
the modern world. Historically, this conception has been
most perfectly realized under federalism, and conflicts law
has conspicuously and most satisfactorily developed within




championed party autonomy.92 Much later, the Reporter for
the first Restatement of Conflict of Laws (1934), Joseph
Beale, replaced comity for vested rights, and did not allow
party autonomy.93 In Beale's opinion, it could not be
allowed that the parties choose the law to be applied to
their contract. This would make legislators of them since
they determined which law applies to a specific contract.94
As a result, the first Restatement remained silent on the
issue of party autonomy and generally applied the law of
the place of contracting to questions of obligation (form,
capacity and validity) and the law of the place of
performance to questions of performance.95
5. Two German authors.
Carl Friedrich von Savigny (1779-1861)96 made a
decisive break with all former approaches to the subject in
his book "On the Conflict of Laws" (1849) in which he
maintained that it was possible to construct a system of
private international law common to all civilized
92 J. Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws
(1834) . But Story's historically influential book lacked
clarity in this respect.
93 See Restatement, Conflict of Laws §332 (1934); J.
Beale, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws II §332.2 (1935)
and Beale, What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract?, 23
Harv. L. Rev. 260, 267 (1909).
94 J. Beale, The Conflict of Laws II (1935), at 1079-
95 Yntema, Autonomv, at 349.
96 See aenerally Saviany in Modern Comtlarative
Perspective, 37 Am. J. Compo L. 1 (1989).
33
nations.97 He alleged that the law of the physical seat
(the "sitz") of each legal relationship should be applied
to it and would link people and legal relationships with a
given territory by means of various contacts. His method
thus worked as follows.98 First, all legal relationships
were classified in broad categories (e.g. property,
obligations, decedents' estates). A specific connecting
factor applied to each of these categories (domicile,
situs, place of transaction or place of litigation). This
led to a specific choice of law rule, e.g. party autonomy,
determining the applicable law. 99
Carl Georg von Wachter recognized certain specific
conflicts rules that he believed to be rooted in customary
law such as, to a point, the principle of party autonomy,
but generally he was forum oriented. 100
97 Cheshire & North, at 21-
98 See Parra-Aranguren, supra note 56, at 63-64;
Juenger, Historv, at 451 and Cheshire & North, at 21-23.
99 Other choice of law rules were, e.g., lex rei sitae
(in matters of immovables, the law of the place where the
immovables are situated governs) and locus regit actum (the
formal validity of documents is governed by the place where
its redaction took place). For instance, the question which
law governs the transfer of land situated in Germany and sold
by an Italian to a Spaniard would be analyzed as follows.
The legal relationship between the two parties classifies
under property. The connecting factor is thus the situs of
the land, and, consequently, the rule of lex rei sitae has
to be applied which leads to the application of German law
to the matter.
100 Parra-Aranguren, sut>ra note 56, at 63-64.
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6. Pasquale Stanislao Mancini.
Primarily, the influential Italian author Mancini
(1817-1888) considered the personal link of an individual
to a nation to be of fundamental importance. 101 In
accordance with his "liberal emphasis on the sacred faith
of agreements", he also favored party autonomy. 102
The opinions of these early writers are of cardinal
importance to the conflict of laws; and not only with
respect to party autonomy. Since these authors have
discussed choice of law problems nothing new has happened.
Now we can say that "everYthing worthy of trying has been
tried before, under the same or other labels. ,,103 The realm
of conflicts is marked by a "universal unoriginality" .104
That is the reason why this historical introduction has
received substantial attention. This overview witnesses
how deep the principle of party autonomy is rooted in this
101 Juenger, History, at 454-55.
102 Yntema, suora note 56, at 350.
103 Nadelmann, Marainal Remarks on the New Trends in
American Conflicts Law, 28 L. & Con. Probe 860 (1963) QUotedin, Juenger, American and Eurooean Conflicts Law (Svmoosium:
The Influence of Modern American Conflicts Theories on
Eurooean Law), 30 Am. J. Compo L. 117, 120 (1982).
104 l5L. Briefly, Juenger argues that the ideas of
Livermore came from the statutists, Story was based on Huber,
Beale borrowed from Dicey and thus from Huber, Ehrenzweig
relied on Wachter, Leflar on Aldricus, Currie on Bartolus and
Coquille and the concept of "most significant relationship"
can be traced back to Savigny. The influential Brainerd
Currie was original in that he "reinvented the wheel". In
the 14th century, Bartolus already asserted that choice of
law problems could be resolved by the "ordinary processes of
construction and interpretation". Id. at 118-19.
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area of law. It proves to be a fundamental principle that
cannot be set aside arbitrarily.
C. Rationale for allowina Dartv autonomy.
There are two main considerations supporting party
autonomy. The first one is the desirability of certainty
in the area of contracts.105 The contract area experiences
a real need for certainty, i.e., predictability of result.
In contrast with torts, parties enter into contracts with
forethought and give advance consideration to what their
rights and obligations will be. 106 Therefore, a contract
should be governed by the law the parties expected to
govern it. This seems to be an obvious and natural
principle. 107 The best indication of the parties'
expectations is a choice of law clause. lOB Respect for
choice of law clauses relieves the parties of their
uncertainty as to the law governing their contract as well
105 Reese, Power of the Parties to Choose the Law
Governing Their Contract, 1960 Proc. Am. Soc'y Int'l L. 49,
Sl [hereinafter cited as Reese, Power]. Friedler, Party
Autonomy, at 471-73 writes that "The possibility of selecting
in advance a law and perhaps a court with expertise in a
particular area affords them a degree of control and
predictability that is very attractive."
106 Reese, American Choice of Law (SvmDosium: The
influence of Modern American Conflicts Theories on EuroDean
Law), 30 Am. J. Compo L. 135, 138 (1982).
107 "Party autonomy plays a key role in upholding the
reasonable expectations of the parties to mul tistate and
international agreements by promoting predictability and
uniformity." Friedler, Party Autonomy, at 473.
lOB "Predictability of result is clearly more difficult
to achieve in situations where the contract does not contain
a choice of law provision." Reese, Power, at 52.
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as it relieves the courts of having to embark upon a
troublesome decision as to which law applies to the
contract. 109 Party autonomy has the additional advantage of
reducing litigation.11o
The second consideration is the need for freedom.111
The parties should enjoy the normal contractual freedom to
shape their contract in a way they can agree upon.112 They
may have good reasons to select one or the other law: use a
certain formula which is internationally known, submit the
contract to the law of the country that dominates the
109 Id. at 51. See the opinion of Judge Harlan in
Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, Ltd., 221 F.2d 189, 195 (2d
Cir. 1955): "Instead of viewing the parties as usurping the
legislative function, it seems more realistic to regard them
as relieving the courts of the problem of resolving a
question of conflict of laws."
110 Judge Harlan contends that the parties' course [to
insert a choice of law clause in their contract] "might be
expected to reduce litigation, and is to be commended as much
as good draftsmanship which relieves courts of problems of
resolving ambiguities. To say that there may be no reduction
in litigation because courts may not honor the provision is
to reason backwards. A tendency toward certainty in
commercial transactions should be encouraged by the courts."
Siegelman v. White Star, Ltd., 221 F.2d 189, 195 (2d Cir.
1955) .
111 Lando, Contracts, at 33-34.
112 Recognition of the principle of freedom was congenial
to the liberal conceptions of the days of Adam Smith, Jean
Jacques Rousseau and Emmanuel Kant. The supreme example of
this individual freedom is art. 1134 of the Code Napoleon
declaring the parties at liberty by their agreement to
prescribe for themselves "private laws" regulating "the
infinite variety .of individual interests within the sphere
of free enterprise." Yntema, Autonomy, at 342-43. "Le
principe [de la loi d'autonomie] n'a ~t~ entendu ••• que
comme une sorte de corollaire ou de compl~ment nature I de la
libert~ dont les contractants jouissent." Giuliano, supra
note 51, at 209-10.
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market, select a neutral law in which each of them has more
confidence than in that of the domicile of the other party,
select a well developed or well suited law, choose a law
used in earlier transactions etc.113
The only uncertainty is the forum that will adjudicate
an eventual dispute, although this could be solved by a
forum selection clause. Provided however that most fora
recognize party autonomy, even this last uncertainty is not
significant. No matter where the case is brought the court
will always apply the law chosen by the parties,114 unless
they differ substantially with regard to its limits.
These limits function also as counter arguments for the
doctrine of party autonomy. The basic argument against
party autonomy is that it not appropriate to let private
parties decide which law applies to a legal relationship.
That would be the task of the legislator. This argument
can easily be countered: it is not because the parties have
chosen the applicable law that this law applies, but
because the law of the forum allows parties to choose the
applicable law.11s
113Lando, Contacts, at 33.
114 Private international law can only exercise its
"prophylactic function" in contract matters if all courts
recognize party autonomy. O. Kahn-Freund, General Problems
of Private International Law (1980), at 193.
11S This would be a valid reason to allow parties to
choose the law applicable to the construction as well as to
the validi ty of their contract. Weintraub, Functional
DeveloDments, at 272-73 and Giuliano, SUDra note 51, at 206-
13.
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D. The present situation with respect to partv autonomy.116
Difficulties with the mechanical rules of lex loci
contractus (law of the place of contracting) and the lex
loci solutionis (law of the place of performance)l17 explain
the wide influence of doctrines emphasizing intent, as
introduced by Dumoulin and Savigny in Continental Europe
and by Huber and Lord Mansfield in Anglo-American law,
doctrines which have inspired the wide acceptance by the
courts of the principle of autonomy. 118 The rule that the
parties to a contract are free to stipulate what law shall
govern their transaction is perhaps the most widely
accepted private international law rule of our time.119
1. England.
During a century after Robinson v. Bland, English
judges continued to rely on the law of the place of
contracting more frequently than on any other law. But in
1865 the law of the place of contracting was finally
abandoned in favor of the proper law. 120 The case which
116 See generally E. Rabel, The Conflict of Laws: A
Comparative Study (2d ed. U. Drobnig ed. 1960).
117 Examples of difficulties with these rules are: the
place of contracting is often fortuitous or hard to determine
like in a case where the contract is concluded by
correspondence; the place of performance can be undetermined
at the moment of the conclusion of the contract or there can
be several places of performance. See, Yntema, Autonomv, at
342 and Note, supra note 48, at 568.
118 Yntema, Autonomy, at 342.
119Weintraub, Functional Developments, at 271.
120 8J. Morris, supra note 7, at 267.
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(1889) 42 Ch.D. 321 (C.A.).
124 Cheshire & North, at 485.
law must be "bona fide and legal" and that no contact with
England is required in order to do so. 126




121 (1865) 3 Moo. P.C. (n.s.) 272, 291. See also Lloyd
v. Guibert, (1865) L.R. 1 Q.B. 115, 120-21.
122 Lando, General Principles, at 257.
[1939] A.C. 277 (P.C.).
126 Cheshire & North, at 453-54. Morris is of the
opinion that though the Vi ta Food Case may not cover the
selection of a law other than English law, its principle
would also apply to an express and reasonable choice of a
foreign law as the proper law of the contract not visibly
connected with the foreign country in question. A. Dicey &
J.Morris, The Conflict of Laws (L. Collins ed. 1987), at
1169 et seq. Note, A Different Aooroach to Choice of Law in
Contract, 43 Mod. L. Rev. 650, 659 (1980): "If any general
principles emerge •••, it is perhaps that party choice is
subject to the qualifications of legality, bona fides and
public policy." See also R. Graveson, Conf lict of Laws:
Private International Law (7th ed. 1974), at 409-10.
shows this transition most clearly is Peninsular & Oriental
Steam Naviaation Co. v. Shand. 121 Through this case,
England was the first country in which reliance on party
autonomy was clearly accepted by the courts.122
Furthermore, in re Missouri Steamship CO.123 held that the
intention of the parties may eliminate the application of
mandatory rules of the law of the place of contracting.124
The leading case on the freedom of the parties to choose
the proper law is Vita Food Products. Inc. v. Unus Shippina
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2. United States of America.
In 1934 the first Restatement of Conflict of Laws was
published. And although Beale and his Restatement were
opposed to the freedom of parties to choose the applicable
law, Beale had to admit that "on the whole, the prevailing
tendency of the American cases is to regard the intention
of the parties as controlling. ,,127 Indeed, Beale's
opposition to party autonomy was paid heed to only in a few
American cases. 128 In Lauritzen v. Larsen, 129 Justice
Jackson said that the tendency of the law in contract
matters was to apply the law which the parties intended to
apply. 130 In Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, the arguments
of Beale against party autonomy were disposed of by Judge
Harlan who said that "instead of viewing the parties as
usurping the legislative function, it seems more realistic
to regard them as relieving the courts of the problem of
resolving a question of conflict of laws. ,,131 So even in
127 J. Beale, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws (1935),
at 1100. But Beale continues stating that "this intention
of the parties is often conclusively found to be in favor of
the law of the place of performance." As mentioned above,
the first Restatement advocated application of the law of the
place of contracting to questions of obligation and the law
of the place of performance to questions of performance.
128 See, ~, Gerli & Co. v. Cunard 5.5. Co., 48 F.2d
115, 117 (2d Cir. 1931).
129 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
130 For an earlier case, see Pritchard v. Norton, 106
U.S. 124 (1882).
131 221 F.2d 189, 195 (2d Cir. 1955).
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consumer contracts. If a choice of law clause was obtained
134 Lando, Contracts, at 26.
See Appendix 4.
This is important in light of the treatment of
§187.133
135 . k bSee, ~, Fr~c e v. Is randtsen Co., 151 F.Supp. 465
(S.D.N.Y. 1957).
136 See Restatement (Second) §187(2).
132 C. Cramton, D. Currie & H. Kay, Conflict of Laws:
Cases, Comments & Questions (4th ed. 1987), at 145.
by unfair means or written in a language unknown to the
other party the courts have paid heed to it.135 The
requirement of substantial relationship and public policy
considerations are further limits to party autonomy.136
Finally, in case of inequality of bargaining power, the
second Restatement reluctantly respects choice of law
laws. ,,134
In the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971)
paramount importance is attributed to party autonomy.133
However, an unrestricted freedom of parties to choose the
applicable law has never been recognized. A distinction
between "contracts tainted with dirigism [sic] and free
contracts is a noteworthy feature of American conflict of
the early days of the first Restatement party autonomy was
accepted in general. Besides, the rule permitting parties
to select the law to govern the validity of a contract had
many adherents.132
A recent case review holds that "one of the few non-
at common law and can therefore be equated with §187 of the
case, especially in the federal courts, the issue is dealt
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The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), now
the parties should be given great weight. In case after
controversial maxims of conflicts is that the autonomy of
second Restatement. 139
105 may be regarded as similar in scope to party autonomy
137 It does so expressly in §192 on life insurance
contracts and in §193 dealing with contracts for fire, surety
or casualty insurance. The same consideration, however,
seems to apply to employment contracts, to contracts
concerning small loans, etc., but restrictions on party
autonomy are not found in the sections concerning these
contracts. Here the general reservation in §187 in favor of
the fundamental policy of the otherwise governing law may
prevent hardship to the weak party.
138 In 1974 Louisiana was the last state to adopt the
UCC. However Louisiana did not adopt sections 2 and 9. But
in 1988, Louisiana has also adopted section 9 which is took
effect in January 1990. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the
American Courts in 1988, 37 Am. J. Compo L. 457, 482 (1989).
139 E. Scoles & P. Hay, Conflict of Laws (1982), at 649
[hereinafter cited as Scoles & Hay].
bills of lading and other documents of title: §1-105 states
that parties may choose "the law of a state or a nation
bearing a reasonable relation to the contract." Section 1-
adopted by every state,138 upholds party autonomy for sales,
commercial paper, letters of credit, warehouse receipts,
clauses.137
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with summarily and the choice made in the contract is given
effect. ,,140
3. France.
In 1910 the French Cour de Cassation pronounced an
unqualified recognition of party autonomy.141 This
recognition of party autonomy followed a long period of
hesitation which may have been due to the violent criticism
levelled at the theoretical plan. 142 Now the rule is
clearly established that international contracts are
140 Kozyris, Choice of Law in the American Courts in
1987: An Overview, 36 Am. J. Comp.L. 547, 560-61 (1988).
In Symeonides' words: "The cases that uphold choice of law
clauses by far outnumber the cases that disregard these
clauses. Even far more numerous, however, are the cases
where these clauses are not at all scrutinized." Symeonides,
supra note 138, at 478. See also Kramer, Rethinkina Choice
of Law, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 277, 329 (1990).
141 Casso Civ. 5 Dec. 1910, S. 1911.1.129: "The law
governing contracts, their formation, their conditions and
their effects, is the law which the parties have selected."
(own translation). H. Batiffol & P. Lagarde, Droit
International prive (6th ed. 1976), at 232 write: "C'est
seulement en 1910 que la Cour de Cassation a enonce que la
loi applicable aux contrats, soit en ce qui concerne leur
formation, soit quant a leurs effets et conditions, est celIe
que les parties ont adoptee."
142 See, ~, Mailher de Chassat, Traite des Statuts
(1841), at 54. His criticism strongly reminds of Beale's
arguments against party autonomy: "The great error in this
theory is that you rob the law of its essential purposes: to
govern all interests, to reign in sovereignty, for the common
benefit, over all individual desires. Instead, the will of
the private person has been elevated above the law; a
presumed intention has been made Master of the Law, has
swallowed the Law and all its Majesty and Authority; the
Public Interest has been rendered null and void."
145
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subject to the law upon which the parties have agreed.143
This international character indeed is a prerequisite to
party autonomy. 144 Fraudulently making a contract
international or artificially locating it somewhere to
either enjoy or evade application of a certain law can be
attacked under the doctrine of "fraude ~ la loi".145
4. The Benelux.
A decision of 1938 of the Belgian Cour de Cassation
affirmed the acceptance of the principle of party
autonomy. 146 Like the French Cour de Cassation did in its
decision of 1910, the Belgian highest court stressed the
autonomy of the parties as the prevailing principle both
for cases in which the intention had been expressed and for
143This is the rule of the proposed new version of Code
Civil Article 2213(1) (Draft Law Supplementing the French
Civil Code in Matters of Private International Law Submitted
by a Government Committee in 1967).
144 H. Batiffol & P. Lagarde, SUDra note 141, at 242-
44: "Le charactere international de relations privees
justifie un regime propre, de maniere generale plus souple,
en raison de la concurrence, que celui des relations
internes. "
Id. at 244-45.
146 Casso 24 Feb. 1938, 1938 Revue Critique de Droit
International prive 661. See Hanotiau & Fallon, Les Conflits
de Lois en Matiere d'Obliaations Contractuelles et Non
Contractuelles: Chroniaue de JurisDrudence (1965-1985), 1987
Journal des Tribunaux 97.
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those in which it had to be presumed.147 The doctrine of
Itfraudea la loi" is also recognized in Belgiwn.148
In the Netherlands, it was only after the second world
war that the acceptance by the Dutch courts of party
autonomy became clear. 149 However, since 1947 in dicta150
and since 1966, in the famous Alnati case,151 the Dutch
Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) , more decisively than many
courts, has held that the choice of law by the parties is
the decisive factor to determine the applicable law.152
In addition, the Benelux Uniform Law on Private
International Law, which never came into effect, recognizes
party autonomy. 153
147 See R. Vander Elst & M. Weser, Droit International
Priv~ BeIge et Droit Conventionnel International I (1983),
at 147-48: "C'est en France que les principes d'autonomie de
la volonte furent degages clairement avant que la
jurisprudence beIge consacre les m~mes principes. [•••] La
Cour de Cassation de Belgique a cons acre Ie rattachement
subjectif absolu, laissant au juge de fond Ie soin de
decouvrir la volonte des parties."
148Rigaux, supra note 48, at 205-206.
149 See aenerally R. Van Rooij & M. Polak, Private
International Law in the Netherlands (1987).
150Hoge Raad 12 Dec. 1947, 1948 Nederlands Juristenblad
No . 608.
151Hoge Raad 13 May 1966, 1967 Nederlands Juristenblad
No.3.
152Lando, Contracts, at 20.
153Traite Benelux port ant Loi Uniforme Relative au Droit
International Prive, signe a Bruxelles Ie 3 juillet 1969 avec
Expose des Motifs Commun (1969) (Secretariat General de
l'Union ~conomique Benelux ed.), I, Article 13. See
qenerally Meijers, The Benelux Convention on Private
International Law, 2 Am. J. Compo L. 1 (1953).
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5. West Germany. 154
German courts respected parties' choice of law already
before 1945.155 When the problem was questioned after the
second world war, the courts did not hesitate to follow the
earlier cases,156 backed by modern authors such as Wolff,
Raape and Gamillscheg. 157 It was unsolved whether the
courts will recognize a party reference if the country
referred to has no local contact with the contract.15B
Since the Federal German Act of 26 July 1986 enacted the
1980 EEC Convention, the rules of this Convention are
applicable. As a result, it has become clear that no local
contact is required. The implementation of the 1980 EEC
Convention indicates an affirmation of the concept of party
autonomy with application of special rules to employment
contracts and to consumer contracts. 159
154 See F. Kegel, Internationales Pri vatrecht (5th ed.
1985).
155 See, ~, RG 11 Dec. 1917, LZ 1918, 612; 14 Jan.
1931, IPRspr. 1931 No. 31.
156 See, ~, BGH 11 Feb. 1953, BGHZ 9, 349, IPRspr.
1952/53 No. 37; BGH 4 July 1969, BGHZ 52, 239, 241, IPRspr.
1968/69 No. 24.
157See, ~, L. Raape, Internationales privatrecht (4th
ed. 1955) and M. Wolff, Das Internationalen privatrecht
Deutchlands (1954).
15B But a search revealed that no decisions have been
rendered in which a lack of contacts induced a German court
to disregard a choice of law clause in an international
contract. See Lando, Contracts, at 23.
159 See infra ch. II.C.2.a.
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6. Other countries.
In Switzerland160 the principle is firmly established by
a 1952 case, Chevallev v. GenimDortex S.A. /61 and a 1965
case, Ades v. Internationale Filmvertriebsanstalt.162
Article 116 of the 1987 Swiss Federal Act on Private
International Law163 provides that a contract is governed by
the law which the parties have chosen. 164 It is not
required that the parties' choice is supported by a
legitimate interest or that the contract has any connection
with the chosen legal system. However, like the other
articles, Article 116 only applies to international
contracts. Special provisions apply to consumer and
emploYment contracts. 165
160 See Le Nouveau Droit International Prive Suisse
(Dessemonted ed. 1988), at 85 et seg.
161 BG 12 Feb. 1952, BGE 78 II 74.
162 BG 23 March 1965, BGE 91 II 44.
163 "La Loi Federale sur le Droit International prive"
was adopted by the Swiss parliament on 18 December 1987, it
entered into force on 1 January 1989 and is published in FF
(Feuille Federale) 1988 I 5.
164 See SYmeonides, The New Swiss Conflicts Codification:
An Introduction (with English translation), 37 Am. J. Compo
L. 187 (1989) and Samuel, The New Swiss Private International
Law Act, 37 Int'l & Compo L.Q. 681 (1988). For a comment on
the draft of this law, see McCaffrey, The Swiss Draft
Conflicts Law, 28 Am. J. Compo L. 235 (1980).
165 See Article 120 (choice of law) and Article 114
(jurisdiction) with regard to consumer contracts and Article
121 (choice of law) and Article 115 (jurisdiction) with
regard to emploYment contracts.
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In Austria, the federal law on conflict of laws of 1978
gives full effect to the parties' choice of law in
contracts containing foreign elements (§§ 1 and 35).166
Exceptions to this rule are, once more, employment
contracts and consumer contracts (§§ 41, 42 and 44).
Danish, Norwegian and Swedish courts and authors
recognize party autonomy. 167 "Thus it seems that the
freedom of the parties to choose the law is assumed and
recognized in modern Scandinavian law. ,,168
In socialist countries party autonomy is recognized as
well.169 The Soviet Union,170 Czechoslovakia, East Germany
(now Germany), Poland, Albania, Yugoslavia, Hungary,
Rumania and Bulgaria, e.g., recognize party autonomy.171
The ongoing changes in the Soviet Union and in Eastern
Europe may lead to legislative changes but no negative
166 Austrian Bundesgesetz vom 15 juni 1978 iiber das
International privatrecht (IPR-Gesetz), BGBl. 1978 No. 304.
See Beitzke, Neues ~sterreichisches Kollisionsrecht, 43
RabelsZ 245 (1979).
167Lando, General Principles, at 279-80.
168Lando, Contracts, at 29.
169 "Formulee d 'une fac;on ou de 1 'autre, [la loi
d'autonomie] se retrouve, a l'heure actuelle, dans presque
tous les syst~mes juridiques nationaux ••• aussi bien dans
la plupart des syst~mes juridiques de pays a economie de
marc he que ••• de pays a economie planifiee." Giuliano,
supra note 51, at 199.
170 See M. Boguslavskii, Private International Law: The
Soviet Approach (1988).
171Lando, General Principles, at 281-83.
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impact is expected on party autonomy, as it is an aspect of
contractual freedom. In China also, "party autonomy is the
basic principle of the contractual system of ••• private
international law. ,,172
Party autonomy is further accepted by most of the
countries of the Spanish and Portuguese speaking world, by
Italy, Greece and Turkey. 173 It is also accepted by
Australia, South Africa and by the new African states,
either French or English speaking .174 In Asia party
autonomy is supported among others in India,175 Israel,
Japan, Thailand and Taiwan.176
E. The limits of party autonomy.
This subchapter summarizes all grounds on which choice
of law provisions can be disregarded. This overview gives
a general idea of the restrictions to party autonomy. This
is helpful since these restrictions are the very means to
protect consumers against oppressive choice of law clauses.
172 Guojian, Contract in Chinese Private International
Law, 38 Int'l & Compo L.Q. 648, 649 (1989). See also Fang,
The Emb~o of China's Private International Law, 23
Willamette L. Rev. 737 (1987).
173Lando, General Principles, at 283. Limitations are
nevertheless found in the statutes of various Latin. American
countries, notably in Chile and Mexico. See S. Baytich & J.
Siqueiros, Conflict of Laws: Mexico and the United States.
A Bilateral Study (1968) and Val1adao, Le Droit International
prive des Etats Americains, 81 Rec. des Cours 40 (1952).
174 Giuliano, supra note 51, at 203.
175 See Rama Rao, Conflict of Laws in India, 23 RabelsZ
259 (1958).
176 Lando, Contracts, at 32.
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With regard to the basis of a choice of law clause's
invalidity, a distinction can be drawn between the law
governing the choice of law clause itself and the law
applicable to the contract according to the clause.
1. Law governing the choice of law clause .177
The validity of the choice of law clause is determined
by the proper law of the contract and not by the law of the
forum of any other law. It is, e.g., for the proper law to
decide whether an incorporation clause in a standard form
contract is an onerous term which should be disregarded in
order to protect the weaker party, or whether in view of
the commercial character of the contract it should be
upheld.
2. Grounds to limit party autonomy.
Before focusing on the exceptions to party autonomy, it
is important to stress the distinction between the
construction and the validity of a contract.178 None of the
limitations make sense when applied solely to a question of
construction. If a choice of law clause can realistically
be viewed as a shorthand statement of what the parties were
free to spell out at length, then the agreement can
177 Lando, General PrinciDles, at 305.
178 A distinction has to be made, in other words, between
matters the parties could have resolved by an explicit
provision in their contract (suppletive matters) and matters
which the parties could not have resolved by an explicit
provision in their contract (mandatory matters). This
distinction is recognized by Restatement (Second) §187 and
by Article 3 (3) of the 1980 EEC Convention on the Law
Applicable to Contractual Obligations.
180
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incorporate by reference any jurisdiction's rule of
construction. 179 No other jurisdiction can have a contrary
policy. This distinction is essential and should be borne
in mind throughout the discussion.
a. Procedural questions.
Procedural questions are universally governed by the
lex fori.180 The parties cannot choose the law that will
apply to the court's procedure. The problem with this
limitation is the determination whether a matter is
procedural or not.
b. International transaction.
It seems to be widely accepted that the freedom of the
parties to make a party reference must be restricted to
international and interstate contracts. 181 The problem
however is how to define an international contract.182
Where the parties have their place of business in different
states, and goods, services and/or paYment have to cross
borders for the performance of the contract, there seems to
179 Weintraub, Functional Developments, at 271-72.
Scoles & Hay, at 58-59.
181 See, ~, Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws
§187 and Article 3(3) of the 1980 EEC Convention. See also
Friedler, Party Autonomv, at 474, n. 12.
182 Each forum decides which criteria it will use to
determine whether a contract has an international character.
See generally, Delaume, What is an International Contract?
An American and a Gallic Dilemma, 28 Int'l & Compo L.Q. 258
(1979) and Lando, Contracts, at 34-35.
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be agreement that the contract is international.183 But
when one of these two elements is absent, the answer is not
clear. 184 That is the reason why the 1980 EEC Convention
and the 1985 Hague Sales Convention185 give up the
requirement of an international contract. 186
The rationale to grant this freedom exclusively in
international contracts lies in the rationale of party
autonomy itself. A choice of law provision is a means to
avoid uncertainty as to which law will govern the contract.
In contracts of a purely internal character this
uncertainty is not present and it would therefore be
unlogical to grant party autonomy. 187
c. Local contact with the intended legal system.
A private international law system will often require
at least some relationship between the chosen law and the
parties or the transaction.188 If there is no physical
183 Lando, General Principles, at 286.
184 d1-:.
185 See infra ch. II. D.
186 Article 1(1) of the 1980 EEC Convention declares that
it applies to any situation "involving a choice between the
laws of different countries." Article l(b) of the 1985 Hague
Sales Convention makes it applicable to contracts for the
sale of goods in "cases involving a choice of law between the
laws of different states, unless such a choice arises solely
from a stipulation by the parties as to the applicable law."
187 Sauveplanne, Consumer Protection, at 101.
188 See, ~, Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws
§187 and UCC §1-105 which require a "substantial" or a
"reasonable" relationship. This requirement was originally
developed as the qualification on an exception (i.e. party
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contact, it is at least expected that the parties have a
reasonable basis for their choice. 189 A physical contact is
not an absolute requirement as long as the choice is made
bona fide, i.e., without an evasive intent.190 A remarkable
exception to this rule is the 1980 EEC Convention which
does not require a link between the contract and the law
selected, nor is there any formal requirement that the
choice be bona fide or legal.191
Closely related to the cases demanding a substantial
contractual connection with the stipulated law are the
cases in which the courts refuse to recognize any binding
force in the stipulation of foreign law, but consider the
stipulation as evidence helping them to locate the center
of gravity. 192
autonomy). "Today, the exception has become the rule but the
qualification has remained." Gruson, Governina Law Clauses
in Commercial Agreements: New York's Ap~roach, 18 Colum. J.
Transnat'l L. 323, 351 (1980).
189 Reese, Contracts and the Restatement of Conflict of
Laws. Second, 9 Int'l & Compo L.Q. 531,532-33 (1960). Reese
argues that lawyers' familiarity with the chosen law may be
enough to support a governing law clause where the other
legal systems with substantial contacts are relatively
immature.
190 See Vita Food Products, Inc. V. Unus Shipping Co.,
Ltd., (1939) A.C. 277 (P.C.) in England, Casso Civ., 5
December 1910, S. 1911.1.129 and Casso Civ. 19 February 1930
and 27 January 1931, S. 1933.1.41 in France and Ades V.
Internationale Filmvertriebanstalt, BG, 23 March 1965, BGE,
91 II 44 in Switzerland.
191 Lagarde, An Apologia, 22 Va. J. Int'l L. 91, 95-96
(1981) •
192 See Note, supra note 126. In France, this approach
is supported by Professor H. Batiffol.
54
d. Public policy. 193
All countries require obedience to the fundamental
public policy ("ordre public") of the forum. In several
continental countries the public policy has a dual
aspect. 194 Negatively, foreign law contrary to the ethical
or political bases of the forum country is denied effect.
Positively, a statute of the forum which regulates the
subject matter must be applied irrespective of whether
foreign law is otherwise applicable.
Both functions of public policy have been relied on to
safeguard the application of protective legislation of the
forum, especially when the contract is sufficiently
connected with the country of the forum.195 The doctrine of
public policy does not, however, render the protective
legislation of foreign countries applicable; it is a
193 See aenerally Cor, Modern Choice of Law and Public
Policy: The Emperor Has the Same Old Clothes, 39 U. Miami L.
Rev. 647 (1985); Prebble, Choice of Law to Determine the
Validitv and Effect of Contracts: A Comparison of American
and Enalish Ap~roaches to the Conflict of Laws, I, 58 Cornell
L. Rev. 433, 509-17 (1973) and Paulsen & Sovern, "Public
Policy" in the Conflict of Laws, 56 Colum. L. Rev. 968
(1956).
194 Lando, General Principles, at 295.
195 Id. at 296.
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national remedy and that is one of its weaknesses.196 This
could be cured in two ways.
First, as §187(2)(b) of the Restatement (Second)
provides, courts should abide by certain mandatory
provisions of the law which would have been the governing
law in the absence of a choice of law by the parties.197
Secondly, as provided in Article 7(1) of the 1980 EEC
Convention, effect can be given to the mandatory rules of a
law which is not the proper law of the contract provided
that the situation has a close connection with the enacting
country and provided that under the law of that country
those rules must be applied whatever the law applicable to
the contract. 198
196 Another danger is that a frequent application of
local public policy will encourage forum shopping and
endanger predictability and uniformity of decision. It is
therefore suggested with good reason that the principle of
public policy should be applied cautiously. According to
Johnston the difficulty, however, is that "while permitting
an exception to the doctrine where there are infringements
of the forum's public policy, it invites perpetuation of the
courts' present sporadic application of the doctrine [of
party autonomy] at all." A restrained use of the concept
imposes itself. Johnston, supra note 48, at 38.
197 Al though the law which would be applicable if the
parties had not made a choice is not to be treated as the
proper law of the contract, the rules expressing fundamental
policies of that legal system should be observed.
198 See infra ch. II.C .1.a.ii •
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e. Choice of two or more laws. 199
In the United States, the power of the parties to
choose to have different issues in their contract governed
by different laws follows from the fact that questions of
choice of law depend upon the particular issue and may vary
from issue to issue. 200 This power is well recognized in
Europe. 201
f. Defenses against an unfettered freedom.
A liberal rule accepting the choice of any legal system
has made a "triumphal progress and experience seems to show
that in commercial contracts made between parties of equal
bargaining power this rule is to be preferred in most
cases. ,,202 Such an unrestricted freedom may be a dangerous
weapon in the hands of a powerful enterprise dealing with a
weak party. Therefore, several restrictive measures have
been taken, aside from the exceptions described so far.
These include economic legislation,203 special choice of law
rules for instances of inequality of bargaining power, and
199 See aenerallvLagarde, Le D~De~aae dans Ie Droit
International Priv~ .des Contrats, 11 Revista de Diritto
Internazionale Private e processuale 649 (1975) and Reese,
DeDe~age: A Common Phenomenon in Choice of Law, 73 Colum. L.
Rev. 58 (1973).
200 See Restatement (Second) §187, 1986 revision,
Reporter's Note on Comment i.
201 . I 3 f h 980See, ~, Art1C e 0 t e 1 EEC Convention.
202 Lando, General PrinciDles, at 293.
203 For instance, laws against restrictive trade
practices, price legislation, exchange control legislation
and other measures which regulate the state economy.
57
for adhesion contracts204 and legislative measures
regulating the choice of law. 205
204 See generally Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts in the
Conflict of Laws, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 1072 (1953).
205 During the last decades, several countries have
enacted statutes against unfair or unconscionabie contract
terms. See,~, United States UCC§2-302, West German
Standard Contract Law of 1976, French Decree of 24 March
1978, British Unfair Contract Terms Act of 1977, Austrian
Consumer Protection Act of 1979 and the Swedish Acts on
Contract Clauses in Consumer Relationships of 1971 and on
Contract Clauses in Business Relationships of 1984. See
infra ch. II.C.2.
II. CHOICE OF LAW CLAUSES IN INTERNATIONAL CONSUMER
CONTRACTS.
A. Theorv. 206
In the introduction it was argued that the function of
private international law reaches beyond the blind or
mechanical designation of the applicable law. Instead, a
private international law system has to take the underlying
policies into account of the laws that are in competition
for application. A choice between different laws does not
occur in a vacuum and "today's private international law is
not a purely intellectual legal exercise, but it forms part
of the living law and it fulfills its social function in
close connection with other branches of the law. ,,207 If
consumer protection is a fostered policy, private
international law should be a means to serve this policy.
A choice of law system can provide either of two
extremes of protection and every nuance in between, the
extremes being an absolute freedom to choose the applicable
law or a system that will apply the most protective law.
Which system is adopted depends on the extent to which a
legal system wants to protect consumers.
206 ~ Appendix 2.
207 Sauveplanne, Consumer Protection, at 103.
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Since party autonomy forms the basis of an eventual
oppression of the consumer, all protective devices will
consist in a restriction of this freedom. 208 A first
possibility therefore is the complete exclusion of party
autonomy. 209 Parties would never be allowed to choose the
applicable law in a consumer contract and the otherwise
applicable law would always apply. 210 Since party autonomy
does not make sense any longer when it leads to the
oppression of the weak by the stronger, such a far reaching
limitation could be justified.211 The problem is that party
autonomy, being such a deeply rooted basic doctrine of
conflicts law, should not be put aside arbitrarily.
Besides, it is possible that the law chosen is more
208 pocar, Weak Party, at 352 contends: "Or, c'est bien
cette liberte qui permet au plus fort de profiter de sa
position au detriment du faible de sorte que 1 'exercise d'une
liberte pour l'une des parties devient en fait l'acceptation
d'une imposition pour l'autre."
209 See, ~, Article 120 of the Swiss Law of Private
International Law which provides for consumer contracts:
"l'election d'un droit est exclue."
210 Sauveplanne, Consumer Protection, at 104 states that
accordingly, "as far as the legal regime is concerned,
international consumer contracts are assimilated to domestic
ones. As a matter of fact in the eyes of the consumer it
does not make a noticeable difference whether he enters into
an internal or an international contract. The average
consumer will be hardly conscious of a possible difference
when he accepts an offer that reaches him from abroad,
especially when such an offer, as usually, reaches him in his
own language and through the same channels as internal
offers. "
211 In Neuhaus' words: "Die Parteiautonomie verliert
ihren Sinn wenn sie zur Herrschaft des Starkeren fiber den
Schwachen wird." P. Neuhaus, Die Grundbegriffe des
Internationalen Privatrechts (2d ed. 1976), at 257.
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protective than the otherwise applicable law. There is, in
other words, no incentive to deny party autonomy if the
choice of law does not reflect an abuse of bargaining power
by the stronger party. 212
SecondlY, it is possible to restrict party autonomy in
relation to the law chosen by the parties. Such a guided
choice would only respect the choice of a law under certain
conditions. This is no guarantee for adequate protection
per se because it is possible that the laws to which the
choice is limited are less protective than the law of
another jurisdiction with which the contract also has
objective links. The value of a guided choice will largely
depend on the conditions imposed on the free choice of
law.213
A third way to protect consumer interests is to
regulate the relationship between the chosen law and the
otherwise applicable law. A free choice can be outlawed
when the chosen law violates mandatory rules of the
otherwise applicable law. This implies that the consumer
is protected to the extent the otherwise applicable law
protects him. Anyway, apart from restrictions on party
212 The law of the seller can be more protective than
that of the buyer. A Swedish company can, for reasons of
uniformity in the course of its business, include a standard
clause providing that Swedish will govern. When this company
contracts with an Italian consumer, this consumer will
benefit from this choice since the Swedish law is more





autonomy, the achievement of effective consumer protection
also depends on the determination of the law applicable in
the absence of a choice. 214
It is useless to limit the free choice if the
alternatively applicable law does not provide any
protection. The factors determining the otherwise
applicable law can only grant protection to a certain
extent. The place of contracting, e.g., which modern
approaches do not regard any longer as solely
determinative, is often fortuitous and can, moreover, be
manipulated by the strong party to escape consumer
protective laws. Secondly, the place of performance can
be located as well in a state where less protection is
afforded. A further complication with this criterion is
that it can be unclear which obligation's performance
determines the place of performance of the entire contract
since contracts usually comprise mutual obligations.
To solve this problem, the concept of "characteristic
performance" was developed. This concept, though, is
detrimental to consumer interests since the consumer's
obligation, usually the payment of money, is seldom the
characteristic performance.215 The law of the stronger
See Id.
215 To prevent the splitting up of contracts and their
subsequent submission to different laws, it was contended
that although it is true that a contract consists of various
obligations, only one of them really characterizes the
contract. It goes without saying that the obligation to pay
hardly ever will characterize a ccntract, i.e., will
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party's jurisdiction will consequently prevail, which is in
clear contradiction with the search for consumer
protection. 216
A fourth protective device resolves this problem and
consists in linking the contract with the legal sphere of
the consumer. Instead of applying the law of the place of
characteristic performance, it seems more protective to
apply the law of the consumer's legal environment, i.e.,
the law of his domicile or habitual residence.217
Application of this law guarantees the protection the
distinguish it from others. In most cases the other
obligation will characterize the contract. This results in
the contract being governed by the law of the natural
economic and social environment where the contract it to
operate. See Lipstein, Characteristic Performance: A New
Concept in the Conflict of Laws in Matters of Contract for
the EEC, 3 Nw. J. of Int'l L. & Bus. 402 (1981).
216 The situation is better in the case of employment
contracts. Here, the obligation to carry out work is the
characteristic performance, which is the weaker party's
obligation. But generally "the theory [of characteristic
performance] reveals itself as a functional and loyal
handmaiden of capitalistic society in which the weaker party,
consumers, employees, those needing insurance, those seeking
specialized help, etc., gets the wrong end of the stick."
D'Oliveira, Characteristic Obliaation in the Draft EEC
Obligations Convention, 26 Am. J. Compo L. 313, 327 (1977).
Emphasizing the need for consumer protection, the draft EEC
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations
was changed in this regard. The Swiss project Law of Private
International Law underwent a similar change with respect to
consumer contracts and employment contracts. Pocar, Weak
partv, at 390.
217 See Keller's proposal not to limi t the parties
freedom to choose the applicable law, but to give the
consumer the right always to invoke the protective provisions
of the law of his habitual residence. M. Keller, Schutz des
Schwacheren im Internationalen Vertraasrecht, in Festschrift
Vischer (Zurich 1983), at 185-86.
be a minimum standard: if the consumer lives in a country
Finallv, it would be useful, as indicated above, to
allow a free choice only when this favors the consumer. It
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This protection will usually
220 See, ~, §187(2)(b) of the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws and Article 7 of the 1980 EEC Convention.
Under the former provision, a fundamental policy of the
otherwise applicable law can be invoked and under the latter,
immediately applicable rules of the lex causae or other laws
can be invoked. Not every mandatory rule should be
considered to be immediately applicable however. "Bien que
l'existence de r~gles d' application immediate ne soi t pas
exclue dans notre domaine [protection de la partie faible],
il faut ••. resister A la tentation d'en trouver partout et
d'augmenter l'intervention de l'etat dans Ie domaine priveau moyen de r~gles rigides au-delA des limites que les r~gles
mAmes indiquent." Pocar, Weak Party, at 380.
may be asked whether this favor test should not be applied
218 Whether this law provides better protection because
the consumer is more familiar with it is doubtful for the
consumer's familiarity with his own law is often fictitious.
219 See supra note 212.
allow that the public policy of other jurisdictions be
taken into account also. 220
fori, so that it can be invoked. But modern approaches
protection has to be a fundamental principle of the lex
order to function as a protective mechanism, consumer
with little protection and the supplier lives in a country
with high protection, the consumer would be better off with
the application of the law of the supplier.219
Fifth, public policy is an ordinary principle of
private international law to adjust the normal functioning
of the system used to indicate the applicable law. In
consumer expects to get. 218
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in a general way and should also be used to designate the
applicable law in the absence of choice. This means that
the law would be applied which is most favorable to the
consumer. Such a proposal, however, meets with serious
objections. First of all, it may be difficult, if not
impossible, to choose from several laws the most favorable
one.221 This problem could be solved by applying the most
favorable law to each particular issue involved.222
But above all such a rule would disturb the balance
between the parties, just as this is done by a neutral rule
which does not give any consideration to the need for
consumer protection. A rule of the latter kind creates the
danger of disturbing the balance to the consumer's
prejudice, a rule aimed at giving the consumer the maximum
of protection would create the danger of disturbing the
balance to the detriment of the supplier.223 The purpose of
consumer protection is not to make the weak party in all
respects the strong party but to arm him against the strong
221 Sauveplanne, Consumer Protection, at 105. It may be
that the law of the consumer allows the parties to make
certain stipulations which are forbidden by the law of the
supplier, but with regard to other stipulations the opposite
may be the case. Then with regard to some stipulations the
law of the consumer, but with regard to other stipulations
the law of the supplier would be the more favorable one, and
the choice between the two would raise a more precarious
issue. See Kisch, "La Loi la Plus Favorable", in Ius et Lex,
Festschrift Gutzwiller (1959), at 373 et seg.
222 In Sweden, this approach is championed by Professor
M. Bogdan.
223 Sauveplanne, Consumer Protection, at 105-106.
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party's preponderance and to maintain the balance between
the two. 224 The idea that men of full age and competent
understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting
can only be maintained when parties are on the same socio-
economic level.225
Two conclusions can be drawn from this overview.
First, choice of law clauses in consumer contracts cannot
be discussed without looking at the law applicable in the
absence of a choice of law provision. Secondly, the degree
of protection choice of law can provide varies widely. The
particular degree granted by a private international system
depends on the value attributed to consumer protection in
that specific legal order. There is no absolute argument
to defend the choice of the most favorable law or the
application of another forum's public policy. This may be
done to balance the standard of consumer protection with
that of a more advanced country in this field but there is
no compelling argument to do so. A minimum standard,
however, should be that the consumer cannot be deprived of
the protection that mandatory provisions of the normally
applicable law afford him. 226
224 P. Malaurie, La Protection du Consommateur en Droit
International Prive, in Travaux de l'Association Henri
Capitant 23 (1973), at 389 et seq.
225 Pocar, Weak partv, at 352 and Lando, General
Principles, at 294.
226 Protection beyond this point, is a pure matter of
policy to be decided by each state. In the words of
Kropholler, the residuary law furnishes a "Mindeststandard".
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Finally, the effectiveness of consumer protection under
private international law depends also on the treatment of
choice of forum clauses and on the rules of jurisdiction in
general. 227
B. Consumer contracts in American conflict of laws.
In the United States, choice of law rules belong to the
field of state law.228 However, all States have adopted one
of a few main choice of law methods.229 The United States
remains, nevertheless, a colorful patchwork of different
approaches to choice of law. The Supreme Court has not yet
tried to exercise a unifying function in this area. The
Highest Court has given the states an almost unrestricted
freedom to adopt a choice of law system. The leading case
Kropholler, Das Kollisionsrechtliche System des Schutzes des
Schwacheren VertraasDartei, 42 RabelsZ 634,656 (1978). See
also Keller, SUDra note 217, at 185-86.
227 For a clear explanation of this problem, see Pingel,
La Protection de la Partie Faible en Droit International
Prive (du Salarie au Consommateur), 1986 Droit Social 133 and
Pocar, Weak Party, at 398-99.
228 Kozyris, supra note 140, at 547.
229 For an account of the choice of law methods currently
adopted by the different American states, ~ Appendix 2.
For a basic explanation of the main choice of law methods,
see Smith, Choice of Law in the United States, 38 Hastings
L. Rev. 1041 (1987 )•
206 see Appendix 2.
207 Sauveplanne, Consumer Protection, at 103.
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Since party autonomy forms the basis of an eventual
oppression of the consumer, all protective devices will
consist in a restriction of this freedom.208 A first
possibility therefore is the complete exclusion of party
autonomy. 209 Parties would never be allowed to choose the
applicable law in a consumer contract and the otherwise
applicable law would always apply. 210 Since party autonomy
does not make sense any longer when it leads to the
oppression of the weak by the stronger, such a far reaching
limitation could be justified.211 The problem is that party
autonomy, being such a deeply rooted basic doctrine of
conflicts law, should not be put aside arbitrarily.
Besides, it is possible that the law chosen is more
208 Pocar, Weak Party, at 352 contends: "Or, c'est bien
cette libert~ qui permet au plus fort de profiter de sa
position au d~triment du faible de sorte que 1 'exercise d'une
libert~ pour l'une des parties devient en fait l'acceptation
d'une imposition pour 1 'autre. "
209 See, ~, Article 120 of the Swiss Law of Private
International Law which provides for consumer contracts:
"1'~1~ction d'un droit est exclue."
210 Sauveplanne, Consumer Protection, at 104 states that
accordingly, "as far as the legal regime is concerned,
international consumer contracts are assimilated to domestic
ones. As a matter of fact in the eyes of the consumer it
does not make a noticeable difference whether he enters into
an internal or an international contract. The average
consumer will be hardly conscious of a possible difference
when he accepts an offer that reaches him from abroad,
especially when such an offer, as usually, reaches him in his
Own language and through the same channels as internal
offers."
211 In Neuhaus' words: "Die Parteiautonomie verliert
ihren Sinn wenn siezur Herrschaft des Starkeren iiber den
Schwachen wird." P. Neuhaus, Die Grundbegriffe des
Internationalen Privatrechts (2d ed. 1976), at 257.
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protective than the otherwise applicable law. There is, in
other words, no incentive to deny party autonomy if the
choice of law does not reflect an abuse of bargaining power
by the stronger party. 212
Secondly, it is possible to restrict party autonomy in
relation to the law chosen by the parties. Such a guided
choice would only respect the choice of a law under certain
conditions. This is no guarantee for adequate protection
per se because it is possible that the laws to which the
choice is limited are less protective than the law of
another jurisdiction with which the contract also has
objective links. The value of a guided choice will largely
depend on the conditions imposed on the free choice of
law.213
A third way to protect consumer interests is to
regulate the relationship between the chosen law and the
otherwise applicable law. A free choice can be outlawed
when the chosen law violates mandatory rules of the
otherwise applicable law. This implies that the consumer
is protected to the extent the otherwise applicable law
protects him. Anyway, apart from restrictions on party
212 The law of the seller can be more protective than
that of the buyer. A Swedish company can, for reasons of
uniformity in the course of its business, include a standard
clause providing that Swedish will govern. When this company
contracts with an Italian consumer, this consumer will
benefit from this choice since the Swedish law is more




autonomy, the achievement of effective consumer protection
also depends on the determination of the law applicable in
the absence of a choice. 214
It is useless to limit the free choice if the
alternatively applicable law does not provide any
protection. The factors determining the otherwise
applicable law can only grant protection to a certain
extent. The place of contracting, e.g., which modern
approaches do not regard any longer as solely
determinative, is often fortuitous and can, moreover, be
manipulated by the strong party to escape consumer
protective laws. Secondly, the place of performance can
be located as well in a state where less protection is
afforded. A further complication with this criterion is
that it can be unclear which obligation's performance
determines the place of performance of the entire contract
since contracts usually comprise mutual obligations.
To solve this problem, the concept of "characteristic
performance" was developed. This concept, though, is
"detrimental to consumer interests since the consumer's
obligation, usually the payment of money, is seldom the
characteristic performance.215 The law of the stronger
214 See Id.
215 To prevent the splitting up of contracts and their
subsequent submission to different laws, it was contended
that although it is true that a contract consists of various
obligations, only one of them really characterizes the
contract. It goes without saying that the obligation to pay
hardly ever will characterize a contract, i.e., will
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party's jurisdiction will consequently prevail, which is in
clear contradiction with the search for consumer
protection. 216
A fourth protective device resolves this problem and
consists in linking the contract with the legal sphere of
the consumer. Instead of applying the law of the place of
characteristic performance, it seems more protective to
apply the law of the consumer's legal environment, i.e.,
the law of his domicile or habitual residence.217
Application of this law guarantees the protection the
distinguish it from others. In most cases the other
obligation will characterize the contract. This results in
the contract being governed by the law of the natural
economic and social environment where the contract it to
operate. See Lipstein, Characteristic Performance: A New
Concept in the Conflict of Laws in Matters of Contract for
the EEC, 3 Nw. J. of Int'l L. & Bus. 402 (1981).
216 The situation is better in the case of employment
contracts. Here, the obligation to carry out work is the
characteristic performance, which is the weaker party's
obligation. But generally "the theory [of characteristic
performance] reveals itself as a functional and loyal
handmaiden of capitalistic society in which the weaker party,
consumers, employees, those needing insurance, those seeking
specialized help, etc., gets the wrong end of the stick."
D'Oliveira, Characteristic Obliaation in the Draft EEC
Obligations Convention, 26 Am. J. Compo L. 313, 327 (1977).
Emphasizing the need for consumer protection, the draft EEC
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations
was changed in this regard. The Swiss project Law of Private
International Law underwent a similar change with respect to
consumer contracts and employment contracts. Pocar, Weak
Party, at 390.
217 See Keller's proposal not to limit the parties
freedom to choose the applicable law, but to give the
consumer the right always to invoke the protective provisions
of the law of his habitual residence. M. Keller, Schutz des
Schw~cheren im Internationalen Vertraasrecht, in Festschrift
Vischer (ZUrich 1983), at 185-86.
be a min~um standard: if the consumer lives in a country
may be asked whether this favor test should not be applied
order to function as a protective mechanism, consumer
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This protection will usually
218 Whether this law provides better protection because
the consumer is more familiar with it is doubtful for the
consumer's familiarity with his own law is often fictitious.
219 See supra note 212.
Finally, it would be useful, as indicated above, to
allow a free choice only when this favors the consumer. It
allow that the public policy of other jurisdictions be
taken into account also. 220
220 See, ~, §187(2) (b) of the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws and Article 7 of the 1980 EEC Convention.
Under the former provision, a fundamental policy of the
otherwise applicable law can be invoked and under the latter,
immediately applicable rules of the lex causae or other laws
can be invoked. Not every mandatory rule should be
considered to be immediately applicable however. "Bien que
l'existence de regles d'application imm~diate ne soit pas
exclue dans notre domaine [protection de la partie faible],
il faut .•• r~sister A la tentation d'en trouver part out et
d'augmenter l'intervention de l'~tat dans le domaine priv~
au moyen de regles rigides au-delA des limites que les regles
m~mes indiquent." Pocar, Weak Partv, at 380.
protection has to be a fundamental principle of the lex
fori, so that it can be invoked. But modern approaches
with little protection and the supplier lives in a country
with high protection, the consumer would be better off with
the application of the law of the supplier. 219
Fifth, public policy is an ordinary principle of
private international law to adjust the normal functioning
of the system used to indicate the applicable law. In
consumer expects to get. 218
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in a general way and should also be used to designate the
applicable law in the absence of choice. This means that
the law would be applied which is most favorable to the
consumer. Such a proposal, however, meets with serious
objections. First of all, it may be difficult, if not
impossible, to choose from several laws the most favorable
one.221 This problem could be solved by applying the most
favorable law to each particular issue involved.222
But above all such a rule would disturb the balance
between the parties, just as this is done by a neutral rule
which does not give any consideration to the need for
consumer protection. A rule of the latter kind creates the
danger of disturbing the balance to the consumer's
prejudice, a rule aimed at giving the consumer the maximum
of protection would create the danger of disturbing the
balance to the detriment of the supplier.223 The purpose of
consumer protection is not to make the weak party in all
respects the strong party but to arm him against the strong
221 Sauveplanne, Consumer Protection, at 105. It may be
that the law of the consumer allows the parties to make
certain stipulations which are forbidden by the law of the
supplier, but with regard to other stipulations the opposite
may be the case. Then with regard to some stipulations the
law of the consumer, but with regard to other stipulations
the law of the supplier would be the more favorable one, and
the choice between the two would raise a more precarious
issue. See Kisch, "La Loi la Plus Favorable", in Ius et Lex,
Festschrift Gutzwiller (1959), at 373 et seg.
222 In Sweden, this approach is championed by Professor
M. Bogdan.
223 Sauveplanne, Consumer Protection, at 105-106.
65
party's preponderance and to maintain the balance between
the two. 224 The idea that men of full age and competent
understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting
can only be maintained when parties are on the same socio-
economic level.225
Two conclusions can be drawn from this overview.
First, choice of law clauses in consumer contracts cannot
be discussed without looking at the law applicable in the
absence of a choice of law provision. Secondly, the degree
of protection choice of law can provide varies widely. The
particular degree granted by a private international system
depends on the value attributed to consumer protection in
that specific legal order. There is no absolute argument
to defend the choice of the most favorable law or the
application of another forum's public policy. This may be
done to balance the standard of consumer protection with
that of a more advanced country in this field but there is
no compelling argument to do so. A minimum standard,
however, should be that the consumer cannot be deprived of
the protection that mandatory provisions of the normally
applicable law afford him. 226
224 P. Malaurie, La Protection du Consommateur en Droit
International Priv~, in Travaux de l'Association Henri
Capitant 23 (1973), at 389 et seq.
225 Pocar, Weak Partv, at 352 and Lando, General
Princi~les, at 294.
226 Protection beyond this point, is a pure matter of
policy to be decided by each state. In the words of
Kropholler, the residuary law furnishes a "Mindeststandard "•
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Finally, the effectiveness of consumer protection under
private international law depends also on the treatment of
choice of forum clauses and on the rules of jurisdiction in
general. 227
B. Consumer contracts in American conflict of laws.
In the United States, choice of law rules belong to the
field of state law.228 However, all States have adopted one
of a few main choice of law methods.229 The United States
remains, nevertheless, a colorful patchwork of different
approaches to choice of law. The Supreme Court has not yet
tried to exercise a unifying function in this area. The
Highest Court has given the states an almost unrestricted
freedom to adopt a choice of law system. The leading case
in this respect is Home Insurance v. Dick230 in which the
Supreme Court announced that a state's choice of law method
would be subjected to a constitutional due process test,
the only standard to be met being a requirement of minimum
Kropholler, Das Kollisionsrechtliche System des Schutzes des
Schwacheren VertraQspartei, 42 RabelsZ 634,656 (1978). See
also Keller, suora note 217, at 185-86.
227 For a clear explanation of this problem, see Pingel,
La Protection de la Partie Faible en Droit International
Priv~ (du Salari~ au Consommateur), 1986 Droit Social 133 and
Pocar, Weak Party, at 398-99.
228 Kozyris, suora note 140, at 547.
229 For an account of the choice of law methods currently
adopted by the different American states, see Appendix 2.
For a basic explanation of the main choice of law methods,
see Smith, Choice of Law in the United States, 38 Hastings
L. Rev. 1041 (1987).








233 This Convention was signed in Vienna, and has entered
into force as to the United States on 1 January 1988 after
the ratification instrument was deposited with the U.N.
headquarters on 11 December 1986.
234 Article 2(a).
No convention is in force in the United States that
to have known that the goods were bought for any such
use. ,,234 The Convention will only apply to consumer sales
in the event the seller was unaware that the sale was a
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods233 expressly excludes
application to "sales of goods bought for personal, family
or household use, unless the seller, at any time before or
at the conclusion of the contract, neither knew nor ought
influences the treatment of choice of law provisions in
contracts are examined.
discussed, uniform choice of law rules concerning consumer
significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts,
creating state interests, such that choice of its law is
neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair. ,,232
Before the approach in some particular states is
clarified the criterion that a state must have "a
contact. In Allstate v. Haaue, 231 the Supreme Court
68
consumer sale. The sale remains a consumer contract, but
the rules for commercial sale contracts will apply to it.235
In 1986 the United States became member of the Hague
Conference on Private International Law. This Conference
has produced a Convention on choice of law rules for
consumer sales. This Convention will be discussed below.236
However, the United States has not formally adhered to this
Convention so that its importance, if any at all, lies
exclusively in its moral force.
b. Federal statutes.
Very few federal statutory provisions deal with choice
of law issues for consumer contracts.237 For usury and
insurance, these statutes, if any, are enacted on the state
level.238 The two most important federal statutes
containing consumer law are the Consumer Credit Act and the
Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act.239 However, the
235 Party autonomy is allowed under the Convention's
dominant theme of contractual freedom. A. Kritzer,
International Contract Manual: Guide to Practical
Applications of the United Nations Convention on Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods (1989), at 9, 114. No
special choice of law rules are provided since the uniform
rules of the Convention render choice of law rulessuperfluous.
236 See infra ch. 11.0.
237 See aenerally D. Pridgen, Consumer Protection and the
Law (looseleaf) and H. Alperin & R. Chase, Consumer Law:
Sales Practices and Credit Regulation (1986).
238 For usury, ~ infra notes 327-28 and accompanying
text; for insurance, ~ R. Jerry, Understanding Insurance
Law (1987) §36, at 173-75.




"governing law" provisions of these statutes answer the
question whether state or federal law applies, not whether
choice of law is allowed. 240
c. The Uniform Commercial Code. 241
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws aims at the uniformity of state laws through
uniform codes. In the area of conflict of laws, uniform
rules are very important for they result in conflict
avoidance. An important achievement of the Conference,
therefore, is the adoption of the UCC by all states and
other subdivisions of the United States.242
240 See 15 U.S.C.A. §1601 and 15 U.S.C.A.
(Consumer Credit Act) and see 15 U.S.C.A. §262
Deceptive Trade Practices Act).
241 For the full text of the relevant Code sections, see
Appendix 3. TheUCC is reprinted in Commercial and Debtor-
Creditor Law, Selected Statutes (D. Baird, T. Eisenberg & T.
Jackson ed. 1984). For cases on the various articles of thencc, see UCC Case Digest and UCC Rep. Servo (Callaghan).
242 See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
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The UCC contains an important choice of law provision
in §1_105.243 This section is useful because conflicts
between the laws of states that have adopted the Code
continue to occur since "several states have enacted
variant amendments to some sections of the Code, and the
courts of a number of states, careless of the function of
uniformity in a uniform act, have given non uniform
interpretations to some sections of the Code. "244
Notwithstanding some provisions that are uniquely
applicable to merchants, the Code is generally applicable
to consumer contracts. The most important sections in this
respect are §2 on sales contracts245 and §9 on finance
contracts.246 These articles contain much of the
243 See Siegel, The UCC and Choice of Law: Forum Choice
or Forum Law?, 21 Am. U.L. Rev. 494 (1972)j Smith, Conflicts
and Chaos or Contract and Uniformity: The Uniform Commercial
Code, 2 Kan. L. Rev. 11 (1953); Rheinstein, Conflict of Laws
in the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 L. & Contemp. Probs. 114
(1951); Beutel, The Proposed Uniform (?) Commercial Code
Should not be Adopted, 61 Yale L.J. 334 (1952); Burton, The
U.C.C. and Conflict of Laws, 9 Am. J. Compo L. 470 (1960);
Cullen, Conflict of Laws Problems under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 48 Ky. L.J. 417 (1960); Nordstrom &
Ramerman, The Uniform Commercial Code and the Choice of Law,
1969 Duke L.J. 623 and Adams, The 1972 Official Text of the
Uniform Commercial Code: Analysis of Conflict of Laws
Provisions, 45 Miss. L.J. 281 (1974).
244 Leflar, Conflict of Laws Under the UCC, 35 Ark. L.
Rev. 87 (1981).
245 Section 2-106 (1) defines a sale as consisting of "the
passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price."
246 These are secured transactions, sales of accounts and
chattel paper.
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substantive law applicable to a major part of all consumer
contracts.
Section 1-105, a general provisions of the UCC,247
states that "when a transaction bears a reasonable relation
to [the state that has adopted the UCC] and also to another
state or nation, the parties may agree that [either law]
shall govern their rights and duties. ,,248At first sight
this article expresses a full fledged acceptance of party
autonomy. 249 There are however three limits to this freedom
which constitute simultaneously a protection of consumer
interests.
247 In re Purity Ice Cream Co., Inc., 7 UCC Rep. Serv.
2d (Callaghan) 28, 90 BR 183 (B.C.D.C. 1988).
248The second paragraph of §1-105 lists 5 areas that are
not to be governed by the rather loose provisions of the
first paragraph. These areas, for the sake of maximum
predictabili ty of results in the transactions covered by
them, are to be subject to hard-and-fast choice of law rules,
explicitly laid down. The governing law was to be that of
a designated place, so that the parties could know
beforehand, by knowing that law, what the legal consequences
of their transaction would be (§2-402: rights of creditors
against sold goods, §4-102: applicability of the article on
bank deposits and collections, §6-102: bulk transfers subject
to the article on bulk transfers, §8-106: applicability of
the article on investment securities and §9-103: perfection
provisions of the article on secured transactions). See
Leflar, supra note 244, at 103-10.
249Although Leflar, referring to Standard Leasing Corp.
v. Schmidt Aviation, Inc., 264 Ark. 851, 576 S.W.2d 181
(1919), writes that it must be admitted that "choice of law
contract clauses have been avoided by simply neglecting to
notice §1-105 as a controlling statute." Leflar, supra note
244, at 99.
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The first limit is the requirement of a "reasonable
relationship" between the transaction and the chosen law. 250
Reasonableness, in this respect, should be equated with
good reasons for wishing a particular system of law to
govern, not necessarily with physical contacts.251
Nevertheless, courts usually require a physical contact.252
The Official Comment to the UCC gives a good explanation of
this requirement. 253
250 See Ryan, Reasonable Relation and Party Autonomy
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 63 Marq. L. Rey. 219
(1979) and Tuchler, Boundaries to Party· Autonomy in the
Uniform Commercial Code: A Radical View, 11 St. Louis U.L.J.
180 (1967). The question can be raised if this requirement
is new or if it would be imposed anyway by the constitutional
due process requirements as defined in Home Insurance Y. Dick
and Allstate v. Haque. The reasonable relationship
requirement is probably more stringent than the minimum
contacts test of the Supreme Court.
251 Leflar, SUDra note 244, at 97.
252 A provision in a sale-leaseback agreement between a
New Jersey lessor and a Kentucky corporation having its
principal place of business in Kentucky covering restaurant
equipment located in Atlanta, Georgia that New York law would
govern the transaction was ineffective since the transaction
had no reasonable relation to that state. United Counties
Trust Co. v. MacLum, Inc., 643 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir. 1981).
The parties in this case could have· had good reasons to
choose New York law, the court paid heed to such reasons
emphasizing the existence of physical contacts. See also
woods-Tucker Leasing Corp. of Georgia v. Hutcheson-Ingram
Development Co., 642 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1981), 30 UCC Rep.
1505; Island Creek Coal Co. v. Lake Shore, Inc., 4 UCC Rep.
Servo 2d (Callaghan) 1067, 832 F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1987); In
re Kam Kuo Seafood Corp., 4 UCC Rep. Servo 2d (Callaghan)
579, 76 BR 297 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Dupaln Corp. v.W.B. Davis
Hosiery Mills, Inc., 442 F.Supp. 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) and
Fuller Co. V. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 421 F.Supp.
938 (W.D.Pa. 1976).
253 The affirmatively stated right of the parties to a
multi-state transaction or a transaction involving foreign
trade to choose the applicable law is limited to
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This condition provides at least some protection to the
consumer even if that is not its specific raison d'~tre.
Under §1-10S parties cannot choose whatever law they want
to govern their contract. Consequently, the stronger
contractual party cannot impose an unfavorable and
completely unconnected law on the consumer. Normally, an
international or interstate transaction is only connected
with a limited and well defined number of legal systems.
This limit is thus a relatively efficient protective device
for consumers, but no guarantee whatsoever that the chosen
law has protective characteristics per see Anyway, since
the UCC introduces uniformity, only few possibilities are
left to subject the consumer to a detrimental choice of
law.
SecondlY, §1-10S states that "parties may agree" to a
choice of law. (emphasis added) Such a choice of law
jurisdictions to which the transaction bears a "reasonable
relation". In general, the test of reasonable relationship
is similar to that laid down by the Supreme Court in Seeman
v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 274 U.S. 403, 47 S.Ct. 626,
71 L.Ed. 1123 (1927). Ordinarily the law chosen must be that
of a jurisdiction where a significant enough portion of the
making or performance of the contract is to occur or occurs.
But an agreement as to choice of law may sometimes take
effect as a shorthand expression of the content of the
parties as to matters governed by their agreement, even
though the transaction has no significant contact with the
jurisdiction chosen. Where there is no agreement as to the
governing law, the UCC is applicable to any transaction
having "an appropriate relation to any state which enacts
it." Of course, the Act applies to any transaction which
takes place in its entirety in a state which has enacted the
Act. The Official Comment is reprinted in Commercial and
Debtor-Creditor Law, Selected Statutes (D. Baird, T.
Eisenberg & T. Jackson ed. 1984).
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clause can be hidden in the fine print of a take-it-or-
leave-it form contract which casual customers have little
or no opportunity to study. The term "agree" of the Code
takes a central place in §1-10S from a consumer's point of
view. 254 Indeed, the weaker party may not have agreed to
an unread boilerplate choice of law clause that was never
called to his attention. 255
There can be at least as much justification for
avoiding these clauses as there is for avoiding any other
harsh and unanticipated provision in any kind of adhesion
254 The Code does not define the verb "agree", but
"agreement" is defined in §1-201(3) as "the bargain of the
parties in fact as found in their language or by implication
from other circumstances including course of dealing or usage
of trade or course of performance."
255 T. Quinn, Quinn's Uniform Commercial Code Commentary
and Law Digest, 1989 Cumulative Supplement No.1, at 130-31
writes: "Boilerplate is a term applied to the preprinted
language that laces the back and sometimes the front of a
form contract. Despite its reputation it serves an obvious
and healthy purpose when used properly. [•••] There are,
however, other and less savory aspects of the boilerplate.
For starters, the boilerplate may not be read or even if read
may not be agreed on in the sense of open and voluntary
consent. The boilerplate, after all, will have been drafted
by the dominant party and may well be presented on a "take-
it-or-Ieave-it" basis. Indeed, whole industries may employ
the same or similar language with the result that such terms
must be accepted on a "this-or-nothing" basis. When such is
the case, the boilerplate is hardly a happy illustration of
what "freedom of contract" is all about. Less savory still
is the effort to bury the more noxious terms in the
boilerplate in such a way as to pass unnoticed. Devices of
this type, unfortunately, are many and varied .•• like the
"casserole" approach, which dumps the language on the back
of the form in a single mass ••• so •.• that a gifted lawyer
.with a magnifying glass and plenty of time is needed to
·unravel and understand it."
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contract. 256 Much depends on the factual circumstances in
which the clause was presented.257 A choice of law clause
will, however, not be denied effect merely because it is
contained in an adhesive contract258 or because it is part
of a printed form. 259 There must be an element of
unfairness: the clause merely being part of an adhesion
contract does not mean that it is unreasonable and that it
should not be enforced.
Thirdly, other Code provisions also allow avoidance of
unfair choice of law clauses: §1-103 preserves defenses
based on "estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress,
coercion, or mistake"; §1-203 "imposes an obligation of
good faith"; and §2-302 permits refusal of enforcement to
any unconscionable clause in a sales contract.
256 Leflar, supra note 244, at 99.
257 . A relevant question, e •g. , is where the form
containing the choice of law clause was located (e.g., in the
box sold (would be okay, unless the box was only opened at
the first use) or on a board in the store (would not be
okay) )•
258 See, ~, Windsor Mills, Inc. v. Collins & Aikman
Corp., 10 UCC Rep. 1020, 25 Cal.App.3d 987, 101 Cal.Rptr 347
(1972) and Gamer v. DUPont Walston, Inc., 25 UCC Rep. 550,
65 Cal.App. 3d 280, 125 Cal.Rptr 230 (1976).
259 See, ~, Delhonune Industries, Inc. v. Houston
Beechcraft, Inc., 33 UCC Rep 490, 669 F.2d 1049 (5th Cir.
1982) •
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The concept of unconscionability could be an important
basis to strike down unfair choice of law clauses260 in
consumer contracts in general.261 In assessing whether a
particular contract provision is unconscionable, courts
will look for gross inequality in bargaining power and a
misunderstanding or unawareness of the provision in
question, which factors are examined in light of the
totality of circumstances.262 To be unconscionable a
contract or clause must deprive one of the parties of a
meaningful choice with contract terms that are unreasonably
favorable to the other.263 The protective value of this
260 The mechanism of unconscionability can be reconciled
very well with the basic incentive for consumer protection
in the field of choice of law: justice. Freedom can only be
allowed to an extent that it is reasonable and not oppressive
towards consumers. See Kornhauser, Unconscionability in
Standard Forms, 64 Calif. L. Rev. 1151 (1976).
261 "Although the basic unconscionability prov~s~on of
the UCC ••. is found in §2, which covers the law of sales,
from its inception it was predicted that it would be applied
in cases involving other types of contracts." H. Alperin &
R. Chase, supra note 237, at 259-60.
262 Langemeier v. National Oats Co., Inc., 715 F. 2d 975,
41 UCC Rep. Servo (Callaghan) 1616 (8th Cir. 1985). Mere
inequality in bargaining power does not mean that e.g. an
arbitration clause in agreements for the sale of textile are
unconscionable. Copen Associates, Inc. v. Dan River, Inc.,
18 UCC Rep. Servo (Callaghan) 62 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1975). The
parties to a contract may agree as to the applicable law to
be applied, at least when they are dealing at arms' length
and on an equal basis. Intamin, Inc. v. Figley-Wright
Contracts, Inc., 595 F.Supp. 1350, 40 UCC Rep. 766 (N.D.III.
1984) •
263 Beckman v. Vassall-Dillworth Lincoln-Mercury, Inc.,
468 A.2d. 784, 39 UCC Rep. Servo (Callaghan) 69 (Pa.Super.
1983). See also Kathenes v. Quick Chek Food Stores, 596
F.Supp. 713, 399 UCC Rep. 1326 (D.N.J. 1984).
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device depends on its implementation in court. Courts have
often held contractual provisions unconscionable because
they oppressed or unfairly surprised the other party.264
But these holdings almost always concerned exculpatory
clauses, penalty clauses, termination clauses, disclaimers
of warranties etc. No line of cases has arisen so far
applying the unconscionability criterion to choice of law
clauses.265
Concluding, the UCC, an important legal document in the
U.s., contains useful mechanisms to protect consumers
against oppression by stronger contractual parties.266
d. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.267
i. Introduction:
Uniformity is also achieved through the work of the
American Law Institute which has restated the law in
several areas.268 The Institute adopted in 1971 the
264 See UCC Case Digest ,2-302 for case law on this
subject.
265 A lack of opportunities to do so may be a simple
explanation for this: choice of law clauses under the Uniform
(1) Commercial Code, after being subjected to the reasonable
relationship test and agreement test, will most probably not
be unconscionable.
266The Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC) (1968) states
in §1-103 that the provisions of the UCC supplement the
provisions of the UCCC unless displaced by particular
provisions. So UCC §1-105 applies even outside the UCC.
UCCC §5-108 contains the unconscionability exception.
267 For the relevant sections, see Appendix 4.
268 For instance, in the areas of contracts, agency,
international relations and conflicts.
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According to Professor Reese, the Reporter of the
aspect which clearly distinguishes it from the first
Restatement.272
Id.
Scoles & Hay, at 34.271
272
273 Reese, Contracts and the Restatement of Conflict of
Laws. Second, 9 Int'l & Compo L.Q. 531, 534-40 (1960). Reese
has "ably and effectively stated the justification for the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. This Restatement
has gained cardinal importance in contract conflicts.269 It
is cited "approvingly with increasing frequency. ,,270The
second Restatement, the contract provisions incorporate
four major changes from the original Restatement.273 First,
second Restatement has sought "the right line between
excess of rigidity and excess of flexibility.,,271 It draws
on much of the thought of the period during which it was
drafted (1952-1971) and attempts to provide as much of "the
right line", the balance, as was possible in the light of
the development of the law at that time. Beyond restating,
the work also undertook to be a guide for the future, an
269 Weintraub, Commentary, at 362: "Two rules now seem
to have emerged from the confusing diversity of choice of law
rules that have been applied by United States courts in
resolving contracts conflicts problems. These two rules are
first that the parties may, in the contract, choose the
governing law, and second that in the absence of such a
choice by the parties, the applicable law is that of the
state that has the most significant relationship to the
transaction and the parties." Both rules are enshrined in
the second Restatement.
270Kozyris, supra note 140, at 552. For an illustration
of the far reaching impact of the second Restatement in the
field of contracts, ~ Appendix 2.
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performance.
particular kinds of contracts," whereas the second
The fourth major change is that the new
Restatement "proceeds to discuss particular kinds of
provisions for contracts, courts show that its rules are a
In relying preponderantly upon the second Restatement's
Restatement does not distinguish sharply between matters of
validity and matters of performance, looking in both
instances to the same law except for the details of
contracts and made no attempt to distinguish between
"perhaps the most important change" is that the parties are
now given wide power to choose the law that will govern the
validity of their contract. Second, in the absence of an
effective choice by the parties, "the validity of a
contract is no longer subjected inevitably and unalterably
to the law of the place of contracting," but instead is
governed by the law of the state to which it has the most
significant relationship. Third, the first Restatement
"laid down rules applicable to the entire field of
contracts."
firm basis for judgments while at the same time they leave
enough flexibility to avoid an unjust result.274 The
second Restatement's approach to contracts, particularly in
comparison to an approach based upon interest analysis or one
based upon a rule of validation." Sedler, The Contracts
provisions of the Restatement (Second): An Analvsis and a
Critiaue, 72 Colum. L. Rev. 279 (1972).
274 This is true because "a rule, no matter how broadly
(or precisely) framed, cannot be a substitute for judicial
consideration, not only of all facets of the problem
presented in a particular case, but also of the policies and
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law are designed to fill the gaps in a contract which the
sections dealing with particular contracts are examined.
Most rules of contract
interests of the concerned states and the requirements of
fairness to the parties. Courts should make decisions in
contract cases with reference to considerations of policy and
of fairness and these decisions should be made on a case-
by-case basis." Id., at 286. The Restatement (Second) is
thus "self defining through litigation." Scoles & Hay, at
535.
275 Comment e on §187(1). ~ Sedler, SUDra note 273,
at 286. The parties, generally speaking, have the power to
determine the terms of their contractual engagements. They
may spell out these terms in the contract. In the
alternative they may incorporate into the contract by
reference extrinsic material which may, among other things,
be the provisions of some foreign law. The so-called express
choice of law is merely a shorthand way of doing so, and its
effect is the same as if the chosen state's statutes and
judicial decisions on that point had been explicitly
inserted. So much has never been doubted.
ii. General principles:
-Party autonomy. Section 187 strongly champions party
question of conflict of laws. 275
the parties could have resolved by an explicit provision in
their agreement and issues which they could not have
resolved in that way. The former issues simply can be
incorporated by reference and they are not really a
autonomy; it makes a clear distinction between issues which
principles of §§ 187 and 188 are explained. Then, the
discussion of the Restatement (Second) focuses on its
possibilities to protect consumers and is primarily based
on the Official Text and Comments. First, the general
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parties could themselves have filled with express
provisions.276
Under §187(2), express choice of law is recognized
"even if the particular issue is one which the parties
could not have resolved by an explicit provision in their
agreement .•• Examples of such questions are those involving
capacity, formalities and substantial validity.277 Usually,
the parties are free to choose the law governing these
issues as well. In such event the treatment of the
mandatory rules referred to in §187(2) is identical to that
of the supplementary rules of §187(1). Professor Trautman
has sought the justification why mandatory rules may become
supplementary in a multistate situation in the concept of
functional equivalence278 and in the policy of validation,
276Comment c on §187. The question whether a particular
issue could have been determined by explicit agreement
directed to that issue is a question to be determined by the
local law of the state which has the most significant
relationship to the matter. Examples of gapfilling rules are
those relating to construction, to conditions precedent and
subsequent execution, to sufficiency of performance and to
excuse for non-performance, including questions of
frustration and impossibility.
277 A person cannot vest himself with contractual
capacity by stating in the contract that he has such
capacity. He cannot dispense with formal requirements, such
as that of writing, by agreeing with the other party that the
contract shall be binding without them. Nor can he by a
similar device avoid issues of substantial validity, such as
whether the contract is illegal.
278 See A. von Mehren & D. Trautman, The Law of
Multistate Problems (1965), at 248-49 and the example there
given.
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of upholding private arrangements.279 The protection of the
justified expectations of the parties and their possibility
to forecast with accuracy their rights and liabilities
under the contract, are the rationale given by the
Restatement.28o
There are however two exceptions to this broad
freedom. 281 These exceptions, conspicuous for their clarity
and soundness, 282 are adequate means to protect the
interests of consumers.
The first exception is that the chosen state has to
have a substantial relationship to the parties or the
transaction. 283 This protects the consumer since it
considerably reduces the number of laws that can be chosen.
The concept of substantial relationship infers some kind of
(physical) link between the parties or the transaction and
the chosen law. In this context the suggestion has been
279 Trautman, Some Notes on the Theorv of Choice of Law
Clauses, 35 Mere. L. Rev. 535, 542 (1984).
280 Comment e on §187 (2) . This Comment reads in part:
"In this way, certainty and predictability of result are most
likely to be secured. Giving parties this power of choice
is also consistent with the fact that, in contrast to other
areas of the law, persons are free within broad limits to
determine the nature of their contractual obligations."
281 So far the parties' freedom may seem unrestricted.
The stronger party cannot only impose an unfavorable law
relating to supplementary issues but even relating to
mandatory issues. Such a situation would endanger the
interests of consumers substantially.
282 R. Cramton, D. Currie & H. Kay, supra note 132, at
146.
283 Restatement (Second) §187 (2) (a) •
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the public policy of the state whose law would otherwise
be to overcome the choice and conversely, a weaker policy
may overcome a choice in case there are but few contacts.286
Id.286
284 Scoles & Hay, at 649-52. The words of §187(2) (a)
"and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties'
choice" were intended to uphold a choice even in the absence
of a substantial physical relationship but because the chosen
law was highly elaborated, well-known or familiar. However,
this ground to uphold a choice of law provision has received
relatively little support of the case law thus far. Once
again, the requirement of the UCC and of the Restatement are
synonymous. See Comment f on §187 and Reese, Power, at 53.
285 Trautman formulates this rule as "a choice of law
will be respected if giving effect to it will not contravene
a fundamental policy of the jurisdiction most concerned with
the issue." Trautman, supra note 279, at 544.
govern the contract rather than assuming only the forum's
policy to be relevant. The more contacts a transaction has
with the chosen state, the stronger the public policy must
Secondly, a choice of law will not be recognized when
"the application of the- law of the chosen state would be
contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which has a
materially greater interest than the chosen state in the
particular issue" and which would be the applicable law in
the absence of an effective choice (as determined under
§188).285 This provision is special in that it focuses on
made that the requirement of reasonable relationship of the
UCC and the requirement of substantial relationship of the
second Restatement are synonymous. 284
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a statute which makes one or more kinds of contracts
useful protective rule for consumer's interests. The
Id.290
291 Comment 9 on §187.
public policy exception of the second Restatement goes
beyond the normal situation where the forum refuses to
apply a foreign law or where it imposes the application of
its own law because to do otherwise would fly in the face
of its public policy. This exception is an extremely
"On the other hand, a fundamental policy may be embodied in
stronger party is thwarted in its attempt to insert a
choice of law clause to avoid application of a statute that
embodies a fundamental policy like consumer protection.
287 Comment g on §187.
288 For instance statutes of fraud. But for contracts
relating to wills a requirement relating to formalities may
be a fundamental policy. See ide
289 For instance a rule concerned with the capacity of
marr ied women. See id.
illegal or which is designed to protect a person against
the oppressive use of superior bargaining power. Statutes
involving the rights of an individual insured as against an
insurance company are one example of this sort. ,,291 So the
To be fundamental a policy must be a substantial one.287
A policy of this sort will rarely be found in a requirement
that relates to formalities,288 or in a rule tending to
become obsolete,289 or in general rules of contract law,
such as those concerned with the need for consideration.290
294
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The result of this mechanism depends, however, on the law
that would apply in the absence of a choice of law
provision. 292
-The otherwise applicable law. The otherwise
applicable law is determined under §188. This section is
prototypal for the entire second Restatement. A list of
connecting factors and a list of choice of law principles293
have to be combined to determine the place of the most
significant relationship. There is a rebuttable
presumption that if the place of negotiation and the place
of performance are in the same state, this state has the
most significant relationship. 294
An important question is whether the determination of
the otherwise applicable law takes consumer interests into
account. The notion of most significant relationship leads
292 The question is whether this law contains protective
provisions that express a fundamental policy. As stated
before, the protective degree of choice of law rules on
express choice of law clauses will depend at some point on
the otherwise applicable law.
293 See Restatement (Second) §6. The principles stated
in §6 underlie all choice of law rules and are used to
evaluate the significance of a relationship, with respect to
the particular issue, to the potentially interested states,
to the specific parties and to their specific transaction.
The policy considerations are meant to measure the
significance of contacts because the method is only
interested in significant contacts: "once the significant
relationship concept is permitted to degenerate into contact
counting, other evils follow of selecting the controlling law
without knowledge of its content." Weintraub, Commentary,
at 381.
See second Restatement §188(3). Different
presumptions apply to particular contracts (§§ 189-197).
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to the application of the most closely related jurisdiction
in light of significant contacts but the list of physical
contacts does not contain any guarantee that a consumer
friendly law will be applied. On the other hand, the
principles to evaluate the significance of the physical
contacts do take the weaker parties' situation into
account. These factors can be divided in five groups.295
Their importance varies from field to field and from issue
to issue. 296
The need to protect the expectations of the parties is
important in the contract area and gives importance in turn
to the values of certainty, predictability and uniformity
of result. The otherwise applicable law can never be
construed in a way that surprises the parties. Besides, if
the state of the consumer's domicile has a protective law,
this state will have a high interest in having its law
applied. The consumers' domicile has a greater weight than
295 See Comment b on §188. One group is concerned with
the fact that in multistate cases it is essential that the
rules of decision promote mutually harmonious and beneficial
relationships in the interdependent community, federal or
international. The second group focuses upon the purposes,
policies, aims and objectives of each of the competing local
law rules urged to govern and upon the concern of the
potentially interested sta~e in having their rules applied.
The third group involves the needs of the parties, namely the
protection of their justified expectations and certainty and
predictability of result. The fourth group is directed to
implementation of the basic policy underlying the particular
field of law, such as torts or contracts, and the fifth group
is concerned with the needs of judicial administration,
namely with ease in the determination and application of the
law to be applied.
296 dL...:..
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rather fortuitous contacts like the place of contracting
and the place of performance. It is likely that the state
of the consumer's domicile, having a strong interest to
apply its law to its domiciliary, will be the place of the
most significant relationship, providing the otherwise
applicable law. A choice under §187 cannot be contrary to
a fundamental policy of that state as laid down in its
consumer protective ru1es.297 This leads to the conclusion
that §188 reinforces the protection granted by §187.298
Apart from the two restrictions on party autonomy
explicitly provided in §187, Comment g to §187 contains two
297 Comment c on §188 states: "The purpose sought to be
achieved by the contract rules of the potentially interested
states, and the relation of these states to the transaction
and the parties, are important factors to be considered in
determining the state of the most significant relationship.
This is because the interest of a state in having its
contract rule applied in the determination of a particular
issue. will depend upon the relation of the state to the
transaction and the parties. So the state where a party to
a contract is domiciled has an obvious interest in the
application of its contract rule designed to protect that
party against the unfair use of superior bargaining power.
[••.] On the other hand, the purpose of a rule and the
relation of a state to the transaction and the parties may
indicate that the state has little or no interest in the
application of that rule in the particular case. So as state
may have little interest in the application of a rule
designed to protect a party against the unfair use of
superior bargaining power if the contract is to be performed
in another state which is the domicile of the person seeking
the rule's protection."
298 Much depends on whether the state of the otherwise
applicable law has a consumer protective law and whether this
law embodies a fundamental policy. It doubtlessly contains
a policy of that state, but is it a fundamental one?
According to Comment g on §187 a law designed to protect a
person against the oppressive use of superior bargaining
power is of this nature.
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closely related general exceptions. The first exception
states that "a choice of law provision, like any other
contractual provision, will not be given effect if the
consent of one of the parties to its inclusion in the
contract was obtained by improper means, such as by
misrepresentation, duress, or undue influence, or by
mistake. "
Secondly, "a factor which the forum may consider is
whether the choice of law provision is contained in an
"adhesion" contract, namely one that is drafted
unilaterally by the dominant party and then presented on a
"take-it-or-Ieave-it" basis to the weaker party who has no
real opportunity to bargain about its terms. Such
contracts are usually prepared in printed form, and
frequently at least some of their provisions are in
extremely small print. Common examples are tickets of
various kinds and insurance policies. Choice of law
provisions contained in such contracts are usually
respected. Nevertheless, the forum will scrutinize such
contracts with care and will refuse to apply any choice of
law provision they may contain if to do so would result in
substantial iniustice to the adherent. ,,299 (emphasis added)
299 Comment b on §187. This Comment contains thus two
sets of guidelines. One says that like any other contractual
clause, a choice of law clause has to be agreed upon. The
second allows to take the element "adhesion" into account.
These guidelines are however related.
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S~ple inequality of bargaining power and a lack of
negotiation do not void a choice of law provision.30o This
is well justified in a world in which a clear majority of
contracts are adhesion contracts. 301
To do justice to the adherent, some scholars have
developed more progressive approaches to adhesion
contracts. Professor Rakoff preaches a reversal of the
second Restatement's presumption: terms of adhesion
contracts ought to be considered presumptively invalid and
ought not be enforced unless proof of their reasonableness
is produced.302 Professor Ehrenzweig defends that party
autonomy is inapplicable to adhesion contracts. He proposes
300 Scoles & Hay, at 640. This rule is s~ilar to the
one discussed in relation with the UCC, but there it was in
the context of unconscionability. "Section 1-105 of the UCC
contains no exception for adhesion contracts. One would
hope, though, that this omission can be remedied by applying
to the choice of law clauses the provisions of §2-203 giving
a court power to deny effect to an "unconscionable" clause,
and that, further, in all applications of the first sentence
of UCC §1-105 (1) the word "reasonable" and the words "may
agree" will be utilized to produce the functional results as
would be achieved under the Restatement Second." Id.
301 "Some courts and commentators regard any contract
drafted unilaterally and ~posed upon a party by an
economically strong one as adhesive, while others do so only
when the contract contains unfair or unconscionable terms.
The Restatement Second adopts the first view but would not,
for that reason alone, void a choice of law clause: the
chosen law will be ignored only if its application would be
to the detr~entof the weaker party. Despite the difference
in conceptual approach, both views are thus operationally the
same." Id. They are the same in that both require more to
void a choice of law provision than s~ple inequality of
bargaining power.
302 Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essav in
Reconstruction, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1173 (1983).
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that "the public policy usually invoked as an exception to
the rule of party autonomy" should be restated "as a rule
denying effect to such stipulations, subject to the
exceptions now erroneously stated as the rule of
autonomy. ,,303 Ehrenzweig shows that party autonomy in
adhesion contracts is either upheld because the court deals
with a pseudo-adhesion contract304 or because of or in spite
of giving effect to the stipulation, the court reaches a
result favoring the adherent.305 According to Ehrenzweig,
the rule actually applied by the vast majority of American
courts is that "a stipulation of applicable law in an
adhesion contract is invalid as lacking freedom of
choice. ,,306
303 Ehrenzweig, supra note 204, at 1082.
304 I.e. a contract of a standard form but where parties
have actually equal bargaining strength like in some
insurance and loan contracts. "Most decisions upholding
stipulations of other laws contain express references to the
parties' equal standing." Id. at 1078.
305 Id. at 1080.
306 Also, the vast majority of choice of law stipulations
in loan contracts,as in insurance policies, have either been
invalidated or rendered harmless in favor of the adherent
and in transportation contracts not a single case upholds
such a provision to the disadvantage of the adherent. Id.
at 1084-85. So, "whatever the status of the principle of
party autonomy in the conflicts of law of contracts in
general, this principle has no place in the conflicts law of
adhesion contracts. [•~.] This restated rule serves the
freedom to contract, not the "freedom to adhere". [•..] Once
we have thus consciously and expressly rejected reliance on
a spurious "freedom to adhere" we shall have restored to the
common law one of its proudest achievements, freedom to
contract ••• Id. at 1088-90.
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The second Restatement takes a position in between the
extremes of complete freedom and total prohibition of party
autonomy for adhesion contracts. This seems to be the best
rule: it would be unreasonable to deny effect to all choice
of law clauses in each and every adhesion contract just
because it is an adhesion contract. The clause may, e.g.,
choose a favorable law for the consumer. Therefore, it is
required in addition that the stronger contractual party
has used its superior bargaining power in an oppressive
manner. This is a valuable tool nevertheless for the
protection of consumers who conclude many adhesion
contracts. 307
-Partial rule of validation. The question should be
raised whether the second Restatement's partial rule of
validation308 has any value for consumer protective
purposes. This rules says that in case the chosen law
would declare the contract invalid, the invalidating law
will not be applied. To do so would defeat the parties'
expectations. The parties can be assumed to have intended
that their contract is binding; if it is not, a mistake
must be assumed.309 It is possible, however, that no
307 Almost all consumer contracts are adhesion contracts
but not all adhesion contracts are consumer contracts because
in the field of commercial activities many contracts have
adhesive characteristics as well.
308 See Comment e on §187.
309 This is a partial rule of validation because §187
orders that the choice of law will be given effect only if
it selects a validating law, but not if it selects an
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mistake was involved. Invalidity in such case effectuates
the parties' choice and serves to uphold party autonomy.
It may also serve the protection of the consumer to uphold
the choice of an invalidating law since grounds for
invalidity often protect one of the parties, eventually the
weak one, and if this party has been able to choose the law
he has also chosen its protection.310 To validate the
contract against the free choice would deprive the weak
party of the protection it has opted for. 311 Consequently,
this partial rule of validation does not provide much
protection for the consumers' interests. Weintraub,
however, has suggested a rule of validity for contracts
that takes the weak bargaining position of the consumers
largely into account. 312
iii. Particular contracts:
-Contracts for the transfer of interests in land.
(§189) The rule of §187 and its protective exceptions
invalidating one. Weintraub, Commentary, at 373.
310 Scoles & Hay, at 649.
311 However, assuming then that the parties bargained
deliberately and in good faith, this result hardly can
comport with their intention to create a contract and their
expectation that it will be valid. The choice of an
invalidating law will be treated as a mutual mistake and will
therefore be disregarded.
312 Invalidity is recommended when "the invalidating rule
reflects a viable, current trend in the law of contracts such
as the growing concern for protection of the party in the
inferior bargaining position." Weintraub, Commentary, at
397-98.
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apply to these contracts. If there is no choice of law,
the rule of §188 applies, except that the state where the
land is situated has the presumptively most significant
relationship. 313 This presumption is justified since it can
often be assumed that the parties, to the extent that they
contemplated the matter, would expect that the local law of
the state where the land is situated would be applied to
decide most contractual issues.314 This section does not
grant any additional consumer protection.
-Sales of interests in chattel. (§191) For these
contracts, §§ 187 and 188 apply as well but in the absence
of an effective choice of law the place "where under the
terms of the contract the seller is to deliver the chattel"
is presumptively the state of the most significant
relationship. uee §§ 1-105 and 2-401 also playa role here
and can be combined with the relevant Restatement (Second)
provisions since the trend is to equate the requirements of
physical relationship of the uee and the Restatement
(Second).315 Apart from a new presumption, §191 contributes
313 An identical rule applies to contractual duties
arising from transfer of interests in land. See §190.
314 See Comment c on §189. It is further justified that
"the state where the land is situated will have a natural
interest in the transactions affecting it, particularly in
view of the fact that land by its nature is immovable." Id.
Functionally however, it seems that the state where the land
is situated will only have a natural interest in issues of
land use.
315 See supra note 284 and accompanying text.
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no further to consumer protection. In the majority of
instances, the delivery will probably take place in the
state where the seller is domiciled or does business. The
rule of this section will therefore frequently lead to the
application of what may be termed as the seller's law.
This is not particularly advantageous for the consumer.316
-Insurance contracts. The Restatement (Second)
distinguishes between life and casualty insurance
contracts. In the case of life insurance contracts (§192),
§§ 187 and 188 apply more protectively. Section 192
contains a new presumption: the almost universal reference
is to the law of the insured's domicile which, typically,
is also the place of the forum. This presumption
originates from the forum's concern to protect its
residents against adhesion contracts. Courts have sought
to protect the individual insured and his beneficiaries.
They have done so by requiring that, at least as a general
rule, the insured should receive the protection accorded to
him by the local law of his domicile. 317
The forum's concern to protect its residents against
adhesion contracts is further reflected in the limited
316 See Comment d on §191. But on the other hand, the
local law of the buyer's domicil will usually be applied, in
the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties if
delivery under the contract is to take place in that state.
This will at least guarantee protection in the sense that the
buyer's "own" law applies to him.
317 See Comment c on §192.
95
ability of the parties to select the applicable law by
stipulation: "effect will not be given to a choice of law
provision in a life insurance contract designating a state
whose local law gives the insured less protection than he
would receive under the otherwise applicable law. ,,318 Since
the otherwise applicable law is usually the local law of
the state where the insured was domiciled when the policy
was applied for, the Restatement (Second) furnishes ample
protection to consumers in this area. 319 Since the
rationale for this rule is the protection of a weak party
against oppression in the form of an unfavorable clause two
exceptions are logical. First, a choice of law stipulation
will be honored if the chosen law affords the same or
greater protection to the insured.32o Secondly, a choice of
law provision will likely be respected in group life
insurance contracts since the greater leverage possessed by
318 Comment e on §192. See also Scoles & Hay, at 675.
319 A case as early as 1900 did not permit the insurer
to stipulate away from the law of the insured's domicile lest
protective rules of law of the latter would be avoided. See
New York Life Insurance Co. v. Cravens, 178 U.S. 389, 20
S.Ct.962 (1900). See also Nelson v. Aetna Life Insurance
Co., 359 F.Supp. 271, 290-92 (W.D.Mo. 1973) and Johnston v.
Commercial Travelers Mutual Accident Association of America,
242 S.C. 387, 131 S.E.2d 91, 93, 95 (1963).
320 Comment c on §192. See Mutual Life Insurance Co. of
New York v. Dingley, 100 F.Supp. 408, 413 (9th Cir. 1900).
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the group bargaining agent also distinguishes this kind of
contract from the typical adhesion contract.321
Section 193 on contracts of fire, surety or casualty
insurance is the only provision concerning specific
contracts that does not contain a reference to §187. This
does not mean, however, that a choice of law is totally
excluded but "effect will frequently not be given to a
choice of law provision in a contract of fire, surety or
casualty insurance which designates a state whose local law
gives the insured less protection than he would receive
under the otherwise applicable law. [...] Effect is more
likely to be given such a choice of law provision in a
situation where the insured enjoys a relatively strong
bargaining position, and particularly where in addition one
or more of the insured risks is principally located in the
state of the chosen law. ,,322 In the author's opinion, the
provisions of the Restatement (Second) concerning insurance
contract are model provisions for consumer protection in
private international law.
-Contracts for the repayment of money lent. (§195)
Again, §§ 187 and 188 are applicable and the local law of
321 Comment h on §192. See also Scoles & Hay, at 641;
Reger v. National Association of Bedding Manufacturers, 83
Misc.2d 527, 372 N.Y. S. 2d 97, 114-15 (1975) and Davis v.
Humble Oil & Refining Co., 283 S.2d 783 (La.App. 1973).
322 Comment e on §193.
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the state where the contract requires that repayment is
made is presumptively applicable in the absence of a choice
of law. Money lent by a bank or deposited in a bank is
usually repayable at the bank or its branch with which the
customer dealt.323 Thus, in the absence of a choice of law,
application of the strong party's law is enhanced which
might not be protective for the consumer.
Some authors, nevertheless, favor application of the
law of the debtor to afford him protection against the
economically stronger lender.324 Weintraub's new rule
approach holds that a "stay-at-home lender" cannot claim
that it could not have foreseen at the time of the consumer
10an325 that borrower's state would have an interest in
applying its law to invalidate the repayment obligation.326
Choice of law in small (consumer) loan cases has become
to be a statutory subject;327 legislation in a number of
323 Comment d on §195.
324 See Weintraub, Commentary, at 398-404 and Westen,
USUry in the Conflict of Laws: The Doctrine of Lex Debitoris,
55 Cal. L. Rev. 123 (1967). See also Currier v. Truck, 112
N.H. 10, 287 A.2d 625 (1972).
325Of course, "the arguments for applying the validating
law to the large business loans are more compelling than for
upholding the consumer loan." Weintraub, Commentary, at 398.
326 Id. at 402: "There is not a sufficient need for a
nationally uniform result under the small loan statute of the
lender's state to outweigh the interest of the borrower's
state in protecting the borrower under its own law. There
does not seem to be, then, any constitutional barrier to the
borrower's state applying the full force of its law even to
the stay-at-home lender."
327 Id. at 404 and Comment f on §203.
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states provides protection for the consumer in small loan
.. 11 . t .. t t t 328transact~ons, espec~a y aga~ns usur~ous ~n eres ra es.
Small loan statutes apart, the courts tend to apply, in
conformity with §195 of the Restatement (Second), the law
of the place where the promissory note is payable.329 This
will ordinarily be identical with the law of the place of
contracting and of the lender's location, yielding no
specific protection to consumers.330
Section 203 contains the second Restatement's rule of
validation for usury.331 Comment b to §203 explains this
rule of validation as follows: "Ordinarily, the permissible
rate of interest will vary only slightly from state to
state. Upholding a contract against the charge of usury
••• can hardly affect adversely the interests of [a] state
when the stipulated interest is only a few percentage
points higher than would be permitted by the local law of
the other state. Under these circumstances, the courts
328 See, ~, O.C.G.A. §57-106 which allows interest
rates up to the maximum allowed where the contract was made.
For a listing and analysis, as of 1 January 1985, see
Weintraub, Commentary, at 405-409.
329 See, ~, Residential Industrial Loan Co. v. Brown,
559 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1977) and Birger v. Turner, 104
Misc.2d 63, 427 N.Y.S.2d 904 (1980).
330 Scoles & Hay, at 677-78. See,~, Suitt
Construction Co., Inc. v. Seaman's Bank for Savings, 30
N.C.App. 155, 226 S.E.2d 408 (1976); American Training
Services v. Commerce Union Bank, 415 F.Supp. 1101, 1104
(M.D.Tenn. 1976) and Pacific Gamble Robinson Co. v. Lapp, 24
Wn.App. 795, 604 P.2d 1300 (1979).
331 See Sedler, supra note 273, at 315-27.
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deem it more important to sustain the validity of a
contract, and thus to protect the expectations of the
parties, than to apply the usury law of any particular
state. The courts will not, however, save a contract by
application of the usury law of a state to which the
contract has no substantial relationship even though this
is the state of the law chosen by the parties. ,,332
In the same train of thoughts, Comment e on §203
contains a protective rule for express choice of law
provisions: "A choice of law by the parties will not secure
application of a law that would not otherwise be applicable
to sustain a contract against the charge of usury. This is
primarily because of the liberality of the present rule.
Under it, the forum will examine the general usury statutes
of all states which have a substantial relationship to the
contract and apply the statute which either sustains the
contract in full or else imposes the lightest penalty for
usury. The parties will not be permitted, by means of a
choice of law provision, to obtain still more favorable
treatment for the contract by application of the local law
of a state which has no substantial relationship to the
332 Comment b to §203 also points to the fact that this
area has undergone a substantial legislative intervention:
"To protect debtors against extortion, many states have
enacted usury laws which limit the rate of interest that can
legally be charged. In the event of their infraction, these
laws may invalidate the contract outright or else forbid the
recovery of any interest at all or at least of the exceeding
amount. "
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contract. Usury laws are designed to protect a person
against the oppressive use of superior bargaining power and
thus represent an important policy of the enacting state.
They would largely be deprived of efficacy if the parties
could effectively choose to be governed, as to usury, by
the local law of a state which has no substantial
relationship to the contract." This Comment conforms with
the position that protective laws cannot be circumvented by
choosing the application of another law, even if the
forum's law is chosen and the protective law is that of
another forum.
-Contracts for the rendition of services. (§196)
Sections 187 and 188 are applicable to these contracts.
The presumption of §188, however, is switched to the local
law of the state where the contract requires that the
services are rendered. This will often be the consumer's
domicile which, consequently, confers some protection.333
-Contracts of trans90rtation. (§197) Here also, §§ 187
and 188 apply. Aside from the protection provided in §187,
the presumption that the local law of the state from which
333 Criticism is that "while the restatement second
differentiates between transportation contracts and those for
other services, it undertakes no distinction with respect to
brokerage, an area in which a state may often be expected to
have regulatory concerns." Scoles & Hay, at 680. This
section is said to be "overbroad" and "by attempting to deal
in such comprehensive fashion with disparate types of service
contracts, it cannot deal effectively with areas in which
there are regulatory concerns." Id. at 678.
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the passenger departs or the goods are dispatched has the
most significant relationship, being usually the consumer's
domicile, can give additional protection.
iv. Conclusion:
The second Restatement comprises a broad variety of
means to function as a protective choice of law system for
consumer's interests. EverYthing depends on how the courts
interpret and apply this theoretical model. Although the
second Restatement was not adopted overwhelmingly in its
early years, probably because of its renewing character,
contemporary case law proves that the contract provisions
have found substantial approval. The guidelines furnished
in the Restatement (Second) are a practical handhold for
courts: no strict rules that could lead to injustice, but
at least rules to rely on as a starting point.
2. State law.
a. Introduction.
As explained, choice of law is part of state law and
states can adopt any approach within certain constitutional
boundaries. Logically, state courts apply the state's
choice of law approach, but federal courts as well, in
diversity cases, have to apply the choice of law rules of
the state in which they sit.344
344 This rule was announced in Klaxon v. Stentor Elec.
Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). The holding of this case is
a corollary of the Erie doctrine as laid down in Erie R. Co.
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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Most of the current cases follow a pattern of multiple
citation, seldom relying solely upon any single modern
choice of law theory, but combining two or more of the
theories to produce results which, interestingly can be
sustained under any or nearly all of the new non-mechanical
approaches. 345
This overview will consist primarily in an analysis of
the available case law. Indeed, in the United States the
protection of consumers against onerous choice of law
clauses occurs basically through case law. 346 However,
cases concerning choice of law clauses are not abundant in
the field of consumer contracts. 347 Sometimes, cases
345 Leflar, Choice of Law: A Well-Watered Plateau, 41 L.
& Cont. Prob. 10,11 (1977). Similarly, Juenger alleges that
"ever since Babcock, eclecticism has reigned supreme."
Juenger, American and European Conflicts Law (Svmposium: The
Influence of Modern American Conflicts Theories on European
Law), 30 Am. J. Compo L. 117, 123 (1982).
346 Lando, Consumer Contracts and Partv Autonomv in the
Conflict of Laws, in M~langes de Droit Compar~ en I'Honneur
du Doyen Ake Malmstrom, in Acta Instituti Upsaliensis
Iurisprudentiae Comparativae, XIV (Stockholm 1972), at 141,
144.
347 Juenger, Some Critical Observations, 22 Va. J. Int'l
L. 123 (1981) speaks .of a "rather meager crop of judicial
opinions" and. W. Richman & W. ReYnolds in Understanding
Conflict of Laws (1984) §73, at 216-17 write that "contract
disputes do not present conflict of law questions as
frequently as other areas, largely because contract law tends
to be uniform throughout the country." Other reasons
include: choice of law clauses seldom lead to injustice in
reality, disputes concerning consumer contracts are rarely
litigated, consumers are not aware of the effect of a choice
of law clauses, etC. An important reason could be that the
judicial system is not open for cases relating to such minor
contracts. Class actions might be a solution here. See
Truax, United States Class Actions in Private International
Law Decisions, 23 Cal. Western L. Rev. 342 (1987).
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concerning non-consumer contracts have been cited in order
to explain a possible protective device in case of a real
consumer contract.
b. Illinois.
i. Consumer contracts in general:
After Illinois' adherence to the Restatement (Second)
for tort cases,348 there was some hesitation to follow the
same path for contracts.349 Now the Illinois' courts have
unequivocally chosen the Restatement (Second) to solve
contract conflicts.35o Illinois courts have recognized the
validity of choice of law clauses,351 and this freedom is
348 Ingersoll v. Klein, 46 Ill.2d 42, 262 N.E.2d 593
(1970).
349 See Smith, supra note 229, at 1071-72.
350 "Illinois courts have adopted the rules of the
Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws." Safety Mutual
Casualty Corporation v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company,
1989 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 12985 (N.D.Ill. 1989) (referring to §§
1.88 and 193). See also Bridge Products, Inc. v. Quantum
Chemical Corporation, 1990 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 2202 (N.D.Ill.
1990) (referring to § 187) and Nelson v. Hix, 122 Ill.2d 343
(1988) •
351 "In Illinois, where the parties expressly choose
another state's law to govern their contract, their expressed
choice will be honored." J. Robert Robertson v. Stauffer
Seed, Inc., 615 F.Supp. 1477 (C.D.Ill. 1985). See also
Swanberg v. Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company, 79
Ill.App.3d 81, 398 N.E.2d 299 (1979): Tele-Controls, Inc. v.
Ford Industries, Inc. 388 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1967): Carter v.
Catamore Company, Inc., 571 F.Supp. 94 (N.D.Ill. 1983);
Sumner Realty Company v. Thomas R. Willcot, 148 Ill.App.3d
497: 499 N.E.2d 554,101 Ill.Dec. 966 (1986); Reighly v.
Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co., 390 Ill. 242,
61 N.E.2d 29 (1945): Dayan v. McDonald's Corp., 138
Ill.App.3d 367, 485 N.E.2d 1188 (1985): Melvin Mell v.
Goodbody & Co., 10 Ill.App.3d 809, 295 N.E.2d 97, 63 A.L.R.3d
335. In the beginning the limit of the freedom of parties
was that the application of the chosen law should not be
available.
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This means that the consumer protective devices of §187 are
Secondly, the chosen law
"dangerous, inconvenient, immoral, nor contrary to the public
policy of the local government." McAllister v. Smith, 17
Ill. 328, 334 (1856).
352 James R. Keller v. Brunswick Corporation, 54
Ill.App.3d 271, 369 N.E.2d 327, 11 Ill.Dec. 873 (1977); The
Hartford v. Burns International Security Services, Inc., 172
Ill.App.3d 184, 526 N.E.2d 463, 1988 Ill.App. LEXIS 895, 122
Ill.Dec. 204 (1988).
353 See, ~, The Hartford v. Burns International
Security Services, Inc., 172 Ill.App.3d 184, 526 N.E.2d 463,
1988 Ill.App. LEXIS 895, 122 Ill.Dec. 204 (1988).
354 Potomac Leasing Company v. Chuck's Pub, Inc., 156
Ill.App.3d 755, 509 N.E.2d 751, 109 Ill.Dec. 90 (1987).
Contacts that were found to establish the required
relationship include, i.a., the principal place of business,
the place of execution of the contract, the place of payment,
the place from where the consumer was contacted.
355 "In short, the public policy considerations must be
strong and of a fundamental nature to justify overriding the
chosen law of the parties" Id.
otherwise applicable law. The Illinois courts require that
this policy is fundamental to override an express choice of
law. 355 Sometimes, though, only the forum's public policy
is checked without deciding whether the forum has a
to the matter in controversy. 354
will not be applied if it violates the public policy of the
First, a substantial relationship between the law
chosen and the transaction is required.353 The purpose of
this requirement is to preclude parties from arbitrarily
selecting the laws of a jurisdiction which has no relation
expressed with reference to §187 and its limitations.352
105
materially greater interest. Recent cases, however, have
applied the exception of §187(2)(b) exactly.356 In Wayne
Donaldson v. Fluor Engineers. Inc.,357 a choice of
California law was struck down because Illinois' public
policy against indemnity agreements was overriding. This
case is a good example of the correct application of the
mechanism of §187(2)(b) since the court first examined
whether Illinois had a materially greater interest before
it decided that the Illinois public policy could play any
role at all. Since many significant contacts were in
Illinois, a less fundamental policy was needed to override
the choice of law. 358 This is one of few examples where a
choice of law clause was not upheld. 359
356See, ~, WaYne Donaldson v. Fluor Engineers, Inc.,
169 Ill.App.3d 759, 523 N.E.2d 1113, 1988 Ill.App. LEXIS 588,
120 Ill.Dec. 202 (1988).
357Id. See also James Lyons v. Turner Construction Co. ,
1990 Ill.App. LEXIS 271.
358 See Comment g to §187.
359 Symeonides, supra note 138, at 478: "The cases that
uphold choice of law clauses by far outnumber the cases that
disregard these clauses. Even far more numerous, however,
are the cases where these clauses are not at all
scrutinized. " Modern Computer Systems, Inc. v. Modern
Banking Systems, Inc., 858 F.2d 1339 (8th Cir. 1988) (decided
under Nebraska law) is another notable exception. Relying
on §187(2) of the second Restatement and emphasizing the
adhesion character of the contract, the court disregarded the
contractual choice of Nebraska law. Application of Nebraska
law would frustrate the fundamental policies embodied in the
Minnesota Franchise Act which accords Minnesota franchisees
additional protection.
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desirable source from which to derive expressions of
rules of contract construction are not a typical or
156 III.App.3d 755, 509 N.E.2d 751, 109 III.Dec. 90360
(1987).
decide if a fundamental policy is at stake: "Common law
361 This is an excellent example of where a court only
investigates the public policy of the forum, but does not
determine if the forum would be the otherwise applicable law
in the first place. Potomac also held that the contract at
hand was not unconscionable or adhesive. A case similar to
Potomac is Janice Doty in which the chosen law was even
applied to pre-contractual issues. Janice Doty Unlimited,
Inc. v. William J. Stoecker, 697 F.Supp 1016, 1988 U.S.Dist.
LEXIS 11401 (N.D.III. 1988). Other relevant cases include
Paul Schwartzkopf v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation,
178 III.App.3d 226,532 N.E.2d 1333,1988 III.App. LEXIS
1393, 127 III.Dec. 324 (1989) (Illinois has a strong public
policy against indemnity agreements), and Melvin Mell v.
Goodbody & Co., 10 III.App.3d 809, 295 N.E.2d 97, 63 A.L.R.
3d 335, 12 UCC rep. Servo (Callaghan) 172 (1973) (application
of New York usury statute not violative of Illinois' public
policy although the interest rate permitted was higher in New
York than in Illinois).
3621989 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 12100 (N.D.III. 1989).
In Potomac Leasina Co. v. Chuck's Pub. Inc.360 the court
respected a choice of Michigan law even though application
of Michigan law would be contrary to the Illinois Consumer
Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act. The subject
matter of the case was a lease agreement for french fryers.
The defendants alleged that the lease was invalid since it
did not contain a notice of cancellation provision required
by the Illinois Act. The court, however, applied the
chosen law, because it was not contrary to a strong public
policy of Illinois.361 In Richard Mackowiak v. Harris
Graphics corp.,362 the court gave more information on how to
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An important feature of the Illinois case law is that
the courts largely take the "adhesion" factor into account
as prescribed in Comment b on §187.365 In American Food
Id.366
Manaaement, Inc. v. Henson,366 the court adopted Professor
Ehrenzweig's definition of adhesion contracts,367 and
363 Id. at 9.
364 The Michigan Consumer Protection Act did not differ
substantially and in addition the parties were business
concerns. Indeed, Potomac dealt with a lease between two
business concerns, which influence decision decisively. But
this can proof the different treatment of commercial
contracts and consumer contracts.
365See, ~, American Food Management, Inc. v. Henson,
105 Ill.App.3d 141, 434 N.E.2d 59 (1982). In this case the
court found a choice of Missouri law to be of an adhesive
character, but decided to apply it since ultimately the
result would be the same whether it applied Illinois law or
Missouri law.
367 "Agreements in which one party's participation
consists in his mere "adherence" unwilling and often
unknowing, to a document drafted unilaterally and insisted
upon by what is usually a powerful enterprise." See
Ehrenzweig, SUDra note 204, at 1075.
an example of an expression of fundamental policy. [••• ]
The legislative process is more conducive to the
development of cohesive public policy. ,,363So it is
probably true that the Illinois Consumer Protection Act
contains a fundamental public policy, but in the Potomac
case it was held otherwise for specific reasons. 364
fundamental public policy. [••• ] On the other hand, a
fundamental policy is often embodied in a statute. A
statute which makes certain types of contracts illegal is
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law clause down. This makes sense "since the bulk of




Closely related, Illinois courts would invalidate
enforced. 370
the contract entirely, in which case it can be entirely
unenforceable by the sticking party. ,,369(emphasis added) A
finding of adhesion is merely a first step, not the last
one; courts aim at distinguishing good adhesion contracts
unfair are enforced unless the rest of the contract is so
which should be enforced from bad ones which should not be
one-sided that iustice would be better served by discarding
371 1See, ~, Persona Finance Company v. Bennie
Meredith, 39 Ill.App.3d 695, 350 N.E.2d 781, 20 UCC Rep.
Servo (Callaghan) 198 (1976).
368 434 N.E.2d 59 (1982), at 62, quoting Corbin on
Contracts, §559A through 559I (Kaufman supp. 1980).
contractual choice of law clauses because of
unconscionability.371 Adhesive clauses are subject to a
defense of unconscionability when exacted by the
overreaching of a contracting party who is in an unfairly
automatically invalidating adhesion contracts would be
completely unworkable. ,,368Courts have to review the
contract and "those terms which cannot be proven to be
contracts signed ••• are adhesion contracts, a rule
championed the rule of the Restatement (Second) that a mere
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superior bargaining position.372 In Robert Robertson v.
Stauffer Seed. Inc. ,373 there was a finding of an adhesive
character and the governing law provision was rendered
unenforceable on that ground. 374
The law applicable in the absence of an express choice
of law is determined in accordance with §188 of the
Restatement (Second). 375
372 American Food Management, Inc. v. Henson, 105
III.App.3d 141, 434 N.E.2d 59 (1982). The Restatement
(Second) of contracts §208 Comment d (1979) explains that "a
bargain is not unconscionable merely because the parties to
it are unequal in bargaining position, nor even because the
inequality results in an allocation of risks to the weaker
party. But gross inequality of bargaining power, together
with terms unreasonably favorable to the stronger party may
confirm indications that the transaction involved elements
of deception or compulsion, or may show that the weaker party
had no meaningful choice, no real alternative, or did not in
fact assent or appear to assent to the unfair terms." See,
~, DeValk Lincoln Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Company, 811
F.2d 326, 1987 U.S.App. LEXIS 1503 (1987) Other definitions
of unconscionability adopted in Illinois can be found in
Personal Finance Company v. Bennie Meredith, 39 III.App.3d
695, 350 N.E.2d 781, 20 UCC Rep. Servo (Callaghan) 198
(1976).
373 615 F.Supp. 1477 (C.D.III. 1985).
374 But in this case, the choice of Minnesota law being
invalid, Minnesota law still applied under the choice of law
rules applicable in the absence of an express choice of law.
375 James Lyons v. Turner Construction Co., 1990 Ill.
App. LEXIS 271; Illinois Tool Works v. Sierracin Corp., 134
III.App.3d 63, 479 N.E.2d 1046 (1985); Vincent Champagnie v.
W.E. O'Neil Construction Co., 77 III.App.3d 136, 395 N.E.2d
990 (1979), accord Palmer v. Beverly Enterprises, 823 F.2d
1105 (7th Cir. 1987); James R. Keller v. Brunswick
Corporation, 54 IIl.App.3d 271, 369 N.E.2d 327, 11 Ill.Dec.
873 (1977).
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ii. Particular consumer contracts:
For specific contracts the case law reveals Illinois'
adherence to the second Restatement as well.376
iii. Conclusion:
Illinois' complete adherence to the Restatement
(Second) guarantees application of its protective
mechanisms to consumers. The Illinois courts seem aware of
the need for consumer protection in the field of choice of
law and have consequently put emphasis on the second
Restatement's provisions in this respect.
c. Georgia.
i. Consumer contracts in general:
Georgia follows the traditional approach of the first
Restatement.377 The first Restatement differs essentially
from its second version in that it contains purely
mechanical rules378 and does not allow party autonomy. 379
376 Section 192 was followed in Ravenna C. Swanberg v.
The Mutual Benefit Life Insurance, 79 III.App.3d 81, 398
N.E.2d 299, 34 III.Dec. 624 (1979) and in Jean L. Hofeld v.
Nationwide Life Insurance Company, 59 III.App.2d 522, 322
N.E.2d 454 (1975) (choice of law clause in group life
insurance policy upheld referring to Comment h on §192) .
Section 193 was followed in St.Paul Fire & Marine Insurance
Company v. Protection Mutual Insurance Company, 664 F.Supp.
328, 1987 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 2547 (N.D.III. 1987) and §195 was
followed in Charter Finance Company v. Vernon Henderson, 15
III.App.3d 1065, 305 N.E.2d 338, 13 UCC Rep. Servo
(Callaghan) 497 (1973).
377 See Rees, Choice of Law in Georgia: Time to Consider
a Chanae?, 34 Merc. L. Rev. 787, 790-93 (1983).
378 The rules of the first Restatement are mechanical in
that they designate the applicable law without taking its
content into consideration. Policy considerations like
consumer protection and protection of the contractually
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The rule of lex loci contractus was unquestioned until
1973380 when the rule was repealed by the enactment of the
Georgia UCC. 381
weaker party against oppressive use of bargaining power by
the economically stronger party consequently play no role in
the determination of the applicable law. Largely fortuitous
localizing factors as place of contracting and place of
performance determine the applicable law. This method does
not grant special treatment for consumer contracts.
379 The Reporter of the first Restatement, Joseph Beale,
explains the denial of the freedom to choose the applicable
law as follows: "It involves permission to the parties to do
a legislative act. It practically makes a legislative body
of any two persons who choose to get together and contract .
••• The meaning of the suggestion is that since the parties
can adopt any foreign law at their pleasure to govern their
act, that at their will they can free themselves from the
power of the law which would otherwise apply to their acts.
So extraordinary a power in the hands of any two individuals
is absolutely anomalous; so much that even the courts which
adopt a rule of this sort have been occupied in defining
limitations to the exercise of the parties' will." J. Beale,
A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws, II (1935), at 1079-80.
See also Beale, What Law Governs the Validi tv of a Contract?,
23 Harv. L. Rev. 260 (1909). Such a rule provides protection
to the extent that a protective law cannot be evaded by a
choice. But the otherwise applicable law, which becomes all
important does not provide any protection. Of course Beale
would allow a choice of law amounting to a reference; the
cited deals with a choice of law governing the validity ofa contract.
380 Although for the pre-1974 period parties have been
permitted to select which forum's law governs. See,~,
Barzda v. Quality Courts Motel, Inc., 386 F.2d 417 (5th Cir.
1967) and Delta Airlines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
350 F.Supp. 738 (N.D.Ga. 1972), aff'd 503 F.2d 239 (5th Cir.1974) •
381 O.C.G.A. §11-1-105 (1989). See Allen v. Smith &
Medford, Inc., 129 Ga.App. 538, 199 S.E.2d 876 (1973).
Before the enactment of the UCC which became effective on 1
January 1974 (O.C.G.A. §109A-1-105), O.C.G.A. §20-209
specified the lex loci contractus choice of law rule. In the
traditional system, all matters concerning execution,
interpretation and validity are determined by the law of the
place of making (lex loci contractus) and all matters




Remarkably, the Restatement (Second) §187 has been
cited increasingly in upholding choice of law clauses.382
Sometimes UCC §1-105 is cited. 383 And most importantly,
§187(2)(b) has been applied and instead of voiding a choice
of law clause because it infringes upon Georgia's public
policy, the courts would first determine whether Georgia
has a materially greater interest. 384
In Nordson Corporation v. Joseph Plasschaert,385 e.g.,
the court followed §187(2) painstakingly so that its
of performance (lex loci solutionis). See Restatement of the
Law of Conflict of Laws §§ 332, 358 (1934).
382Nasco, Inc. v. Gimbert, 239 Ga. 675, 238 S.E.2d 368
(1977); Carr v. Kupfer, 250 Ga. 106, 296 S.E.2d 560 (1982)
(absent a contrary public policy, Georgia courts will enforce
a contractual choice of law clause). The Restatement
(Second) is also cited more in general, in other areas. See,
~, Roadway Express, Inc. v. Warren, 163 Ga.App. 759, 295
S.E.2d 743 (1982) (§182 on workmen's compensation).
383See, ~, Manderson & Associates, Inc. v. Gore, 193
Ga.App. 723, 1989 Ga.App. LEXIS 1640, at 4 and Wallace v.
Harrison, 166 Ga.App. 461, 304 S.E.2d 487 (1983).
384William G. Law v. Kwik-Kopy Corporation, slip opinion
on LEXIS (N.D.Ga. 1986): "The Georgia courts have looked to
the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws §187(2) (1971)
to answer conflict questions •••• The controlling question,
therefore, is whether Georgia has a materially greater
interest than Texas in the controversy in question."
Similarly, in Ryder Truck Lines, Inc. v. Goren Equipment Co.,
Inc., 576 F.Supp. 1348 (N.D.Ga. 1983) the court merely
decided whether Georgia's public policy was infringed without
deciding whether Georgia had any interest at all in the
matter.
385674 F.2d 1371 (11th Cir. 1982). This case dealt with
a policy against restraints of competition which is not





protective mechanism functioned to a full extent. A choice
of Ohio law was only given effect after two requirements
were checked: whether a substantial relationship existed
between the transaction and the chosen law and whether the
state with the materially greater interest did not have a
contrary policy. 386 The court found that Georgia had a
contrary fundamental policy, and the controlling question
was thus whether Georgia had a materially greater interest.
This was determined by considering the contacts with the
relevant states, the parties' expectations, the policies of
the individual states, and the basic policy underlying the
field of law. The court held that Georgia did not have a
materially greater interest and applied Ohio law. 387
However, in General Telephone CompanY of the Southeast
v. Trimm,388 the Georgia Supreme Court clearly rejected
adoption of §188:389 "Although the "center of gravity"
386 "Georgia will honor the choice of law prov~s~on
unless there was no reasonable basis for the parties' choice
or unless the provision is contrary to a fundamental policy
of a state which has a materially greater interest than the
chosen state." Id.
Id.
252 Ga. 95, 311 S.E.2d 460 (1984).
389 Some federal c.ourts interpreted Allen v • Smith &
Bedford, Inc., 129 Ga.App. 538, 199 S.E.2d 876 (1973), to
mean that Georgia courts had adopted the rule of Restatement
(Second) §188. See,!t:.5L.,Eldon Industries, Inc. v. paradies
and Co., 397 F.Supp. 535 (N.D.Ga. 1975) and General Telephone
Co. v. Trimm, 706 F.2d 1117 (11th Cir. 1988).
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system390 is a more recent development in choice of law
cases, we are impressed with the finding of other
jurisdictions that this approach is neither less confusing
nor more certain than our traditional approach. [••• ] Until
it becomes clear that a better rule exists, we will adhere
to our traditional approach." 391 Thus, in the absence of a
choice of law, the lex loci contractus controls all
substantive matters such as the nature, construction and
interpretation of the contract.392 These traditional rules
are easy in their application but do not take consumer
interests into account. Therefore they seem anachronistic
amidst choice of law methods that largely consider policy
considerations in determining the otherwise applicable
law. 393
390 The court named the method of Restatement (Second)
§188 mistakingly "center of gravity" approach or "grouping
of contacts" theory. The theory is of the Restatement
(Second) has only one correct name namely theory of the "most
significant relationship".
391 311 S.E.2d 460, 462 (1984).
392 The lex loci contractus is the law of the place where
the last act essential to the completion of the contract
occurred. See,~, Manderson & Associates, Inc. v. Gore,
193 Ga.App. 723, 1989 Ga.App. LEXIS 1640, at 4. For matters
concerning performance, the lex loci solutionis is
determinative. See,~, Mathews v. Greiner, 130 Ga.App.
817, 204 S.E.2d 749 (1974) and Tillman v. Gibson, 44 Ga.App.
437, 161 S.E. 630 (1931).
393 This traditional rule may not surprise in a state
that has an old principle as the comity principle in its
legislation. See O.C.G.A. §1-3-9: Effect and Enforcement of
Foreign Laws: "The laws of other states and foreign nations
shall have no force and effect of themselves within this
state further than is provided by the Constitution of the
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ii. Particular consumer contracts:
-Insurance. 394 Since questions of contract construction
are governed by the law of the state in which the last act
essential for the creation of the contract occurred,395
insurance contracts are governed, in the absence of a
choice of law provision, by the law of the place of
making. 396 The holding of Hutsell v. U.S. Life Title Ins.
United State and is recognized by the comity of states. The
courts shall enforce this comity, unless restrained by the
General Assembly, so long as its enforcement is not contrary
to the policy or prejudicial to the interests of this state."
Sometimes state legislation clearly expresses to hold rules
pertaining to the public policy of the state so that it
cannot be contracted out by inserting a choice of law clause.
See, ~, O.C.G.A. §10-1-624 (1989) on Motor Vehicle
Franchises: "The applicability of this article shall not be
affected by a choice of law clause in any agreement. [.••]
Any provision in violation of any Code section of this
article shall be deemed null and void and without force and
effect. "
394 See, ~, American Family Life Assurance Co. of
Columbus, Ga. v. United States Fire Co., 885 F.2d 826, 1989
U.S.App. LEXIS 15341 (1989) and Government Employees
Insurance Co. v. Thomas J. Dickey, Jr., 255 Ga. 661, 340
S.E.2d 595 (1986).
395General Telephone Co. of the Southeast v. Trimm, 252
Ga. 95, 311 S.E.2d 460 (1984).
396Avemco Insurance Co. v. Rollins, 380 F.Supp. 869, 872
(N.D.Ga. 197.), aff'd without opinion, 500 F.2d 1182 (5th
Cir. 1974); American Family Life Assurance Co. of Columbus,
Ga. v. United States Fire Co., 885 F.2d 826, 1989 U.S.App.
LEXIS 15341 (1989) and Government Employees Insurance Co. v.
Thomas J. Dickey, Jr., 255 Ga. 661, 340 S.E.2d 595 (1986).
Insurance contracts are considered to be made at the place
where the contract is delivered, not where it is executed.
Thus, Georgia law controls where the contract is made and
delivered in Georgia even though the accident which gave rise
to the claim occurred in another state. Ranger Insurance Co.
v. Culberson, 454 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1972).
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CO.397 seems very protective on the other hand. The insurer
is presumed, according to this case, to have intended that
the clause most favorable to the insured is effective
otherwise it would not have been inserted in the policy,
and the insured is presumed to have chosen and intended to
accept the clause most favorable to him. In case a choice
of law clause is inserted, §187 of the Restatement (Second)
would probably be followed. Effect has been given to
choice of law provisions in life insurance contracts,
especially to the advantage of the insured.398
-Contracts for the rendition of services. Georgia
cases on this point do not seem to be basing their
decisions particularly on the place where the contract
requires that the services be performed. 399 They simply
appear to be applying the traditional place of making and
place of performance rules followed with respect to
contracts in general.4oo In the presence of a choice of law
provision, §187 would probably be followed by the Georgia
courts.
397 157 Ga.App. 845, 278 S.E.2d 730 (1981).
398 Figueroa, Choice-of-Law of Contracts: A Summary
Reference to the Situation in Georaia, 21 Mercer L. Rev. 389,
408 (1970).
399 The Restatement (Second) requires that, in the
absence of an effective choice of law by the parties,
contracts for the rendition of services should be governed
by the local law of the state where the services, or a major
portion of it, should be rendered according to the contract.
400 Figueroa, SUDra note 398, at 406.
404
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-Small Loans (usury). 401 Where money contracts are
valid in the state where they are made and to be performed,
the laws of that state govern the obligation, even though
it is a usurious one under Georgia law. 402 The Georgia Code
provides that "every contract shall bear interest according
to the law of the place of the contract at the time of the
contract, unless upon its face it shall be apparent that
the intention of the parties was to adopt the law of
another forum; in this case the law of that forum shall
govern. ,,403 In Wildon L. Mover v. CiticorD Homeowners,404
the court followed Georgia law and invalidated the contract
as usurious. It did not find any support in Georgia case
law for the application of the rule of validation of the
second Restatement §203. 405
401 Id., at 409-11.
402 Commercial Credit Plan, Inc. v. Parker, 152 Ga.App.
409, 263 S.E.2d 220 (1979).
403 O.C.G.A. §7-4-13 "Interest and Usury" (1989). This
section has been interpreted as a choice of law provision
which determines which state's usury laws are controlling.
F.D.I.C. v. Lattimore Land Corp., 656 F.2d 139 (5th Cir.
1981).
804 F.2d 681 (11th Cir. 1986).
405 Under South Carolina law the interest rate was
allowed and South Carolina had a substantial relationship to
the contract. The COurt said: "It is true that a choice of
law by the parties will not secure application of a law that
would not otherwise be applicable to sustain a contract
against the charge of usury (Restatement (Second) § 203
Comment e). This rule is designed to protect a debtor from
an overreaching creditor who seeks to secure the application
of a more favorable law of a state having no substantial
relationship with the contract. Such policy considerations,
however, are not relevant to the present inquiry. In this
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In Clark v. Transouth Financial CO.,406 application of
South Carolina's higher interest rate was allowed because
the note was executed and made payable there.407 In
general, "the Georgia courts have acted in usury cases with
sufficient flexibility according to the facts of the case
to assure a just and fair decision under the particular
circumstances. They have applied the place of paYment,
invoked public policy, interpreted the intention of the
parties, applied a rule of validation, and even weighed
substantial contacts. ,,408 In the present climate of
increasing protection of consumers and debtors, it is even
possible that the Georgia courts will switch entirely to
the Restatement (Second) to solve usury questions.409
instance, the parties have agreed that the law of Georgia,
a state clearly having a substantial relationship with the
contract, should control. Moreover, in this case the
credi tor has agreed to the application of laws more favorable
to the debtor, the parties' choice-of-Iaw in this case would
not "sustain a contract form the charge of usury" but would
render the contract usurious. Thus, the problem of creditor
overreaching is not presented and there is therefore no
reason not to enforce the contractual choice of law."
406 142 Ga.App. 389, 236 S.E.2d 135 (1977).
407 "Where a note is executed and made payable in another
state, even though secured by a deed to land in this state,
••• the rate of interest on the note is governed by the usury
laws of the sister state. [••.) In the case before us, the
notes were South Carolina notes controlled by South Carolina
law, under which they were not usurious. The manifest
intention of the parties was to make a valid and binding
contract.[ ••• ) We think they succeeded in so doing." Id.
408 Figueroa, supra note 398, at 411.
409So far it is only submitted that Georgia courts could
invoke §203. "The authors of the Restatement (Second) seem
to be of the opinion that some Georgia usury decisions could
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iii. Conclusion:
Georgia courts show very little sensitivity to the
needs of the weaker contractual parties with regard to
choice of law clauses. Fortunately though, they seem to
have adopted the rule of Restatement (Second) §187 which
can grant protection to consumers. The concepts of
adhesion contracts and unconscionability have not yet
influenced Georgia choice of law cases substantially.
Since Georgia follows the place of contracting rule, little
protection is available in the absence of a choice of law
clause.
d. California.
i. Consumer contracts in general:
Under impulse of Judge Roger TraYnor, 410 California
adopted an approach elaborated by Brainerd Currie411 called
be explained under § 203. Such approach would still allow
the court sufficient flexibility to issue a just and fair
decision and at the same time offer guidance to future
parties, their attorneys and the local judiciary." Id.
410 See, ~, Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal.2d, 588, 12
Cal. Rptr. 266, 360 P.2d 906 (1961).
411 See B. Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict of
Laws (1963). For an explanation, see R. Cramton, D. Currie
& H. Kay, sU9ra note 132, at 188-287. For an excellent
summary of the whole theory, ~ Currie, Notes on Methods and
Obiectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 Duke L.J. 171,
reprinted in B. Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict of
Laws 177-87 (1963). See also Richman, Diaarammina Conflicts:
A Graphic Understanding of· Interest Analvsis, 43 Ohio St.
L.J. 317 (1982) and Kay, A Defense of Currie's Governmental
Interest Analvsis, 215 Rec. des Cours 9 (1989).
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"governmental interest analysis. ,,412 The basic method of
interest analysis has, in addition, been extended with the
comparative ~pairment method.413 Since the decision to
apply a states's law depends on that state interest in the
application of its law, the determination that a state is
interested is crucial. It goes without saying that a state
will always have an interest in the application of its
consumer protective laws to its domiciliaries.414 To permit
parties to choose the applicable law is in contradiction
with a basic premise of interest analysis if the chosen law
is that of a non-interested state, even if it has a
substantial relationship with the contract. But, as a
matter of fact, interest analysis was pr~arily developed
412 First adopted in Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal.2d 551, 63
Cal.Rptr 31, 432 P.2d 727 (1967), the analysis was further
explained in Hurtado v. Superior Court, 11 Cal.3d 574, 522
P.2d 666, 114 Cal. Rptr 106 (1974), in Bernhard v. Harrah's
Club, 16 Cal.3d 313, 128 Cal.Rptr. 215, 546 P.2d 719 (1976)
and in Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 22 Cal.3d
157 (1978). For a more recent overview of the application
of these cases see Nicolet e.a. v. Superior Court of the City
and County of San Francisco, 179 Cal.App.3d 7, 224 Cal.Rptr
408 (1986).
413 For an explanation of this method, see Baxter, Choice
of Law and the Federal System, 16 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1963);
Horowitz, The Law of Choice of Law in California: A
Restatement, 21 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 719 (1974) and Kay, The Use
of Comparative Impairment to Resolve True Conflicts: An
Evaluation of the California Experience, 68 Cal. L. Rev. 577
(1980).
414 This method thus grants protection to the extent that
the state with the favorable law has an interest in the
protection of the consumer in question, which will often
depend on whether that consumer is a domiciliary of this
state.
121
for and is mostly used in tort cases.415 This explains why
most California contract conflicts cases are largely
inspired by the Restatement (Second) and why California has
indeed allowed parties to choose the applicable law.416 One
court boldly stated: "The analysis of conflicts law follows
that of the second Restatement ••• [because] California
usually follows the Restatement in every substantive
field. ,,417 Party autonomy is also buttressed by
California's adoption of the UCC.418 Consequently,
California courts will honor the parties' choice of law419
415 Juenger, Choice of Law in Torts and Contracts, in
Hague-zagreb-Ghent Essays on the Law of International Trade,
vol. VIII (to be published), n. 74 writes: "It bears mention
that Currie's ideas have had little influence on American
contract choice of law. He never discussed party autonomy
in any detail •.• " See also Note, Effectiveness of Choice-
of-Law Clauses in Contract Conflicts of Law: Party Autonomv
or Obiective Determination, 82 Colum L. Rev. 1659, 1666 n.33
(1982).
416 For commercial transactions involving in the
aggregate not less than $ 250,000 the parties may agree that
California law shall govern even if the transaction bears no
reasonable relation to California. See Cal. Civ. Code
§1646.5 (1990) and Friedler, Party Autonomy, at 471.
417 Mencor Enterprises, Inc. v. Hets Equities Corp., 190
Cal.App.3d 432, 235 Cal.Rptr 464 (1987).
418 Cal. UCC §1-105.
419 "The parties may expressly agree on what law shall
govern their contract." 11 Cal.Jur.2d 137, Conflict of Laws,
§55. "Choice of law clauses are valid and enforceable in
California. " Smith, Valentino & Smith, Inc. v. Superior
Court, 17 Cal.3d 491, 494, 131 Cal.Rptr 374, 551 P.2d 1206
(1976); C.M. Record Corp. v. M.C.A. Records, 168 Cal.App.3d
965, 214 Cal.Rptr 409 (1985); Thomas L. Hall v. The Superior
Court of Orange County, 150 Cal.App.3d 411, 197 Cal.Rptr 757
(1983).
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unless (1) the chosen state has no substantial relation to
the parties or the transaction; or (2) the choice results
in a violation of California public policy or the evasion
of a California statute.420 If consumer protection is part
of California's public policy, the public policy concept
will protect consumers. The standard, however, is not
s~ply that the law is contrary to public policy, but that
it is so offensive to public policy as to be "prejudicial
to recognized standards of morality and to the general
interests of the citizens. ,,421 And even where it is agreed
that a foreign law offends public policy, it may still be
applied in a limited context where the potential harm is
min~al. 422 Other cases required a fundamental public
420 Kenneth B. Wilson v. Solide Enterprises, Inc., 802
F.2d 1143 (9th Cir. 1986). As one can notice, this rule is
barely compatible with interest analysis: why would one look
at California public policy if it has no interest in the
first place. Strange enough, the rule of the Restatement
(Second) §187 (2 )(b) seems to be more in accordance wi th
interest analysis than this rule of a California court. See
also Sarlot-Kantarjian v. First Pennsylvania Mortgage Trust,
599 F.2d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 1979); Ashland Chemical Co. v.
Provence, 129 Cal.App.3d 790,794,181 Cal.Rptr 340,342
(1982); Windsor Mills, Inc. v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 25
Cal.App.3d 987, 995 (1972) and Ronald Frame v. Merrill,
LYnch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 20 Cal.App.3d 668, 97
Cal.Rptr 811 (1971).
421 Leo Wong v. Tenneco, Inc., 39 Cal.3d 126, 702 P.2d
570, 216 Cal.Rptr 412 (1985). See also Knodel v. Knodel, 14
Cal.3d 752, 765, n.15 quoting Biewend v. Biewend, 17 Cal.2d
108, 113, 109 P.2d 701 (1941).
422 Id. See also Nevcal Enterprises, Inc. v. Cal-Neva
Lodge, Inc., 194 Cal.App. 2d 177, 14 Cal.Rptr 805 (1961) and
Estate of Bir, 83 Cal.App.2d 256, 188 P.2d 499 (1948).
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policy. 423 Most laws with consumer protective features
could probably stand these tests and overrule a choice of
law clause if that choice would have a contrary result. In
several cases Restatement (Second) §187 was invoked in this
respect. 424 Further, and also in compliance with §187,
protection can be provided by taking the contract's
adhesive character into account. 425
In this field, referring to §187 Comment b of the
Restatement (Second), California has adopted the logical
position that although a contract may be characterized as a
contract of adhesion, the choice of law provision contained
423 Susan Gerdlund v. Electronic Dispensers, 190 Cal.
App.3d 263, 235 Cal.Rptr 279 (1987). See also Gamer v.
DuPont Glore Forgan, Inc., 65 Cal.App.3d 280, 135 Cal.Rptr
230 (1976).
424 Seidman & Seidman v. Phillip J. Wolfson, 50 Cal.App.
3d 826, 123 Cal.Rptr 813 (1975); Robert McMullan & Son, Inc.
v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 103 Cal.App.3d
198, 162 Cal.Rptr 720 (1980); Smith, Valentino & Smith v.
Life Assurance Co. of Pennsylvania, 17 Cal.3d 491, 551 P.2d
1206, 131 Cal.Rptr 374 (1976) and Peter P. Gamer v. DuPont
Glore Forgan, 65 Cal.App.3d 280, 135 Cal.Rptr 230 (1976).
425 The term contract of adhesion was defined by the
California Supreme Court as "a standardized contract prepared
entirely by one party to the transaction for the acceptance
of the other; such a contract, due to the dispari ty in
bargaining power between the draftsman and the second party,
must be accepted or rejected by the second party on a "take-
it-or-Ieave-it" basis, without opportunity for bargaining and
under such conditions that the "adherer" cannot obtain the
desired product or service, save by acquiescing in the form
agreement." Steven v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 58 Cal. 2d
862, 377 P.2d 284, 27 Cal.Rptr 172 (1962). See also Moussa
Dalla v. Atlas Maritime Company, 562 F.Supp. 752 (C.D.Ca.
1983) ("American courts generally look unfavorable upon
"boiler plate" provisions in adhesion contracts.").
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than a mere proof of adhesive character: even if the clause
428 d~
137 Cal.App.3d 99, 186 Cal.Rptr 740 (1982).
20 Cal.App.3d 668, 97 Cal.Rptr 81 (1971).427
429
basic contention was repeated: a determination that a
showing that it was outside the reasonable expectations of
the weaker or the adhering party or that enforcement would
in such a contract is usually respected. 426 Striking down a
choice of law clause in an adhesion contract, requires more
were adhesive, it would be fully enforceable absent a
be unduly oppressive or unconscionable. The "reasonable
expectations of the weaker party" test was applied in
Ronald Frame v. Merrill. Lvnch.427 The court reasoned that
"where the bargaining strength of contracting parties is
unequal, a contractual provision may be construed to give
effect to the reasonable expectations of the weaker party
when necessary to avoid injury or unfair imposition. ,,428
In Bos Material Handlina v. Crown Controls Corp., 429 the
that are required, aside from an adhesive character, to
contract is adhesive is the beginning and not the end of
the analysis in so far as enforceability of its terms is
concerned. This case clearly explains the extra elements
strike a contractual clause down. Generally speaking,
426 Alex Furda v. The Superior Court of Orange County,
161 Cal.App.3d 418, 207 Cal.Rptr 646 (1984); Player v. Geo
M. Brewster & Son, Inc., 18 Cal.App.3d 526, 533, 96 Cal.Rptr
149 (1971) and Windsor Mills, Inc. v. Collins & Aikman Corp.,
25 Cal.App.3d 987,101 Cal.Rptr 347,10 UCC Rep. Serve
(Callaghan) 1020 (1972).
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there are two judicially imposed limitations on the
enforcement of adhesion contracts or provisions thereof.
The first is that such a contract or provision which does
not fall within the reasonable expectations of the weaker
party will not be enforced against him. The second, a
principle of equity applicable to all contracts, is that a
contract or provision, even if consistent with the
reasonable expectations of the parties, will be denied
enforcement if, considered in its context, it is unduly
oppressive or unconscionable. This case referred also to
Comment b on §187 of the Restatement (Second). In the Bos
case, however, the choice of law clause was upheld
principally because the contract was shaped in a commercial
context. This implies that a finding of unconscionability
or of contravention of the parties reasonable expectations
is more likely in a consumer context.430 This is logical: a
consumer could be very well surprised by a boiler plate
choice of law provision in a contract he did not read and
which has the surprising result of giving less protection
than expected.
In the absence of an effective choice of law, a
contract is governed by the law of the place where it is to
be performed, or if this place is not indicated, by the law
430 The court remarked that most adhesive contracts occur
in a consumer context, but that some of them are also found
in a commercial setting as between businessmen of unequal
bargaining strength. Id.
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of the place where it is made. 431 Surprisingly, in a state
adhering to interest analysis, this rule is very akin to
the traditional one and does not provide any special
protection. However, when the application of this rule is
obscure, California courts are guided by the factors set
out in Restatement (Second) §188.432
For instance, in Dixon Mobile Homes. Inc. v. Harold L.
Walters,433 the court also referred to §188. This case
shows how interest analysis works in the contract area. In
this case, California had a special interest in the
application of the Rees-Levering Act to the sale of a
mobile home, the act being designed to protect buyers from
abusive and unethical practices of motor vehicle sellers
and dealers. The other interested state was Nevada whose
statutes granted less protection to consumers than
California's Rees-Levering Act. The protection of
California consumers against abusive and deceptive sellers
is an important subject of protection for California in
which it has a large interest as expressed through the
431 Cal. Civ. Code §1646 (1990).
432 See, ~, A. Douglas Henderson v. Rosemary G.
Henderson, 77 Cal.App.3d 583, 142 Cal.Rptr 478 (1978).
433 48 Cal.App.3d 964, 122 Cal.Rptr 202 (1975).
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adoption of the Rees-Levering Act. Thus California law was
applied. 434
The comparative impairment approach can provide some
additional protection since courts, in their comparative
analysis, are guided by the chief criterion whether a
policy may be deemed attenuated and anachronistic.435 Being
a relatively new trend, consumer protective policies will
often prevail. In terms of comparative impairment: non-
application of the law that incorporates a modern consumer
protective policy will impair that policy to a greater
extent than non-application of a more traditional policy
would do to that policy.
ii. Particular consumer contracts:
-Insurance. In insurance cases, courts have referred
to the solution of §193 of the second Restatement436 and to
§1646 of the Civil Code.437 A choice of law would probably
be analyzed under the rules of the Restatement (Second).
434 Such a protection can even be extended to non-
residents. See,~, Hurtado v. Superior Court, 11 Cal.3d
574, 580-81, 586-87, 114 Cal.Rptr 106, 522 P.2d 666 (1974)
(California's more favorable laws may properly apply to
benefit non-resident plaintiffs when their home states have
no identifiable interest in denying such persons full
recovery. )
435 See, ~, Offshore Rental Co., Inc. v. Continental
Oil Co., 22 Cal.3d 157, 583 P.2d 721, 148 Cal.Rptr 867
(1978).
436 California Casualty Indemnity Exchange v. Lauren
Pettis, 193 Cal.App.3d 1597, 239 Cal.Rptr 205 (1987).
437 The Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. HeYn, 139
F.Supp. 602 (S.D.Ca. 1956).
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-Lease Contracts. This category is mentioned in
particular since California has a statutory provision in
this respect, operative since 1 January 1990. The
provision is intended to grant the consumer at least the
protection of his domicile's laws, which cannot be taken
away from him by a choice of law.438 California's UCC
§10106 is an example, not only of how choice of law and
consumer protection can be combined, but also of how these
two elements can be combined with a protection relating to
jurisdiction and choice of forum. This statutory path may
well be a directory for the future of consumer protection
in the United States.
-Small loans (usurv). California courts refer in these
cases to the solution of Restatement (Second) §203. In
Peter P. Gamer v. Dupont Glore Foraan,439 a customer of a
brokerage firm claimed that interest rates charged on a
margin account were usurious under California law. The
438 Cal. U.C.C. §10106 parties' power to choose
applicable law and judicial forum: (l)If the law chosen by
the parties to a consumer lease is that of a jurisdiction
other than a jurisdiction in which the lessee resides at the
time the lease agreement becomes enforceable or within 30
days thereafter, in which the goods are to be used, or in
which the lease is executed by the lessee, the choice is not
enforceable. (2)If the judicial forum chosen by the parties
to a consumer lease is in a county other than the county in
which the lessee in fact signed the lease, the county in
which the lessee resides at the commencement of the action,
the county in which the lessee resided at the time the lease
contract became enforceable, or the county in which the goods
are permanently stored, the choice is not enforceable.
439 65 Cal.App.3d 280, 135 Cal.Rptr 230 (1976).
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contract to Colorado, the substantial contacts of the
California's rate. The Court invoked §203 to allow the
Id.




parties with Colorado and consideration of California's
fundamental policy with respect to usury." 442 However, Yn
Colorado law will be permitted in a California forum only
upon the examination of the reasonable relationship of the
the parties or the contract: "the parties' choice of
this case, whether Colorado's 44% interest rate could be
applied depended largely upon Colorado's relationship to
which has no substantial relationship to the contract.
Usury laws are designed to protect a person against the
oppressive use of superior bargaining power and thus
represent an important policy of the enacting state. ,,441 In
the contract by application of the local law of a state
188 referring to several Comments. The court stressed that
"the parties will not be permitted, by means of a choice of
law provision, to obtain still more favorable treatment for
higher interest rate since California's policy against
usury was not offended.
Similarly, in Mencor Enterorises. Inc. v. Hets E~ities
Coro.,440 the court painstakingly followed §§ 203, 187 and
margin account agreement made New York law applicable.
That law permitted an interest rate higher than
iii. Conclusion:
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Restatement are available for consumer protection. In
One thing, though, is clear: party autonomy is
227 Cal.App.2d 11, 38 Cal.Rptr 376 (1964).
444 Kozyris, supra note 140, at 554.
443
i. Consumer contracts in general:
apply. 445
several methods (center of gravity, interest analysis,
significant contacts or paramount interest) New York courts
The New York choice of law approach remains
uncertain. 444 There is no absolute certainty about which of
policies behind the law, which guarantees an appropriate
application of consumer protective laws.
e. New York.
445For good explanations of this uncertainty, its origin
and the current situation, see King, Conflict of Laws (1988
Survey of New York Law), 40 Syracuse L. Rev. 211 (1989);
Reese, Conflict of Laws (1987 Survey of New York Law); 39
Syracuse L. Rev. 219 (1988); Kilbourn & Winn, The rules of
Construction in Choice-of-Law Cases in New York, 62 St.
John's L. Rev. 243 (1988) and Gruson, Governing Law Clauses
in Commercial Agreements: New York's Approach, 18 Colum. J.
Transnat'l L. 323 (1980).
addition, California courts will always look at the
In the presence of a choice of law clause, a California
court will rely heavily upon the Restatement (Second) to
decide whether effect will be given to the clause. This
means that the built-in protective mechanisms of the second
v. Jewelers Acceptance Corp.443 held that California did not
have a strong public policy against enforcing contracts
valid under chosen law but usurious under California law.
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recognized. 446 "Under New York choice of law principles, a
contractual selection of governing law is generally
determinative as long as the chosen state [sic] has
sufficient contacts with the transaction, absent fraud or
violation of public policy. ,,447
New York courts have often relied on the Restatement
(Second) §187.448 An example is Alvin L. Levine v. Arabian
American Oil Company449 in which the court said that the
"most significant contacts" approach followed in New York
is stated succinctly in Restatement (Second) §187 (quoting
446 Gruson, supra note 445, at 378 and New York's UCC
§1-105.
447 Capital National Bank of New York v. MacDonald's
Corp., 625 F.Supp. 874, 42 UCCRep. Servo (Callaghan) 1040
(S.D.N.Y. 1986). See also CBS, Inc. v. Tucker, 412 F.Supp.
1222, 1226, n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Hawes Office Systems, Inc.
v. Wang Laboratories, Inc., 537 F.Supp. 939, 942 (E.D.N.Y.
1982). For commercial contracts of a certain value, New York
law may even be chosen whether or not such contract bears a
reasonable relation to New York. New York C.L. S. Gen. Oblig.
§5-1401 (§5-1402 deals with choice of forum). As explained
above, California has identical provisions.
448See, ~, Bossier Plaza Associates Ltd. v. James F.
Pierson, 548 N.Y.S.2d 507, 1989 N.Y.App.Div. LEXIS 15498
(1989) ("Pursuant to the standard choice-of-law analysis, the
contractual designation of New York law controls (Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws §187)"); Capital National Bank
of New York v. MacDonald's Corp., 625 F.Supp. 874, 42 UCC
Rep. Servo (Callaghan) 1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); S. Leo Harmony,
Inc.v. Binks Manufacturing Co., 597 F.Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y.
1984); Freedman v. Chemical Construction Corp., 43 N.Y.2d
260 ••••• ; Reger v. National ABs'n of Bedding Manufacturers
Group Insurance Trust Fund, 83 Misc.2d 552, Joy v. Heidrich
& Struggles, 93 Misc. 2d 818, Southern International Sales Co.
v. Potter & Brumfield Div., 410 F.Supp. 1339.
449 Slip Opinion on LEXIS, No. 84 Civ. 2396 (RLC)
(S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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§187(2». This case may cause some confusion where it says
"although some jurisdictions give determinative effect to
contract choice of law clauses, and thus follow the so-
called "autonomy rule", the New York Court of Appeals has
held that while the parties' choice of law is to be given
considerable weight, "the law of the jurisdiction with the
"most significant contacts" is to be applied. ,,450 This
looks like a rejection of party autonomy. But with the
court's reference to §187 the holding actually means that
party autonomy is recognized but within certain limits.4S1
This is not new and why the New York court explains this
position so confusingly is enigmatic. In this case, Texas
was found to bear enough of a relationship to the
transaction to provide a reasonable basis for the parties'
450 The court quotes from Haag v. Barnes, 9 N.Y.2d 554,
559-60, 216 N.Y.S.2d 65, 68-69 (1961).
451 And because the freedom to choose the applicable law
is restricted, the court says that the choice-of-law clause
is but one consideration, though an important one, in the
determination of the applicable law. Besides," federal
courts in New York have consistently interpreted New York law
to be that the intent of the contracting parties governs as
to the applicable law, provided that the state whose law is
chosen bears a reasonable relationship to the contract.
Although federal courts sometimes express the rule in
different words, no different meaning seems intended. They
never mention the Haag v. Barnes approach. Thus, it is
likely that the suggestion of Haag v. Barnes, that is, to
apply the Auten v. Auten test (i.e. pure contact counting)
even if the agreement in question contains a choice-of-law
clause, has no longer any force." Gruson, supra note 445,
at 338-39. "A review of New York cases shows that New York
courts overwhelmingly have not applied the grouping of
contacts theory of Auten v. Auten in cases where the parties
have agreed on an applicable law." Id. at 337.
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choice of law provision. What thus might have seemed
confused, is actually clear and logical: although New York
does recognize party autonomy, 452 this freedom is not
absolute.453
The exceptions to the autonomy rule are furthermore
phrased in the terminology of § 187 of the second
Restatement. First, there has to be a substantial
relationship. 454 In Leo Harmonv. Inc. v. Binks
Manufacturinq CO.,455 e.g., a choice of Illinois' law was
not upheld for lack of a substantial relationship, although
the defendant had his principal place of business in
452 See, ~, Compania de Inversiones Internacionales
v. Industrial Mortgage Bank of Finland, 269 N.Y. 22, 198 N.E.
617 (1935).
453 See, ~, Leo Harmony, Inc. v. Binks Manufacturing
Co., 597 F.Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
454 See EAC Systems, Inc. v. Carmen Chevie, 546 N.Y •S .2d
252, 1989 N.Y.App.Div. LEXIS 12722 ("While we agree with
plaintiff that the existence of a New York choice of law
provision in the agreement is a factor to be considered, we
find the absence of a substantial relationship between
defendant's New York business activities and the causes of
action asserted in plaintiff's complaint to be
dispositive. "); Bossier Plaza Associates v. James F. Pierson,
548 N.Y.S.2d 507, 1989 N.Y.App.Div. LEXIS 15498 and Nakleh
v. Chemical Construction Corp., 359 F.Supp. 357 (S.D.N.Y.
1973). Again, it is with respect to this substantial
relationship test, that the New York Court of Appeals has
said that while the parties' choice of law is to be given
considerable weight, the law of the jurisdiction with the
"most significant contacts" is to be applied. See LaBeach
v. Beatrice Foods Co., 461 F.Supp. 152, 155-56 (S.D.N.Y.
1978). This could mean that the test of reasonable
relationship is applied more restrictively by New York
courts. See,~, A.S. Rampell, Inc. v. Hyster Co., 3
N.Y.2d 369, 144 N.E.2d 371, 165 N.Y.S.2d 425 (1957).
455 597 F.Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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also contained in New York's UCC §1-105. But the most
important restriction for consumer purposes, §187 (2)(b),
Compare with Restatement (Second) §187(2).
93 Misc.2d 818, 403 N.Y.S.2d 613 (1977).
See, ~, Clifton Steel Corp. v. General Electric
459
458
However, a choice of law clause will be invalidated only if
its application would violate a particularly important
express choice of law clause in a contract governs the
parties' contractual rights and duties, unless the chosen
state has no substantial relationship to or reasonable
basis for the parties' choice or the law of the chosen
state is contrary to a fundamental public policy of a state
which has a materially greater interest than the chosen
state in the determination of the particular issue. ,,459
456 It is likely that courts in several other states
would have upheld this choice of law.
457
Co., 80 A.D.2d 714,437 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1981) ("It is axiomatic
that even if a contract is valid where made, it will not be
enforced in another state if it is repugnant to positive
statutory enactment and the public policy of that state.")
is not always applied correctly because courts still
ascertain whether the application of the chosen law would
contravene the forum's public policy only. 457
An admirably correct application, though, can be found
in Leonard F. Jov v. Heidrick & Struaales. Inc. :458 "An
Illinois.456 This restriction is consumer protective and is
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undue influence, or overweening bargaining power" against
This conclusion is justified in light of an important
Id. at 261.461
464 6151 F.Supp. 4 5 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). See also Note,
Determinina the Scope of Choice of Law provisions in
Steamship Tickets: Adhesion Contracts and the Conflict of
Laws, 65 Yale L.J. 553 (1956).
462 See aenerallv Gruson, SUDra note 445, at 358-60.
463 Kilbourn & Winn, SUDra note 445, at 257-58.
460 Kilbourn & Winn, SUDra note 445, at 260. "Such a
clause will not be ignored merely on grounds that the chosen
law is "obnoxious and offensive". The test for invalidating
the foreign law is whether its application would result in
"approval of a transaction which is inherently vicious,
wicked or immoral, and shocking to the prevailing moral
sense." Id. 260-61.
label the agreement as an adhesion contract and refuse to
uphold the provision. 463
case concerning a transportation ticket. In Fricke v.
Isbrandtsen CO.,464 plaintiff, a German national domiciled
the party who challenges the validity of the clause, it may
adhesion will be scrutinized more thoroughly which grants
additional consumer protection.462 Although no New York
court has spoken on the issue yet, it is probable that a
New York court will not enforce a choice of law provision
in a contract which is not the product of an arm's length
negotiation. Should the court find any indicia of "fraud,
public policy.460 But only a few New York courts have
denied enforcement of a choice of foreign law for public
policy reasons. 461
Choice of law clauses contained in contracts of
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in Germany, bought a ticket from the agents of the
defendant corporation for a round trip to the United
States. The ticket was designed as a contract and was
written in English which the plaintiff did not know. It
had a limitation provision of six months for notifying the
company and one year for suing it in the event of injury to
the passenger. Another provision in the ticket stated that
all questions arising under the contract were to be decided
according to the law of the United States. During the
return trip to Germany the plaintiff was injured. Within
six months she notified the company, and the parties
corresponded. The defendant company never notified the
plaintiff of the one year time limit for bringing suit.
Two years after her injury she filed her claim with the
United States District Court in New York. The defendant
company filed a motion for summary judgment urging the
expiration of the one year time limit. Under the law of
the United States to which the ticket referred, the one
year limit was valid and enforceable. Under German law
this was doubtful since the company had not brought the
time limit to the plaintiff's attention, it might have been
estopped from invoking it under §242 of the German Civil
Code. The court did not enforce the choice of law clause
and applied the more protective German law. itAcontract of
the type in this case is not formulated as a result of the
give-and-take of bargaining where the desires of one party
are balanced by those of the other. Instead, standard
465
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provisions generally common to the trade are submitted to
the passenger-contractor on a take-it-or-Ieave-it basis. ,,465
This is a perfect example of the minimum amount of
protection choice of law should grant consumers.466 An
American company cannot solicit consumers in Germany and
take away the protection of their own law by inserting a
choice of law clause. On a second occasion, in Sieaelman
v. Cunard White Star Ltd.,467 a choice of law clause in a
transportation contract was given effect. The decision
vindicated a choice of English law made in a steamship
ticket issued by Cunard for a New York-Cherbourg voyage.
The ticket expressly limited the power of Cunard agents to
waive a one-year period within which an action for injuries
aboard the Queen Elizabeth might be brought. The Court of
Appeals thought that as the choice of English was bona fide
in the sense that it did not reflect an effort to avoid a
policy of the forum, and as English law had an indubitably
significant relationship to the contract, the clause should
be given effect. The conditions of good faith and
Id. at 467.
466Mrs. Fricke had bought a ticket in Germany which she
could not read and "while the parties should not be precluded
from seeking predictabili ty and uniformi ty by stipulating
their choice of law, unilaterally imposed provisions of this
nature should not be enforced." Id. at 468. In this case
it was clear that Mrs. Fricke did not know and could not know
about the one year limit; the company should have told or
notified her or should have given her a counterpart of the
contract in German.
467 221 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1959).
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relatedness should be emphasized as they have played a
continuing role in the case law. 468
There was however a strong dissent from Judge Frank
calling for a fair judgement in accordance with the needs
of the contractually weaker party. He stressed the
adhesive character of the contract and would have struck
the clause down on that ground. "The ticket is what has
been called a "contract of adhesion" or a "take-it-or-
leave-it" contract. In such a standardized or mass-
production agreement, with one-sided control of its terms,
when the one party has no real bargaining power, the usual
contract rules, based on the idea of "freedom of contract",
cannot be applied rationally. For such a contract is "sold
not bought". The one party dictates its provisions; the
other has no more choice in fixing those terms than he has
about the weather. [..•] All this has special pertinence
here: a party, like the passenger here, having no real
choice about the matter, cannot in fairness be said to have
joined in a "choice of law" merely because the carrier has
inserted a provision that some particular foreign "law"
shall govern; therefore it would seem that that party
should not be bound by such a provision. [••• ] I am
stressing the need to do iustice in particular instances.
[••• ] For it is generally agreed that the decisions of
conflict of laws cases by mechanized rules, without regard
468 Becker, Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Clauses in
New York, 38 Int'l & Compo L.Q. 167, 168 (1989).
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473 dL:..
choice of law provisions were imposed on them and hence did
not reflect the intent of the parties. The court, however,
Id. at 205-206.469
470 EvelYn Zerman v. Andrew J. Melton, slip op1n10n on
LEXIS, No. 82 Civ. 6846 (ADS) (S.D.N.Y. 1983) ("Plaintiff
complains that she would not be bound by this choice-of-Iaw
provision because it was not expressly pointed out to her
when she signed the Customer Agreement and because the
agreement itself is an adhesion contract unilaterally drafted
by a party with much greater bargaining power than herself.
But these arguments cannot excuse her from the obligations
embodied in the agreement she signed. Defendants were not
duty bound to explain its terms; rather, plaintiff was
obligated to become knowledgeable of the terms clearly
revealed in this single-page Customer Agreement, and
particularly of a term that cannot be said to have been
intended to oppress.")
471 Davidson Extruded Products v. Babcock Wire Equipment,
Ltd., 138 Misc.2d 118, 523 N.Y.S.2d 338 (1987).
472 The Fleischmann Distilling Co. v. The Distillers Co.,
Ltd., 395 F.Supp. 221, 17 UCC Rep. Serve (Callaghan) 678,
684-85.
strike a choice of law clause down. In The Fleischmann
Distillina Co. v. The Distillers Co .• Ltd. ,473 plaintiffs
sought to blunt a prima facie demonstration that English
law controlled by countering with the proposition that the
Anyway, New York adheres to the usual and logical rule
that a mere adhesive character cannot justify the disregard
of a choice of law clause.47o Closely related, arguments of
unfairness471 and of unconscionability472 can be invoked to
to particularized justice, cannot be defended on the ground
that they have promoted certainty and uniformity, since
such results have not been thus achieved. n469
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held that plaintiffs had not made a persuasive case for
unconscionability. The court explained that "to prevail,
they must show that they were unable to exercise any
"meaningful choice" and that the choice of law provisions
were so extreme as to appear unconscionable. [•.•] [It was]
only ••• defendants' bargaining power, as opposed to any
oppressive actions, which led plaintiffs to accept the
choice of law provisions. No unlawful coercion has been
demonstrated. ,,474 Like mere adhesion is not enough to
disregard a choice of law provision, mere exercise of
superior bargaining power is not either. 475
474 Id. at n. 14 . The choice of English law was also
upheld since England bore a reasonable relation to the
transaction and, most importantly, since the case dealt with
two corporations. "It also seems disingenuous to suggest
that major corporations are akin to the usual victims of
adhesion contracts." Id. Because "it is the exceptional
commercial setting where a claim of unconscionability will
be allowed." Id. This suggests that in the case of usual
victims of adhesion, consumers, unconscionability will be
accepted easier as a ground to disregard a choice of law
clause. The unconscionability notion is also found in UCC
§2-302. This Code mandates a finding of unconscionability
"only where there is an absence of meaningful choice for one
party plus contract terms which unreasonably favor the other
party." Nu Dimensions Figure Salons v. Becerra, 73 Misc.2d
140,340 N.Y.S.2d 268 (Sup.Ct. 1973). "The absence of "a
meaningful choice", or procedural unconscionability, turns
on the contract formation process, e.g. whether the important
terms of a contract were understood, whether high pressure
or deceptive sales practices were utilized, whether terms
were hidden in fine print, and whether there was gross
inequality of bargaining power." Id.
475 See The Fleischmann Distilling Co. v. The Distillers
Co., Ltd., 395 F.Supp. 221.
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namely the "paramount interest analysis". The
by any policy considerations, the approach pays heed to
300 N. Y. S. 2d 81724 N.Y.2d 372, 248 N.E.2d 576,
See generally Kilbourn & Winn, supra note 445, at476
477 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
478 See Kilbourn & Winn, supra note 445, at 247 n.24.
479
246-48.
"qroupinq of contacts" approach. In its pure form this
method boils down to mere contact countinq. Not inspired
traditional rule of the first Restatement and adopted the
method as meaninq that the law of the jurisdiction which
has the most siqnificant contacts with the matter in
dispute must be applied.478 In Intercontinental Planning.
Ltd. v. Davstrom. Inc.,479 a second theory was applied
consumer interests. But courts have interpreted this
jurisdiction's interest was determined by analyzinq the
purpose of the particular law in conflict. 480
However, under both theories courts qenerally employ
three analytical steps which pay attention to policy
considerations.481 These three steps are: (1) the court
To determine the applicable law in the absence of a
choice of law clause, 476Auten v. Auten477 departed from the
(1969).
480 Id. at 382.
481 See In re O.P.M. Leasinq Services, Inc., 28 Bankr.
740 (Bkrptcy Ct. S.D.N.Y. 1983); Krauss v. Manhattan Life
Ins. Co. of New York, 643 F.2d 98 (2d Cir. 1981) and Dym v.
Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 124, 262 N.Y.S.2 463, 466, 209 N.E.2d
792, 794 (1965).
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must isolate the issue on which the laws conflict; (2) the
court must identify the purposes of the conflicting state
laws to determine whether a genuine conflict exists and (3)
the court must examine the contacts of the interested
jurisdictions to ascertain which has the closer connection
with the facts of the case and thus has a superior interest
in having its law applied. Step (2) can provide protection
to the consumer's interest while step (3) is purely contact
counting and cannot give any protection. This approach is
an example of the mishmash methods, properly called
eclectic approach, applied by many courts. 482
ii. Particular consumer contracts:
-Small loans (usurv). This topic was dealt with in
North American Bank. Ltd. v. Susie Schulman.483 Here, a
choice of law clause contained in a loan agreement between
defendants, residents of New York and plaintiff, an Israeli
bank, which provided that Israeli law would govern the
agreement, was not honored. This occurred in regard to a
provision of the agreement which set a maximum rate of
interest in excess of that allowed by New York law as of
482 See Reppy, Eclecticism in Choice-of-Law: Hvbrid
Method or Mishmash?,34 Mercer L. Rev. 645 (1983). See,
~, Arkwright-Boston Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Calvert Fire Insurance Co. e.a., 887 F.2d 437, 1989 U.S.App.
LEXIS 15873 (2d Cir. 1989) ("New York courts apply an
"interest analysis" to choice of law issues involving
contractual disputes and, therefore, the law of the
jurisdiction having the greatest interest in the litigation
will be applied.")
483 123 Misc.2d 516, 474 N.Y.S.2d 383.
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the date of execution of the agreement notwithstanding that
Israel has no usury law whatsoever. To permit a contract,
executed in New York, to be governed by the laws of a
jurisdiction which has chosen not to outlaw usury at all,
would offend a time-honored public policy of New York.
Moreover, New York had the most substantial relationship to
the loan agreement since it was executed in New York,
defendants were residents of New York and the law suit was
pending in a New York court.
This case, once again, is a clear example of how the
protective restrictions of Restatement (Second) §187(2)(a)
and (b) should be applied. Strange enough, though, the New
York courts did not apply the validation rule of
Restatement (Second) §203. But more protectively, the
court applied Restatement (Second) §187 correctly and even
used some of the illustrations of the Restatement.484
484 The court's analysis under §187 was as follows.
Usury matters fall outside the scope of §187(1). Under
§187(2) then the choice of Israel law could be struck down
for two reasons. The court held both of them fulfilled.
Israel had no substantial relation with the transaction
(§187(2)(a» in the first place. Secondly, New York had a
materially greater interest in the application of its law and
application of Israeli law would violate a fundamental policy
of New York (§187(2)(b» (The purpose of the New York usury
laws, from time immemorial, has been to protect desperately
poor people from the consequences of their own desperation.
This policy underlying New York's usury laws is in fact of
a fundamental nature. The law chosen, on the other hand,
does not outlaw usury at all, as opposed to the situation
where the laws of another jurisdiction do prohibit usury but
in so doing allow a somewhat higher ceiling than that
permitted in New York).
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-Insurance contracts. Where it is provided by the
contract of insurance itself that it shall be construed in
accordance with the laws of a particular place, such
provisions will control the construction and effect of the
contract provided that the law chosen bears a reasonable
relationship to the transaction. 485 In insurance contracts
courts consider divers factors in determining which state's
law governs. It has been recognized that insurance
involves contracts of adhesion and is usually governed by
the law of the state where the insured resides.486 However,
different factors must be considered in determining which
law applies to group life insurance policies, but as in
other cases, the expectations of the parties remain the
controlling factor.487 Group life insurance policies are
generally not treated as contracts of adhesion because the
group insured is usually large enough to exercise leverage
in bargaining for provisions not normally offered at
similar rates in individual policies.488 In Marv B. Reaer
485 Mary B. Reger v. National Association of Bedding
Manufacturers Group Ins. Trust Fund, 83 Misc. 2d 527, 372
N.Y.S.2d 97 (1975).
486 Id. and Zogg v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 276 F.2d
861, 864 (2d Cir. 1960) ("If any trend is discernible in
these cases, it is that of a forum to apply its own law to
adhesion contracts of insurance entered into by its
residents.")
487 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sullam, 76 Misc.2d 87.
488 Simpson v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 24 N.Y.2d
262 and Mary B. Reger v. National Association of Bedding
Manufacturers Group Ins. Trust Fund, 83 Misc. 2d 527, 372
N.Y.S.2d 97 (1975).
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v. National Association of Bedding Manufacturers Group
Insurance Trust Fund,489 New York law required that the
policyholder would be informed of his conversion rights
under a group life insurance policy while Illinois, the law
designated to apply in the policy, had no such requirement.
The court reasoned that "in group insurance policies a
choice of law provision should be given effect unless it
contravenes [New York's] public policy," but decided to
uphold the choice of law because the parties' justified
expectations should be given greater weight than New York's
policy in this case.
The New York courts rely overwhelmingly on Restatement
(Second) §192 to uphold the parties' choice of law.490
Restatement (Second) §§ 192 and 188 (with reference to
§187) were also applied in, i.a., Oakley v. National
Western Life Ins. CO.491 and Francess Krauss v. Manhattan
Life Ins. Co. of New York. 492
48983 Misc.2d 527,372 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1975).
490 "The views expressed in the second Restatement (§192
Comments e and h) and followed by a majority of jurisdictions
are consistent with the evolution of new concepts in conflict
of laws and constitute a reasonable accommodation of the
varying interests." Id.
491 294 F.Supp. 504, 8 Life Cas.2d 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)
(Insurance companies cannot, through choice-of-law provisions
contravene important New York policies where New York has a
great interest in the application of its law.)
492 643 F.2d 98, 1981 Life Cas. (CCH) 203 (2d Cir. 1980)
(New York has expressed no interest in protecting non-
domiciliaries with its restriction on insurance companies but
Illinois' policy is promoted through application of its law.
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iii. Conclusion:
Although the New York choice of law approach is
unclear, some features have become apparent in the field of
consumer protection against onerous choice of law clause.
Strikingly enough, New York courts follow most of the
Restatement (Second) provisions. And even if § 188 is not
followed, most decisions could be arrived at under the
Restatement's most significant relationship test. To
determine the otherwise applicable law, state policies are,
in any event, taken into account. This grants additional
protection to consumers.
C. The European Economic Community.
The EEC provides a fertile scene for choice of law
cases: many cross-border transactions take place there so
that many conflicts of laws arise. Harmonization of
private international law within the EEC is, consequently,
an indispensable step towards the establishment of a truly
integrated market.493 The Treaty of Rome establishing the
EEC494 anticipated this need: Article 220 contains the
possibility to harmonize the different of national
legislations of the EEC Member States. This harmonization
The rule formulated by the second Restatement might offer
greater uniformity than the interest analysis and center of
gravity approach utilized by New York courts.)
493 I. Fletcher, Conflict of Laws and European Community
Law with Special Reference to the Community Conventions on
Private International Law (1982), at 13.
494 Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3.
497
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advances the proper functioning of an internal market
because it discourages forum shopping. 495
Two such EEC Conventions contain special provisions
dealing with consumer contracts: the 1980 EEC Convention on
the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations496 and the
1968 Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters. 497 Uniform rules
are prescribed, in addition, for insurance contracts.49B
These provisions will be examined and in addition, the
particular situation of some member states will be
described.
495 I. Fletcher, supra note 493, at 15. "A plaintiff
will always try to bring his action in the state whose law
provides him with the best outcome. This forum shopping is
encouraged by existing differences of choice-of-Iaw rules of
the member states. The harmonization of private
international law would be a natural sequel to the Convention
of 27 September 1968. The unification of conflict-of-Iaw
rules is also simpler process than the unification of
substantive law rules •••• To unify the substantive law rules
on contracts of the member states is an infinitely more
ambitious project." Lando, The EEC Convention on the Law
Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 24 Common Mkt. L. Rev.
159, 160-61 (1987) [hereinafter cited as Lando, EEC
Convention] •
496 For the complete text, see Appendix 5.
For the complete text, see Appendix 6.
49B See infra ch. II.c .lob.
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1. Uniform rules.
a. The EEC Convention on the Law Applicable to
Contractual Obligations.499
i. Law applicable to consumer contracts:
Article 5 of this Convention contains the provisions
relating to consumer contracts. Its main features are,
first, the definition of a consumer contract; secondly, the
fact that the terms of the contract regarding choice of law
may be overridden; thirdlY, the test for deciding whether
the contract is sufficiently connected with the consumer's
habitual residence; fourthlY, the rule that, in a contract
499 Signed in Rome on 19 June 1980. For a history and
an explanation of its main features, ~ Giuliano & Lagarde,
Report on the Convention on the Law applicable to Contractual
Obliaations, 23 O.J. Eur. Comm. (NO. C 282) 1 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Giuliano/Lagarde Report]; North, The
EEC Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual
Obligations (1980): Its Historv and Main Features, in
Contract Conflicts: The EEC Convention on the Law Applicable
to Contractual Obligations: A Comparative Study (P. North ed.
1982); Lando, EEC Convention; Williams, The EEC Convention
on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obliaations, 35 Int'l
& Compo L.Q. 1 (1986); I. Fletcher, supra note 493, at 147-
185; Gaudemet-Tallon, Le Nouveau Droit International Prive
Europeen des Contrats, 17 Rev. Trim. Dr. Eur. 215 (1981);
North, The EEC Convention on the Law Applicable to
Contractual Obliaations, 1980 J. Bus. L. 382 and Lagarde, The
European Convention on·.the· Law Applicable to Contractual
Obliaations: An Apoloaia, 22 Va. J. Int'l L. 91 (1981). On
the draft Convention, see European Private International Law
of Obligations (0. Lando, K. Siehr & B. von Hoffman eds.
1975); Harmonization of Private International Law by the EEC
(K. Lipstein ed. 1978); Lando, The EEC Draft Convention on
the Law applicable to Contractual and Non-Contractual
Obligations, 38 RabelsZ 6 (1974); Nadelmann, Impressionism
and Unification of Law: The EEC Draft Convention on the Law
Applicable to Contractual and Non-Contractual , 24 Am. J.
Compo L. 1 (1976) and Nadelmann, The EEC Draft of a
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual and Non-
Contractual Obliaations, 21 Am. J. Compo L. 584 (1973).
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principle that a choice of law clause in a consumer
-Overridina the contractual choice. The basic rule for
Contracts: A
56 (1981 ) and
502 Boggiano, International Standard
Comparative Study, 170 Rec. des Cours 9,
Williams, supra note 500, at 24.
500 Hartley, supra note 29, at 123.
501 Lagarde, supra note 500, at 99. It would have been
equally plausible to define the consumer not by the use for
which the goods or services are presumed to have been
purchased, but by the capacity in which he acts when
purchasing these goods or services. The preliminary draft
adopted by the special commission of the Hague Conference in
June 1979 had considered a consumer to be a person who does
not act primarily in the course of his business or
profession. Al though this latter test seems more
practicable, the usage test was finally preferred, not only
in Brussels (see Appendix 6) and in the Hague Convention (see
Appendix 7), but also in Vienna at the Uncitral Commission
in April 1980. Id., n. 41.
contract cannot deprive the consumer of the protection
choice of law clauses in consumer contracts championed by
the Convention is that of Article 3: party autonomy.502
However, paragraph 2 of Article 5 embodies the protective
Unlike other contracts which are characterized by their
objects, a consumer contract is characterized by the status
of one of its parties, resulting in a broad scope. 501
difficulty of Article 5 was to clarify when it would apply.
made to the Introduction, subchapter D. The main
consumer's habitual residence; and finally, the contracts
which are excluded from its scope. 500
-Definition. For the definitional issue reference is
which is sufficiently connected, the governing law in the
absence of a choice of law clause will be that of the
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afforded to him by the mandatory rules of the law of the
country in which he has his habitual residence.503 This
provision prevails over a choice of law clause in the
contract. This does not, however, mean that the
contractual choice of law is wholly invalid: the chosen law
still governs all aspects of the contract not covered by
the mandatory rules of the law of the consumer's habitual
residence.504
-Connection with the consumer's country. In order for
the protective mechanism of Article 5(2) to function, the
consumer contract has to be connected with the country of
the consumer's habitual residence in one of three ways. 505
Either the conclusion of the contract must have been
preceded by advertising or by a specific invitation
addressed to the consumer in the country of his habitual
residence, and he must have taken in that country all the
steps necessary on his part for the conclusion of the
503 Little objection has been voiced against the
particular mandatory rule provisions relating to consumers.
Jackson, Mandatory Rules and Rules of "Ordre Public", in
Contract Conflicts: The EEC Convention on the Law Applicable
to Contractual Obligations: A Comparative Study (P. North ed.
1982), at 59, 66. For a critique of the protection afforded
by this provision, see, ~, Lando, EEC Convention, at 184-
85.
504 Hartley, supra note 29, at 125. Similar provisions
are found in §27(2) of the British Unfair Contract Terms Act
and Article 6 of the 1980 Hague Convention.
505 So, at least one of the conditions set out in the
three indents of art. 5 (2) has to be satisfied. For a
thorough discussion of these conditions, ~ Giuliano/Lagarde
Report, Comment on Article 5(3). See also Williams, supra
note 500, at 24-25.
507
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contract. This condition is intended to cover, i.a., mail
order and door-step selling.506 Thus the trader must have
done certain acts such as advertising in the press, or on
radio or television, or in the cinema, or by catalogues
aimed specifically at that country, or he must have made
business proposals individually through a middleman or by
canvassing. 507
According to the second indent, Article 5 applies in
situations where the trader or his agent has received the
order of the consumer in the country in which the consumer
has his habitual residence. 508 This would cover, e.g., the
situation where a consumer places an order with a branch of
a foreign company even though that foreign firm has not
advertised in that country. 509
Thirdly, Article 5 applies if the contract is for the
sale of goods and the consumer travelled from the country
of his habitual residence and gave his order in some other
country. The consumer's journey must have been arranged by
506 Giuliano/Lagarde Report, comment 3 on Article 5.
Id.
508 Id. The Giuliano/Lagarde Report explains that there
is a considerable, but not complete, overlap between the
first and the second indents.
509 Williams, supra note 500, at 25.
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to consumer contracts, the Convention does not follow
Provided that the consumer contract is entered into in one
Giuliano/Lagarde Report, comment 3 on Article 5.
I. FletCher, SUDra note 493, at 167.512
511
In describing the situations in which Article 5 applies
provisions parallel to the second and third indents of
Article 5 (2) .511 "The preservation of the force of
mandatory rules for the protection of the consumer under
the law of the latter's habitual residence is thus made
is included in the consumer contract, Article 5(3) contains
a deviation from the principle of Article 4 that normally
-The applicable law in the absence of a choice. Under
the alternative circumstance that no choice of law clause
one hand Article 5 contains no special provision for hire
purchase contracts and loans on deferred terms. On the
other hand, Article 13 of the Judgments Convention has no
Article 13 of the 1968 EEC Judgments Convention. On the
governs the selection of the applicable law in such a case.
conditional upon the presence of a relatively substantial
connection with the jurisdiction in question when the
contract is in its formative stage. ,,512
the seller for the purpose of inducing the consumer to
bUy.510
510 The Giuliano/Lagarde Report coins this as "border-
crossing excursion-selling, i.e. for example, a situation
where a store-owner in country A arranges one day bus trips
for consumers in a neighboring country B with the main
purpose of inducing the consumers to buy in his store. This
is a practice well-known in some areas."
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of the three circumstances described in the previous
paragraphs,S13 it shall be governed by the law of the
country in which the consumer has his habitual residence.S14
The normal policy of a country whose law contains rules
protecting the weak party to a consumer contract will be to
extend this protection to its residents. This social
policy is in general so important that the habitual
residence of the consumer will be regarded as the center of
gravity of a consumer contract. SlS
In this case the scope of protection is more extensive
than in the presence of a choice of law clause because
"Article 5(3) does not content itself with merely
preserving the force of the mandatory rules of the
consumer's "own" law, but indeed goes to the full limit of
making that law in its entirety serve as the proper law of
the contract." S16
-Exclusions.S17 Article 5(4) provides that its consumer
protective provisions of Article 5 do not apply to (a)
contracts of carriage and to (b) contracts for the supply
S13Under one of the connecting elements of Article 5 (2) •
S14 Giuliano/Lagarde Report, comment 4 on Article 5.
SlSLando, New American Choice of Law Princioles and the
Eurooean Conflict of Laws of Contracts, 30 Am. J. Compo L.
19, 35 (1982).
S16 I. Fletcher, suora note 493, at 167. "Moreover, the
words employed by paragraph (3) are absolute ("shall ••. be
governed •.• ") ••• " Id.
S17 For more information about this exclusion, see
Giuliano/Lagarde Report, comment 5 and 6 on Article 5.
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If such a contract is concluded in the circumstances




ii. Mandatory rules: 520
accommodation (e.g. package tours) are not excluded,
protection, between mandatory rules and rules of
substance. 519
described in Article 5 (2), its formal validity is
determined by the law of the country in which the consumer
has his habitual residence.518 This is justified by the
according to Article 5(5).
-Formal validity. A special rule is also established
with regard to the formal validity of a consumer contract.
of services where the services are to be supplied to a
consumer exclusively in a country other than that in which
he has his habitual residence (e.g. hotel accommodation for
a holiday abroad). However, contracts which, for an
inclusive price, provide for a combination of travel and
Giuliano/Lagarde Report, comment II on Article 9.
520 See Fletcher, supra note 493, at 169-72 and Giuliano,
supra note 51, at 252-54.
Four areas are influenced by the concept of mandatory
rules: (1) limitation on the freedom of choice of the
applicable law where all the elements of the contract are
otherwise connected with a different country (Article
3(2», (2) limitation on freedom of choice in certain
consumer contracts (Article 5) and (3) in employment
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contracts (Article 6); and, finally, (4) the general
provisions on mandatory rules (Article 7). Article 7 not
only allows the court to continue to apply the mandatory
rules of the forum, but also empowers the court in
appropriate circumstances, to apply the mandatory rules of
a third country which is neither the forum nor that of the
proper law. 521
Mandatory rules are defined in Article 3(3) as "rules
of law of a country which cannot be derogated from by
contract." That article suggests that such definition is
to be used consistently throughout the Convention because
it reads "hereinafter called mandatory rules". There would
seem to be little difficulty with the definition in the
context in which it was given. Article 3(3) allows the
parties to choose the law of any country but, if all the
elements of the contract are connected with one country,
the choice of the law of a second country is not to
prejudice the application of the mandatory rules of the
first country. The objective is clear: the parties cannot
evade the application of any of the mandatory rules of
their domestic law by a choice of law clause. "Mandatory
rules" rightly has a broad meaning extending to all
domestic laws which cannot be derogated from by contract.522
521 North, supra note 500, at 17.
522 d 8L-:.., at 1 •
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A similarly broad meaning may be justified in the
context of consumer contracts. Here also, the purpose of
the reference to mandatory rules is to limit the freedom to
choose the applicable law.523 Under Article 5(2) a choice
of law, in the restricted class of consumer contracts
covered by Article 5, is to have the result of not
depriving the consumer of protection afforded to him by
mandatory rules of the law of his habitual residence. Once
again, mandatory rules seem to have their broad meaning:
all relevant rules of the law of consumer protection are to
be applied notwithstanding the freedom of choice.524
The only limit on the application of consumer
protective rules of the country of the consumer's residence
would be any spatial limitation contained in such rules.525
It would be "quixotic" to apply such a rule under the
Convention even though, under the law of the country in
question, it did not extend to contracts of an
international character. 526
523 d~
524 North, supra note 500, at 18.
525 Compare Peugeot Motors, 58 L.W. 2389 (C.A. 4, No. 88-
2598, 12/19/89) (New York auto dealership regulatory statutes
are limited in territorial effect to dealers doing business
in New York) and the Explanatory Memorandum to the Dutch Bill
on General Conditions reserving its application for domestic
transactions only, an approach comparable to that of §27(1)
of the British Unfair Contract Terms Act.




The picture changes when Article 7 is considered.
Article 7(2) preserves a generally accepted rule of private
international law, namely that, whatever may be the proper
law and whether it is determined by choice of the parties
or under the rules contained in Article 4 (applicable law
in the absence of a choice of law), the judge may apply
rules of the law of the forum "in a situation where they
are mandatory irrespective of the law applicable to the
contracts". The Giuliano/Lagarde Report expressly refers
to such directly applicable rules as rules on cartels,
competition and restrictive, consumer protection and
certain rules concerning carriage. 527
Under Article 7(1), a judge may give effect to the
mandatory rules of a country, other than that of the proper
law or the forum, if "the situation has a close connection"
with that other country and if, under the law of that
country, those mandatory rules must be applied whatever the
law applicable to the contract.528 The idea of giving
effect to foreign directly applicable rules other than the
proper law of the contract is favored by more and more
authors529 and some support can be found in the case law. 530
Giuliano/Lagarde Report, comment 4 on Article 7.
528 This means, combining Article 3 (3) and Article 7 (1) ,
that if in such a third country there are rules which cannot
be derogated from by contract, they may be applied by the
judge, provided that those rules must, under the law of that
third country,. be applied whatever the law applicable to
contract. North, SUDra note 500, at 19.
529 Lando, EEC Convention, at 210.
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The artisan, the small farmer and fisherman, and the
non-professional party who is not a consumer, are not
afforded the protection provided in Article 5, nor is the
weak "professional" party to a lease of immovable property,
a life insurance, and other contracts tainted with
dirigism. The only means to protect such a weak party by
the law of his habitual residence or another law closely
connected with the contract is by application of Article 7.
But as this article appears it may not give the weak party
the protection he needs. 531 "The Giuliano/Lagarde Report
does not give much guidance as to which mandatory rules are
covered by Article 7(1), and Article 5 ••• , so it seems,
settles the question of consumer protection. In private
law matters the courts may therefore apply Article 7(1)
with caution. Article 7(1) is, however, the only way by
530 See, ~, the famous Dutch Alnati case. For
additional case law, see Giuliano/Lagarde Report, comments
on Article 7.
531 Lando, EEC Convention, at 212. In general, criticism
of the mandatory rule concept has largely concentrated on
Article 7 (1) ~ and the ability to ratify the Convention
without accepting Article 7(1) indicates doubts as to its
desirability and its importance relative to the Convention
as a whole. Jackson, supra note 504, at 73: "Objections
voiced against the provision that it gives greater effect to
a law of a close connection than to the law of the closest
connection, that it will create indefensible uncertainty and
that courts are ill equipped to analyze the nature and
purpose of a foreign legal·rule." See also Philip, Mandatory
Rules, Public Law (Political Rules) and Choice of Law in the
EEC. Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual
Obliaations, in Contract Conflicts: The EEC Convention on the
Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations: A Comparative
Study (P. North ed. 1982), at 81, 103 et seq.
533
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which weak parties not protected elsewhere in the
Convention may be helped." 532
iii. Public policy:
Finally, it should not be forgotten that the
Convention, in Article 16, preserves the widely accepted
rule of private international law that the application of a
rule of the law of any country specified by the choice of
law rules of the Convention may be refused, if such
application is manifestly incompatible with the public
policy ("ordre public") of the forum. Consumers are
protected by this rule to the extent that consumer
protection is part of the public policy of the forum.
This principle is in deep contrast with the concept of
mandatory rules.533 Whenever the forum's public policy is
considered to be violated, the court simply stops the
conflicts process because of its view of the content of the
rule which it is directed to apply. 534
532 Id. at 213: "Instead of providing such inadequate
help the Convention should have let the weak party contracts
be governed by the law of the country which has the greatest
interest in· regulating them." The discretion to apply
Article 7 (1) would make this possible ("effect may be
given"). A somewhat lesser discretion is given in the
provision relating to consumer contracts ("cannot have the
result of depriving").
Id. at 69.
534 The Convention takes the principle advanced by Judge
Cardozo in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., (1918) 224 N.Y. 99,
120 N. E. 1981, in limiting the provision to "manifest






law rules apply. It was impossible to unify these choice
For risks situated outside the Community, the Convention
and its protective rules apply but for risks situated
inside the Community, the national private international
The 1980 EEC Convention created thus a dual system.
b. Insurance contracts.
Article 5 of the 1980 EEC Convention "also applies to
the supply of services, such as insurance, •••,,535But
Under Article 1(4) contracts of reinsurance are covered by
Article 1(3) of the Convention applies only to insurance
contracts which cover risks situated outside the
Community. 536 This exclusion takes account of work being
done within the Community in the field of insurance.537 The
Member States are nevertheless free to apply rules based on
the Convention to risks situated within the Community.538
535 Giuliano/Lagarde Report, comment 2 on Article 5.
536 Giuliano/Lagarde Report, comment 10 on Article 1:
"The provisions of the Convention do not apply to contracts
of insurance covering risks situated in the territories of
Member States of the [EEC] •.•• Thus the uniform rules apply
to contracts of insurance covering risks situated outside
those territories. Insurance contracts, where they cover
risks situated outside the Community, may also, in
appropriate cases, fall under Article 5 of the Convention."
542
residence.
brings most of the provisions of the Convention in a new
part 5 of the Introductory Law of the Civil Code.542
The Federal Republic of Germany has put the 1980 EEC
Convention into force on 1 September 1986: the Law of a New
Enactment of Private International Law of 25 July 1986
a. West Germany. 541
2. National laws.
situated inside the Community but covered by insurance
companies having their head office outside the Community.540
Under this directive, also, the chosen law cannot disregard
mandatory rules of the law of the insured's habitual
choice of law rules for insurance contracts, except for
A recent EEC Directive aims at the unification of the
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of law rules as long as internal barriers prevented the
establishment of a common insurance market. 539
life insurance contracts and for insurance of risks
However, some provisions of the Convention have been left
539 Lagarde, Note sur la Deuxieme Directive du Conseil
du 22 Jtiin 1988, 78 Rev. Crit. de Dr. Int. Priv~ 147 (1989).
540Second Directive of the EEC Council of 22 June 1988,
31 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 172) 1 (1988).
541 See aenerally Dickson, The Reform of Private
International Law in· the Federal Republic of Germany, 34
Int'l & Compo L.Q. 231 (1985).
Gesetz zur Neuregelung des Internationalen
Privatrechts vom 25 Juli 1986, Bundesgesetzblatt 1986, Teil
I, 1142. For a translation, ~ Gildeggen & Langkeit, The
New Conflict of Laws Code Provisions of the Federal Republic
of Germanv: Introductorv Comment and Translation, 17 Ga. J.
Int'l & Compo L. 229 (1986).
543
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out, some have been reformulated, and some have been put in
another part of the Introductory Law which now covers most
of the private international law of the Federal Republic.
This transformation of the provisions of the Convention
into a German law has been made contrary to the advice of
the EEC Commission, and in spite of severe criticism among
others by the Max Planck Institute in Hamburg.543 The
German legislature adopted this attitude in order to
incorporate most of the conflicts rules in one code and to
promote clarity and certainty. 544 Some doubt has been
expressed, however, whether the Federal Republic has
fulfilled its obligation to incorporate the Convention
properly. 545
The provisions relating to consumer contracts are
contained in Article 29 of the Act and are almost identical
to those of Article 5 of the 1980 EEC Convention.546 It is
important to determine which German consumer laws are
considered to be mandatory.
Kodifikation des Deutschen Internationalen
Privatrechts. Stellunanahme des Max Planck· Instituts zum
Reaierunasentwurf von 1983, 47 RabelsZ 595 (1983) and von
Hoffmann, Empfiehlt es Sich das Ubereinkommen fiber das auf
Vertraaliche Schuldverhiiltnisse Anzuwendende Recht in das
Deutsche IPR-Gesetz zu Inkoroorieren?, 4 IPRax 10 (1985).
544 Gildeggen & Langkeit, sUDra note 543, at 236.
545 Triebel, The Choice of Law in Commercial Relations:
A German PersDective, 37 Int'l& Compo L.Q. 935 (1988).
546 The article has been scheduled slightly different and
the provisions of Article 9(5) of the 1980 EEC Convention on
the formal validity of consumer contracts are inserted in the
article on choice of law for consumer contracts.
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In Germany, consumers are protected against unfair
contract terms by the mandatory rules of the Act on the
Regulation of Standardized Contract Terms of 1976.547 The
Act may not be excluded by the choice of a foreign law if
the contract comes into being by virtue of a public offer,
public advertising or other activity in the Federal
Republic of Germany and if the recipient of such
declarations has its residence or habitual residence
there. 548
547 Gesetz zur Regelung des Rechts des Allgemeinen
Geschaftsbedingungen. Triebel, suora note 546, at 939. For
good discussions in English of this Act, ~ Sandrock, The
Standard Terms Act of 1976 of West Germany, 26 Am. J. Compo
L. 551 (1978) and Alpa, Protection of Consumers Aaainst
Unfair Contract Terms: Leaislative Patterns of Controlling
Adhesion Contracts in Eurooe, 105 Willamette L. Rev. 267,
274-76 (1979).
548 Section 12 "International scope of application":
"Where a contract is governed by a foreign law or the law of
the German Democratic Republic, the provisions of this Act
must nevertheless be taken into consideration if: 1) the
contract is entered into on the basis of a public offer, a
public bid or a similar business activity carried out by the
proponent within the territory where this Act is in force,
and if 2) the other contracting party, when expressing his
acceptance for the contract to be concluded, has his domicile
or habitual residence within the territory where the Act is
in force, and expresses such acceptance within that
territory." This statement fails to make clear whether the
required equivalence should exist between the controls on
standard terms in general of the foreign and German law, or
rather as applied to the specific case. Most writers agree
that the level of protection afforded by the German Act
constitutes a minimum standard, and that the foreign law may
not fall short of that level. Duintjer Tebbens, Statutory
Controls on Standard Terms Em-ploved in an International
Context: Is the Cure Worse than the Disease?, in Essays on
International and Comparative Law (Melanges Erades) (1983),
at 32, 36.
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b. The United Kingdom.
The 1980 EEC Convention is not yet implemented in
England although such implementation would not involve
major changes.s49 Special choice of law rules for consumer
contracts are not going to have a great deal of effect in
England because the rules deal with very limited classes of
consumer contracts, few of which occur in England.sso The
decision by the United Kingdom government to exercise its
powers of reservation with respect to Article 7(1), has the
effect in the United Kingdom of removing from the
Convention its most criticized aspect: the widespread
application of foreign mandatory rules. SSl Both Dicey and
S49 "There will be no great substantial change in the
rules which have worked well for a long period; but there
will be the benefit of substantial harmonization throughout
the EEC in an area of law of real significance for the free
provision of goods and services within the Community."
North, supra note 500, at 22-23. See also Collins, Practical
Implications in Enaland of the EEC Convention on the Law
Applicable to Contractual Obligations, in Contact Conflicts:
The EEC Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual
Obligations: A Comparative Study (P. North ed., 1982), at 205
and Jaffey, The Enalish Proper Law Doctrine and the EEC
Convention, 33 Int'l & Compo L.Q. 531 (1984).
sso North, supra note 500, at 22-23. "There will be no
great substantial change in the rules which have worked well
for a long period; but there will be the benefit of
substantial harmonization throughout the EEC in an area of
law of real significance for the free provision of goods and
services within the Community." Jackson, supra note 504, at
70.
SSl Jackson, supra note 504, at 70. "English law has
not distinguished between the mandatory rule application and
the public policy refusal. Indeed, apart from legislative
direction of which there is little, it may not be too extreme
to say that the idea of mandatory rules overriding the choice
of law process will come as a novel experience to the English
judiciary. If nothing else, the Convention categorization
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Morris552 and Cheshire and North553 are agreed that the basic
rules of the Convention do not differ significantly from
the present choice of law rules applicable in England.
The two most important United Kingdom consumer
protection laws containing mandatory rules are the Consumer
Credit Act of 1974 and the Unfair Contract Terms Act of
1977. The former contains only marginal conflicts
provisions.554 The Unfair Contract Terms Act, on the other
hand, contains important conflicts provisions and these
merit consideration in some detail.555
There are three provisions in the Act which deal with
conflict of laws: §§ 26, 27(1) and 27(2). The first two
sections are concerned with situations in which the
mandatory rules will not apply; the third section states
when they must apply, irrespective of any choice of law
of the variants on mandatory rules and public policy will
remove the undefined catch-all which has plagued English law
for no little time."
552 Dicey & Morris, Conflicts (10th ed. 1980), at 827.
553 Cheshire & North, at 250.
554 See §43 (2 )(c) of the Act regarding the international
scope of the provisions of the Act regulating advertising.
555 See aenerall v Burgess, Consumer Adhesion Contracts
and Unfair Terms: A critique of Current Theorv and a
suaaestion, 45 AnglO-Am. L. Rev. 255 (1986); Coote, Unfair
Contract Terms Act, 41 Mod. L. Rev. 312 (1978); Sealy, Unfair
Contract Terms Act 1977, 37 Cambridge J.L. 15 (1978) and
Adams, An Unfair Look at the Contract Provisions of the
Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, 41 Mod. L. Rev. 703 (1978).
For future perspectives, ~ Borrie, Consumer Protection Laws
for the 1990's, 1988 J. Bus. L. 116.
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clause. The purpose of §26 is to make the mandatory
provisions of the Act inapplicable to an "international
supply contract". 556 The second conflicts provision, §27 (1)
states that if the law of some part of the United Kingdom
is applicable to the contract only because of a choice by
the parties, the mandatory provisions of the Act will not
apply.
The third conflicts provision (§27(2», the most
important one, states that, notwithstanding a choice of law
clause in favor of a foreign system, the Act will apply if
either of the following conditions is fulfilled: (a) the
choice of law clause appears to have been included wholly
or mainly in order to evade the Act; or (b) one party was a
consumer habitually resident in the United Kingdom and "the
essential steps necessary for the making of the contract
were taken there, whether by him or by others on his
behalf. ,,557 This provision is akin to Article 5 of the 1980
EEC Convention and grants, consequently, a fair amount of
protection to consumers.
c. Other Member States.
The 1980 EEC Convention was signed by the
plenipotentiaries of Belgium, The Federal Republic of
Germany, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg and the
Netherlands. Seven ratifications are necessary for its
556 Hartley, SUDra note 29, at 119.
557 Id. at 121.
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entry into force, 558 but an anticipatory application is
possible: "Of course, there is no provision preventing a
Court of a contracting State with respect to which the
Convention has not yet entered into force from applying it
in advance under the concept of ratio scripta.". 559 And
indeed, "the principles and rules of the Convention are
gaining ground among European courts even before the
Convention has come into force. ,,560
For the Netherlands such anticipatory application is
very conceivable. 561 Italy and France562 have ratified the
Convention but have not put it into force yet. Denmark has
put the Convention into force on 1 July 1984563 and Belgium
558 Article 29.
559 Giuliano/Lagarde Report, comment on Article 17.
560 Lando, New American Choice of Law Principles and the
European Conflict of Laws of Contracts, 30 Am. J. Compo L.
19, 31 (1982).
561 For example, in the Explanatory Memorandum to the
Dutch Bill on General Conditions, the Dutch Minister of
Justice expects that art. 5 of the 1980 EEC Convention will
have an anticipatory effect on Dutch Private International
Law, even before its ratification. Thus, consumers residing
in the Netherlands would be sufficiently protected. Duintjer
Tebbens, Supra note 549, at 39 referring to Doc. 16 1983 No.
3, at 66-67.
562 See aenerally Minor, Consumer Protection in French
Law: General Principles and Recent Developments, 33 Int'l &
Compo L.Q. 108 (1984).
563 Lando, The EEC Convention on the Law Applicable to
Contractual Obliaations, 24 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 159, 162.
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on 14 July 1987.564 Both countries have incorporated the
Convention in their domestic law as an appendix to the Act
which introduces it. In Luxembourg the Convention has also
been put into effect.565
It is noteworthy that the EEC Members, on 19 December
1988, signed a Protocol endowing the EEC Court of Justice
with the authority to interpret the Convention. In so
doing, the Member States have expressed their confidence in
the Convention. Therefore, it is expected that the
necessary seven ratifications will soon be reached. As
explained, six Member States have already ratified the
Convention (Belgium, Denmark, Italy, the Federal Republic
of Germany, France and Luxembourg) while the ratification
by a seventh Member State (the Netherlands) is expected
very soon.566
564 Statute of 14 July 1987, Moniteur 9 October 1987.
See De Valkeneer, La Convention Eurooeenne sur la Loi
Aoolicableaux Obliaations Contractuelles, 1987 Revue du
Notariat 626; De Ly, Rechtskeuze en Internationale
Overeenkomsten: Implicaties van de Invoerina van het Eurooees
Overeenkomstenconflictenverdrag, 1989 Tijdschrift voor
Privaatrecht 1001; Fallon, Le Nouvel Aaencement des Reales
de Conflit de Lois en Matiere de Contrats, 1988 Journal des
Tribunaux 469; Morris, Het EEG Verdraa van 1980 inzake het
Recht dat van Toeoassina is 00 Verbintenissen uit
Overeenkomst, 1988-89 Jura Falconis 37; Hanotiau, La
Convention CEE sur la Loi Aoplicable aux Obliaations
Contractuelles, 1982 Journal des Tribunaux 749 and G. Van
Hecke & K. Lenaerts, Internationaal Privaatrecht, Algemene
praktische Rechtsverzameling (1987) at 110, 132, 317, 333.
565 Lando, EEC Convention, at 162.
566 Lagarde, Note sous les Protocoles du 19 Decembre
1988, 78 Rev. Crit. de Dr. Int'l Prive 414, 420 (1989).
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D. The Haaue Conference on Private International Law.
This Conference constitutes a reflexion of modern legal
thinking concerning topics of private international law and
this on a rather universal scale.567
Back in 1955, the Conference concluded a Convention on
the Law Applicable to the International Sale of Goods.
This Convention was a failure568 and it was unclear whether
it applied to consumer contracts. Therefore, a new
Convention on this subject was drafted in the 1985 session
of the Conference. This draft was adjusted to the 1980
U.N. Convention on the International Sale of Goods, signed
in Vienna. In addition, a new and separate Convention on
Consumer Sales was drafted. 569
The extensive work done by the Hague Conference on
choice of law for consumer sales was published in the Acts
and Documents of the Fourteenth Session of the Hague
567 See Parra-Aranguren, La Conferencia de La Hava sobre
Derecho Internacional Privado, 37 Revista de la Facultad de
Derechode la Universidad Cat61ica Andres Bello 169 (1987)
and Rabel, Haaue Conference on Unification of Sales Law, 1
Am. J. Comp. L. 58 (1952).
568 It was meant to be universally applicable but so far
it is only applicable in nine countries (Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, France, Italy, Niger, Norway, Sweden and
Switzerland) •
569 For a clear history of this evolution, ~ Pelichet,
La Vente Internationale de Marchandises et Ie Conflit de
Lois, 201 Rec. des Cours 9 (1987). See also Lagarde, La
Nouvelle Convention de La Have sur la Loi Applicable aux
Contrats de Vente Internationale de Marchandises, 1985 Revue
de Droit International Compare 327 and Lando, The 1985 Haaue
Convention on the Law Applicable to Sales, 51 RabelsZ 60(1987).
571
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Conference on Private International Law (6-25 October
1980), Part II, Consumer Sales. 570
The Hague Conference's work on consumer sales strongly
influenced the provisions on this point included in the
1980 EEC Convention. This explains why the Hague
Convention on the Law Applicable to Certain Consumer
Sales571 is substantially similar in many ways to the
consumer provisions of the 1980 EEC Convention.572 Like the
1980 EEC Convention, the Hague Convention's main purpose is
to ensure that the mandatory consumer protection rules of
the country of the consumer's habitual residence will apply
in appropriate cases, even in the presence of a choice of
law clause.573 This law will also be the proper law if
there is no express choice of law. 574
570 Some mention of the problem is also made in the
volume Acts and Documents of the Extraordinary Session of
October 1985, Report by M. Pelichet, at 52.
For the text of this Convention, ~ Appendix 7.
572 See Diamond, Harmonization of Private International
Law relatina to Contractual Obliqations, 199 Rec. des Cours
233 (1986); Diamond, Conventions and Their Revision:
Unification, in Liber Amicorum J.G •. Sauveplanne (1984);
Imhoff-Scheier, Quelaues Observations sur Ie proiet de
Convention de La Have sur la Loi Applicable a Certaines
Ventes aux Consommateurs, 37 Annuaire Suisse de Droit
International 129 (1981); Pelichet, Les Ventes aux
Consommateurs, 168 Rec. des Cours 185 (1980) and von
Overbeck, Le Proiet de Convention de La Have sur la Loi
Applicable a Certaines Ventes aux Consommateurs, 37 Annuaire
Suisse de Droit International 96 (1981).
573 Article 6. Hartley, supra note 29, at 122-23.
574 Article 7. This. too is a provision of the 1980 EEC
Convention • Given this rule, the important question is when
a contract will be regarded as sufficiently closely connected
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At present, the future of this Hague Convention is
unclear. It covers the same ground as Article 5 of the
1980 EEC Convention and if some, but not all, of the EEC
Member States become party to it, the attempt to unify the
conflicts rules in this area will be thwarted. In such a
case the Hague Convention would prevail in those countries
which are parties to it,575 while the consumer provisions of
the 1980 EEC Convention would continue to apply in the
other Member States.576 Nevertheless, this would not be an
important impediment to effective consumer protection since
the two Conventions are based on the same principle. The
main difference is their scope. The Hague Convention only
applies to consumer sales while the 1980 EEC Convention
applies to a wider range of consumer contracts.
E. Comparative analysis of American and EEC law.
The focus of any comparative study of a legal system
should not be directed strictly at the legal institutions
themselves. An institution which works effectively in one
system or context may not in another. Rather such a study
must address the basic problems that the institutions try
to solve. The starting point must be a societal problem,
with the consumer's country for the law of that country to
apply. The test is laid down in Article 5, which is similar
to Article 5(2) of the 1980 EEC Convention. Id.
575 See Article 21 of the 1980 EEC Convention.
576Hartley, supra note 29, at 123.
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not an institution itself. The societal problem addressed
in this thesis is the weak bargaining position of the
consumer.
Both in the United States and in the EEC, a need for
special protection in the field of private international
law has been experienced.577 It cannot be determined yet
which system is most effective since the 1980 EEC
Convention has not entered into force. But the similarity
between the two systems is remarkable. 578
Both United States and European draftsmen had to
address the problem of disparate bargaining strength and
contracts of adhesion. Both the Restatement (Second) and
the 1980 EEC Convention recognize that complete freedom to
choose the applicable law would pervert the principle of
party autonomy in situations where one party has no
effective contractual freedom. According to the second
577 Valuable information for this analysis was found in
Cohen, The EEC Convention and u.s. Law Governina Choice of
Law for Contracts, with Particular Emphasis on the
Restatement (Second), 13 Md. J. of Int'l L. & Trade 223
(1989); Weintraub, How to Choose Law for Contracts and How
Not To: The EEC Convention, 17 Tex. Int'l L.J. 155 (1982);
Contract Conflicts: The EEC Convention on the Law Applicable
to Contractual Obligations: A Comparative Study (P. North ed.
1982); The Influence of Modern American Conflicts Theories
on European Law, 30 Am. J. Comp.· L. 1 (1982); The European
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obliaations,
22 Va. J. Int'l L. 91 (1981) and weintraub, Functional
Developments.
578 "There are good reasons for questioning whether
American and European conflicts law and reality are as far
apart as is often assumed. It seems that the principal
differences lie in the realm of doctrine." Juenger, American
and European Conflicts Law, 30 Am. J. Compo L. 117 (1982).
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Restatement, the one-sided use of bargaining power to
dictate the applicable law may vitiate consent (§187
Comment b). The 1980 EEC Convention is more direct and
specific. It distinguishes between regular contracts and
consumer contracts, and it restricts the power to stipulate
the applicable law for the latter (Article 5). These
provisions illustrate some of the remarkable similarities,
both in outline and in detail, between the Convention and
the second Restatement.
This similarity between Article 5 of the 1980 EEC
Convention and §187 Comment b of the Restatement (Second)
can hardly be accidental.579 One explanation is their
common origin: the distinction between ordinary agreements
and consumer contracts can be traced to Ehrenzweig.580
Also, the European tendency to protect consumers in private
international law is part of the general movement to pay
greater attention to the social realities underlying legal
developments. This is "a kind of interest analysis. ,,581
Further, this similarity reveals a shared frustration
of draftsmen who faced the same dilemma. On the one hand,
the drafters on both sides of the Atlantic yearned for
579 Another remarkable similarity is that between Article
3 of the 1980 EEC Convention and §187 of the second
Restatement. See Cohen, sU9ra note 577, at 230-32.
580 See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
581 Vitta, The Impact in Europe of the American
"Conflicts Revolution", 30 Am. J. Compo L. 1, 12 (1982).
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certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, values
that only fixed rules can safeguard. But on the other
hand, they realized that rules, even if not unduly rigid,
are likely to lead to undesirable results. 582 To escape
this dilemma, the Europeans, like the Americans, adopted a
non-rule approach: "Sometimes the Convention only indicates
to the judge the intellectual step he has to follow rather
than dictate the solution to be adopted. ,,583
The basic difference between the second Restatement
(and American case law in general so it seems) and the 1980
EEC Convention relating to consumer contracts is one of
formulation. 584 Where the EEC Convention contains a
specific provisions for consumer contracts, in the United
States consumers are protected under the general rule
582 This vagueness of the codified rules of the 1980 EEC
Convention has been criticized for it would reduce the
Convention to a statement of broad principles and would not
provide effective guidance either to the judge faced with
problems of conflict solution or to the draftsman of a
contract engaged in techniques of conflict avoidance.
Delaume, Why a Convention?, 22 Va. J. of Int'l L. 105, 107
(1981).
583 Lagarde, An Apologia, 22 Va. J. Int'l L. 92, 93
(1981). For consumer contracts this intellectual step is an
exercise in justice: judges have to seek a just solution for
consumer's benefit. "It is refreshing to see that a line has
been drawn on the international level between consumer and
employment contracts, and other agreements. This distinction
appropriately recognizes that conflicts law must share the
burden of delivering justice." Juenger, Some Critical
Observations, 22 Va. J. of Int'l L. 123, 141 (1981).
584 See Cohen, supra note 577, at 237-38.
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requiring that policies underlying laws of interested
states should not be frustrated. 585
In conclusion, we can say that the u.s. and the EEC
have adopted similar solutions to an identical societal
problem: "If the EEC Convention is adopted and the
Restatement (Second) followed, then they are really
close. ,,586
585 Comment b on §187 of the Restatement (Second)
declares this rule applicable to laws aimed at the protectionof weak parties.
586 Lando, New American Choice of Law Principles and the
European Conflict of Laws of Contracts, 30 Am. J. Compo L.
19, 35 (1982).
SUHMARY OF CONCLUSIONS.
The following conclusions can be drawn from the
discussion of the various issues covered in this thesis.
First, unlike regional harmonization, a global
harmonization of choice of law rules concerning consumer
contracts cannot be effective as such. A prerequisite to
an effective global harmonization is a balance of the
economic, social and legal situation in the developed and
the less developed countries. The developed countries are
the main exporters of goods and services. Generally, these
countries have enacted consumer' legislation while less
developed countries do not have such legislation.
Nevertheless, the people in less developed countries who
receive goods and services cannot benefit from the
protective laws of the developed countries when the law of
their domicile is applied.
Second, to circumvent this obstacle, an extremely
protective and flexible approach could be adopted which
would require a judge to choose the most protective law
among all laws involved. In the United States such an
approach seems possible under the flexible case law. In
the EEC, the more rigid rules of the 1980 EEC Convention do
no seem to allow it.
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Third, as explained above, each legal system determines
the values it chooses to promote. Accordingly, it will
apply a private international law approach that favors
these values. However, an absolute argument is not
available to defend any system. This thesis contends that
the justified expectations of the consumers should be
protected. It should therefore be a minimum standard of
protection that consumers should not be surprised by the
application of a law that is less protective than the law
that could normally be expected to apply, i.e., usually,
the law of the consumer's domicile or habitual residence.
The question should be raised why consumers should
receive more protection in case of an international
contract than in case of a domestic contract. Reasonably,
it can only be expected that a consumer will not loose the
protection granted to him by his own jurisdiction. Why
consumers should be allowed to enjoy the protection of
foreign laws and why this should only be possible in the
case of an international contract are questions calling for
a subjective answer based on policy grounds.
Fourth, it seems that a rigid definition of consumers
and consumer contracts excludes cases in which the same
protection would be justified although technically the
contract in question does not qualify as a consumer
contract. When a dentist, for instance, buys apparel for
his profession, he is in the same weak bargaining position
as an ordinary consumer. Since this is not a contract to
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buy material for personal, family or household use, it does
not qualify as a consumer contract and, consequently, the
dentist cannot claim the protection he enjoys when he buys
a lawn mower. An approach based on unreasonableness,
unfairness, unconscionability and oppressive use of
bargaining strength would solve this problem.
Fifth, in order to effectively protect all consumers
through private international law, "we may need a true
private international law, one that does not rely on choice
of law approaches (which have long been found wanting), but
is directly applicable to individuals and recognizes the
importance of substantive values. If we were to abandon
the "archfiction" of sovereignty, the conflict of laws
could conceivably mature into such private international
law. No longer would this discipline have to divine the
scope of "legislative jurisdiction;" it could assume the
more challenging and creative role of facilitating
transnational transactions. Why should the benefit of
denationalizing multistate law be reserved to such powerful
actors as multinational corporations and be withheld from
tort victims, support claimants and consumers?" 587 This
suggestion implies a fundamental change in today's private
international law.
587 Juenger, Academic Workshop: Should. We Continue to
Distinguish Between Public and Private International Law?
(remarks), 1985 Proc. Am. Soc'y Int'l L. 353, 355.
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Finallv, after all, it should not be forgotten that
substantive rules are of cardinal importance to consumer
protection. They are a conditio sine qua non for consumer
protection through private international law. If no
substantive rules protect consumer interests, they cannot
be chosen in the first place and private international law
cannot grant any protection to consumers. Choice of law
rules protecting consumers are therefore but an
intermediary step towards an adequate protection of
consumer interests. The ultimate solution is the
harmonization of the substantive laws of consumer
protection. No conflict of laws would occur in the first
place and all consumers would enjoy the same standard of
protection.
APPENDIX 1: SCBEHE OF PROTECTIVE DEVICES.
A. PARTY AUTONOMY EXCLUDED: the otherwise applicable law
applies.
THE OTHERWISE APPLICABLE LAW: various possibilities.
- the place of contracting.
- the place of performance.
- the place of the characteristic performance.
- the place of the consumer's habitual residence.
- modern approach (e.g. center of gravity).
- most favorable law for the consumer (for the
entire contract or for specific issues).
B. PARTY AUTONOMY ALLOWED: the law of the parties' choice
applies unless there is a
restriction to this freedom.
1. UNRESTRICTED FREEDOM: the chosen law governs always.
2. RESTRICTED FREEDOM: the chosen law can be overridden.
- if the mandatory rules of the otherwise
applicable law provide more protection.
- if the forum's public policy is violated.
- if a directly applicable rule (d.a.r.) of the
forum is violated.
- if a d.a.r. of any other forum is violated.
- if any other connected forum provides moreprotection.
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APPENDIX 2: THE CHOICE OF LAW METHODS FOR CONTRACTS









District of Columbia: center of gravity.
Florida: first Restatement.
Georgia: first Restatement.









588 From Smith, Choice of Law in the United States, 38











New Hampshire: SECOND RESTATEMENT.
New Jersey: center of gravity.
New Mexico: first Restatement.
New York: interest analysis.
North Carolina: first Restatement.




Pennsylvania: center of gravity.
Rhode Island: first Restatement.
South Carolina: first Restatement.








West Virginia: SECOND RESTATEMENT.






center of gravity: 4.
Leflar's better rule approach: 3.
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APPENDIX 3: UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE II 1-105 AND 2-203.
§ 1-105. Territorial Application of the Act; Parties'
Power to Choose Applicable Law.
(1) Except as provided hereafter in this section, when
a transaction bears a reasonable relation to this state and
also to another state or nation, the parties may agree that
the law either of this state or of such other state or
nation shall govern their rights and duties. Failing such
agreement this Act applies to transactions bearing an
appropriate relation to this state.
(2) Where one of the following provisions of this Act
specifies the applicable law, that provision governs and a
contrary agreement is affective only to the extent
permitted by the law (including the conflict of laws rules)
so specified:
Rights of creditors against sold goods. Section 2-
402.
Applicability of the Article on Bank Deposits and
Collections. Section 4-102.
Bulk transfers subject to the Article on Bulk
Transfers. Section 6-102.




Perfection provisions of the Article on Secured
Transactions. Section 9-103.
§ 2-203. Unconscionable Contract or Clause.
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract
or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable
at the time it was made, the court may refuse to enforce
the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the
contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so
limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to
avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the
contract or any clause thereof may be unconscionable, the
parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to
present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and
effect to aid the court in making the determination.
APPENDIX 4: RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § § 6.
186 AND FOLLOWING.
INTRODUCTION.
§ 6. Choice of Law Principles.
(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions,
will follow a statutory directive of its own state on
choice of law.
(2) When there is no such directive, the factors
relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law
include
(a) the needs of the interstate and international
systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states
and the relative interests of those states in the
determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field
of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result,
and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the
law to be applied.
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CONTRACTS: TOPIC 1. VALIDITY OF CONTRACTS AND RIGB'l'S
CREATED THEREBY.
TITLE A. General PrinciDles.
§ 186. Applicable Law.
Issues in contract are determined by the law chosen by
the parties in accordance with the rule of § 187 and
otherwise by the law selected in accordance with the rule
of § 188.
§ 187. Law of the State Chosen by the Parties.
(1) The law of the state chosen by the parties to
govern their contractual rights and duties will be applied
if the particular issue is one which the parties could have
resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement
directed to that issue.
(2) The law of the state chosen by the parties to
govern their contractual rights and duties will be applied,
even if the particular issue is one which the parties could
not have resolved by an explicit provision in their
agreement directed to that issue, unless either
(a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to
the parties or the transaction and there is no
other reasonable basis for the parties' choice, or
(b) application of the law of the chosen state would be
contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which
has a materially greater interest than the chosen
state in the determination of the particular issue
-
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and which, under the rule of § 188, would be the
state of the applicable law in the absence of an
effective choice of law by the parties.
(3) In the absence of a contrary indication of
intention, the reference is to the local law of the state
of the chosen law.
§ 188. Law Governing in Absence of Effective Choice by the
Parties.
(1) The rights and duties of the parties with respect
to an issue in contract are determined by the local law of
the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most
significant relationship to the transaction and the parties
under the principles stated in § 6.
(2) In the absence of an effective choice of law by the
parties (see § 187), the contracts to be taken into account
in applying the principles of § 6 to determine the law
applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place of contracting,
(b) the place of negotiation of the contract,
(c) the place of performance,
(d) the location of the subject matter of the contract,
and
(e) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of
incorporation and place of business of the parties.
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These contacts are to be evaluated according to their
relative importance with respect to the particular
issue.
(3) If the place of negotiating the contract and the
place of performance are in the same state, the local law
of this state will usually be applied, except as otherwise
provided in §§ 189-199 and 203.
TITLE B. Particular contracts.
§ 189. Contracts for the Transfer of Interests in Land.
The validity of a contract for the transfer of an
interest in land and the rights created thereby are
determined, in the absence of an effective choice of law by
the parties, by the local law of the state where the land
is situated unless, with respect to the particular issue,
some other state has a more significant relationship under
the principles stated in § 6 to the transaction and the
parties, in which event the local law of the other state
will be applied.
§ 190. Contractual Duties Arising from Transfer of
Interests in Land.
The contractual duties imposed upon the parties to a
deed of transfer of an interest in land are determined, in
the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties,
by the local law of the state where the land is situated
unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other
state has a more significant relationship under the
-
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principles stated in § 6 to the transaction and the
parties, in which event the local law of the other state
will be applied.
§ 191. Contracts to Sell Interests in Chattel.
The validity of a contract for the sale of an interest
in a chattel and the rights created thereby are determined,
in the absence of an effective choice of law by the
parties, by the local law of the state where under the
terms of the contract the seller is to deliver the chattel
unless with respect to the particular issue, some other
state has a more significant relationship under the
principles stated in § 6 to the transaction and the
parties, in which event the local law of the other state
will be applied.
§192 Life Insurance Contracts.
The validity of a life insurance contract issued to the
insured upon his application and the rights created thereby
are determined, in the absence of an effective choice of
law by the insured in his application, by the local law of
the state where the insured was domiciled at the time the
policy was applied for, unless, with respect to the
particular issue, some other state has a more significant
relationship under the principles stated in § 6 to the
transaction and the parties, in which event the local law
of the other state will be applied.
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§ 193. Contracts of Fire, Surety of Casualty Insurance.
The validity of a contract of fire, surety or casualty
insurance and the rights created thereby are determined by
the local law of the state which the parties understood was
to be the principal location of the insured risk during the
term of the policy, unless, with respect to the particular
issue, some other state has a more significant relationship
under the principles stated in § 6 to the transaction and
the parties, in which event the local law of the other
state will be applied.
§ 195. Contracts for the Repayment of Honey Lent.
The validity of a contract for the repayment of money
lent and the rights created thereby are determined, in the
absence of an effective choice of law by the parties, by
the local law of the state where the contract requires that
repayment be made, unless, with respect to the particular
issue, some other state has a more significant relationship
under the principles stated in § 6 to the transaction and
the parties, in which event the local law of the other
state will be applied.
§ 196. Contracts for the Rendition of Services.
The validity of a contract for the rendition of
services and the rights created thereby are determined, in
the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties,
by the local law of the state where the contract requires
that the services, or a major portion of the services, be
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rendered, unless, with respect to the particular issue,
some other state has a more significant relationship under
the principles stated in § 6 to the transaction and the
parties, in which event the local law of the other state
will be applied.
§ 197. Contracts of Transportation.
The validity of a contract for the transportation of
passengers or goods and the rights created thereby are
determined, in the absence of an effective choice of law by
the parties, by the local law of the state from which the
passenger departs or the goods are dispatched, unless, with
respect to the particular issue, some other state has a
more significant relationship under the principles stated
in § 6 to the transaction and the parties, in which event
the local law of the other state will be applied.
TITLE C. Particular issues.
§ 198. Capacity to Contract.
(1) The capacity of the parties to contract is
determined by the law selected by application of the rules
of §§ 187-188.
(2) The capacity of a party to contract will usually be
upheld if he has such capacity under the local law of the
state of his domicil.
§ 199. Requirements of a Writing-Formalities.
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(1) The formalities required to make a valid contract
are determined by the law selected by application of the
rules of §§ 187-188.
(2) Formalities which meet the requirements of the
place where the parties execute the contract will usually
be acceptable.
§ 200. Validity of a Contract in Respects Other Than
Capacity and Foxmalities.
The validity of a contract, in respects other than
capacity and formalities, is determined by the law selected
by application of the rules of §§ 187-188.
§ 201. Misrepresentation, Duress, Undue Influence and
Mistake.
The effect of misrepresentation, duress, undue
influence and mistake upon a contract is determined by the
law selected by application of the rules of §§ 187-188.
§ 202. Illegality.
(1) The effect of illegality upon a contract is
determined by the law selected by application of the rules
of §§ 187-188.
(2) When performance is illegal in the place of





The validity of a contract will be sustained against
the charge of usury if it provides for a rate of interest
that is permissible in a state to which the contract has a
substantial relationship and is not greatly in excess of
the rate permitted by the general usury law of the state of
the otherwise applicable law under the rule of § 188.
§ 204. Construction of Words Used in Contract.
When the meaning which the parties intended to convey by
words used in a contract cannot satisfactorily be
ascertained, the words will be construed
(a) in accordance with the local law of the state
chosen by the parties, or
(b) in the absence of such a choice, in accordance with
the local law of the state selected by application
of the rule of § 188.
§ 205. Nature and Extent of Contractual Obligations.
The nature and extent of the rights and duties created
by a contract are determined by the local law of the state
selected by application of the rules of §§ 187-188.
§ 206. Details of Performance.
Issues relating to details of performance of a contract
are determined by the local law of the place of
performance.
§ 207. Keasure of Recovery.
The measure of recovery for a breach of contract is
determined by the local law of the state selected by
application of the rules of §§ 187-188.
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APPENDIX 5: THE EEC CONVENTION ON THE LAW APPLICABLE TO
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS ( SELECTED ARTICLES).
Article 3. Freedom of Choice.
(1) A contract shall be governed by the law chosen by
the parties. The choice must be expressed or demonstrated
with reasonable certainty by the terms of the contract or
the circumstances of the case. By their choice the parties
can select the law applicable to the whole or ap art of the
contract.
(2) The parties may at any time agree to subject the
contract to a law other than that which previously governed
it, whether as a result of and earlier choice under this
article or other provisions of this Convention Any
variation by the parties of the law to be applied made
after the conclusion of the contract shall not prejudice
its formal validity under Article 9 or adversely affect the
rights of third parties.
(3) The fact that the parties have chosen a foreign
law, whether or not accompanied by the choice of a foreign
tribunal, shall not, where all the other elements relevant
to the situation at the time of the choice are connected
with one country only, prejudice the application of rules
of the law of that country which cannot be derogated from
by contract, hereinafter called "mandatory rules."
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(4) The existence and validity of the consent of the
parties as to the choice of the applicable law shall be
determined in accordance with the provisions of Articles 8,
9 and 11.
Article 4. Applicable Law in the Absence of Choice.
(1) To the extent that the law applicable to the
contract has not been chosen in accordance with Article 3,
the contract shall be governed by the law of the country
with which it is most closely connected. Nevertheless, a
severable part of the contract which has a closer
connection with another country may by way of exception be
governed by the law of that other country.
(2) Subject to paragraph 5 of this article, it shall be
presumed that the contract is most closely connected with
the country where the party who is to effect the
performance which is characteristic of the contract has, at
the time of conclusion of the contract, his habitual
residence or, in the case of a body corporate or
incorporate, its central administration. However, if the
contract is entered into in the course of that party's
trade or profession, that country shall be the country in
which the principal place of business is situated or, where
under the terms of the contract the performance is to be
effected through a place of business other than the
principal place of business, the country in which that
other place of business is situated.
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(5) Paragraph (2) shall not apply if the characteristic
performance cannot be determined •••
Article 5. Certain Consumer Contracts.
(1) This article applies to a contract the object of
which is the supply of goods or services to a person "the
consumer" for a purpose which can be regarded as being
outside his trade or profession, or a contract for the
provision of credit for that object.
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 3, a
choice of law made by the parties shall not have the result
of depriving the consumer of the protection afforded to him
by the mandatory rules of the law of the country in which
he has his habitual residence:
-if in that country the conclusion of the contract
was preceded by a specific invitation addressed to him by
advertising, and he had taken in that country all the steps
necessary on his part for the conclusion of the contract,
or
-if the other party or his agent received the
consumer's order in that country, or
-if the contract is for the sale of goods and the
consumer traveled from that country and there gave his
order, provided that the consumer's journey was arranged by
the seller for the purpose of inducing the consumer to buy.
(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 4, a
contract to which this article applies shall, in the
absence of choice in accordance with Article 3, be governed
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by the law of the country in which the consumer has his
habitual residence if it is entered into in the
circumstances described in paragraph 2 of this article.
(4) This article shall not apply to:
(a) a contract of carriage;
(b) a contract for the supply of services where
the services are to be supplied to the consumer exclusively
in a country other than that in which he has his habitual
residence.
(5) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 4, this
article shall apply to a contract which, for an inclusive
price, provides for a combination of travel and
accommodation.
Article 7. Mandatory Rules.
(1) When applying under this Convention the law of a
country, effect may be given to the mandatory rules of the
law of another country with which the situation has a close
connection, if and in so far as, under the law of the
latter country, those rules must be applied whatever the
law applicable to the contract. In considering whether to
give effect to those mandatory rules, regard s hall be had
to their nature and purpose and to the consequences of
their application or non-application.
(2) Nothing in this Convention shall restrict the
application of the rules of the law of the forum in a
situation where they are mandatory irrespective of the law
otherwise applicable to the contract.
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Article 8. Material Validity.
(1) The existence and validity of a contract, or of any
term of a contract, shall be determined by the law which
would govern it under this Convention if the contract or
term were valid.
(2) Nevertheless, a party may rely upon the law of the
country in which he has his habitual residence to establish
that he did not consent if it appears from the
circumstances that it would not be reasonable to determine
the effect of his conduct in accordance with the law
specified in the preceding paragraph.
Article 9. Formal Validity.
(5) The provisions of the preceding paragraphs shall
not apply to a contract to which Article 5 applies,
concluded in the circumstances described in paragraph 2 of
Article 5. The formal validity of such a contract is
governed by the law of the country in which the consumer
has his habitual residence.
Article 16. "Ordre Public."
The application of a rule of the law of any country
specified by this Convention may be refused only if such
application is manifestly incompatible with the public
policy (ordre public) of the forum.
Article 21. Relationship with Other Conventions.
This Convention shall not prejudice the application of
international conventions to which a Contracting State is,
or becomes, a party.
APPENDIX 6: THE EEC CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION AND
ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGEMENTS IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL HATTERS
( SELECTED ARTICLES).
SECTION 3: JURISDICTION IN HATTERS RELATING TO INSURANCE.
Article 12. Agreement between the parties on jurisdiction.
The provisions of this Section may be departed from
only by an agreement on jurisdiction:
1. which is entered into after the dispute has arisen;
or
2. which allows the policy-holder, the insured or a
beneficiary to bring proceedings in courts other than those
indicated in this Section; or
3. which is concluded between a policy-holder and an
insurer, both of whom are at the time of conclusion of the
contract domiciled or habitually resident in the same
Contracting State, and which has the effect of conferring
jurisdiction on the courts of that State even if the
harmful event were to occur abroad, provided that such an
agreement is not contrary to the law of that State; or
4. which is concluded with a policy-holder who is not
domiciled in a Contracting State, except in so far as the
insurance is compulsory or relates to immovable property in
a Contracting State; or
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5. which relates to a contract of insurance in so far
as it covers one or more of the risks set out in Article
12A.
SECTION 4: JURISDICTION OVER CONSUMER CONTRACTS.
Article 13. Contracts for sale of goods or supply of
services.
In proceedings concerning a contract concluded by a
person for a purpose which can be regarded as being outside
his trade or profession, hereinafter called "the consumer",
jurisdiction shall be determined by this Section, without
prejudice to the provisions of Articles 4 and 5(5), if it
is:
1. a contract for the sale of goods on instalment
credit terms; or
2. a contract for a loan repayable by installments, or
for any other form of credit, made to finance the sale of
goods; or
3. any other contract for the supply of goods or a
contract for the supply of services, and
(a) in the State of the Consumer's domicile, the
conclusion of the contract was preceded by a specific
invitation addressed to him or by advertising, and
(b) the consumer took in that State the steps necessary
for the conclusion of the contract.
Where a consumer enters into a contract with a party
who is not domiciled in a Contracting State but has a
-
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branch, agency or other establishment in one of the
Contracting States, the party shall, in disputes arising
out of the operations of the branch, agency or
establishment, be deemed to be domiciled in that State.
This Section shall not apply to contracts of transport.
Article 14. Suits brought by or against consumers.
A consumer may bring proceedings against the other
party to a contract either in the courts of the Contracting
State in which that party is domiciled or in the courts of
the Contracting State in which he is himself domiciled.
Proceedings may be brought against a consumer by the
other party to the contract only in the courts of the
Contracting State in which the consumer is domiciled.
These provisions shall not affect the rights to bring a
counter-claim in the court in which, in accordance with
this Section, the original claim is pending.
Article 15. Special agreement between the parties.
The provisions of this Section may be departed from
only by an agreement:
1. which is entered into after the dispute has arisen;
or
2. which allows the consumer to bring a proceeding in
courts other than those indicated in this Section; or
3. which is entered into by the consumer and the other
party to the contract, both of whom are at the time of
conclusion of the contract domiciled or habitually resident
in the same Contracting State, and which confers
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jurisdiction on the courts of that State, provided that
such an agreement is not contrary to the law of that State.
SECTION 5: EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION.
SECTION 6: PROROGATION OF JURISDICTION.
APPENDIX 7: THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE LAW APPLICABLE TO
CERTAIN CONSUMERCONTRACTS.
Article 1.
This Convention shall apply to certain contracts for
the international sale of goods bought primarily for
personal, family or household use, where the seller acts in
the course of his business or profession and where at any
time before the contract was entered into, he knew or ought
to have known that the goods were being bought primarily
for any such use.
The declaration of the parties relative to choice of
law or the jurisdiction of a court or arbitrator is not by
itself sufficient to confer upon a contract of sale an
international character.
For purpose of this Convention, contracts to supply
goods to be manufactured or produced shall be considered as
contracts of sale, provided that the supplier is to furnish
a substantial part of the necessary materials.
Article 2.
For the purpose of this Convention, a person who buys
goods primarily for a personal, family or household use, is




It is for the seller to show that he neither knew nor
ought to have known that the goods were being bought
primarily for personal, family or household use.
Article 4.
The Convention shall not apply to sales--
(a) by auction;
(b) by way of execution or otherwise by authority of
law;
(c) of stocks, shares, investment securities,
negotiable instruments or money;
(d) on commodity or other exchanges.
Article S.
The Convention shall apply only in the following
cases:
1. the negotiations for the sale were conducted mainly
in the country in which the consumer then had his habitual
residence and the consumer there took the steps necessary
on his part for the conclusion of the contract;
2. the seller or his representative, agent or
commercial traveller received the order in the country in
which the consumer then had his habitual residence;
3. the order was preceded by a specific invitation
addressed to the consumer in the country of his habitual
residence, or by advertising or other marketing activities
undertaken in, or directed to, that country, and the
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consumer there took the steps necessary on his part for the
conclusion of the contract;
4. the consumer travelled from the country of his
habitual residence to another country and there gave his
order, provided that the consumer's journey was directly or
indirectly arranged by the seller for the purpose of
inducing the consumer to buy.
Article 6.
The internal law chosen by the parties shall govern a
contract to which the Convention applies. However, a
choice of law made by the parties shall in no case deprive
the consumer of the protection afforded by the mandatory
rules of the internal law of the country in which he had
his habitual residence at the time the order was given.
The choice of law must be express and in writing.
Questions relating to the existence, validity and form
of the consent of the parties to the choice of law shall be
determined in accordance with the internal law of the
country in which the consumer had his habitual residence at
the time the order was given.
Article 7.
In the absence of a choice of law by the parties, the
internal law of the country in which the consumer had his
habitual residence at the time the order was given shall
govern a contract to which the Convention applies.
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Article 8.
The law applicable to a contract pursuant to Article 6,
paragraph 1, or Article 7 shall govern in particular -
(a) the form of the contract;
(b) the existence and validity of the contract;
(c) the interpretation of the contract;
(d) the consequences of the invalidity of the contract;
(e) the consequences of non-performance of the
contract, including the assessment of damages; however, a
court need not give relief that would not be given under
its own law in a similar case.
Article 9.
Articles 6 and 7 shall not apply to:
(a) the capacity of the parties;
(b) the effects of the contract as regards any person
other than the parties.
Article 10.
The application of a law specified by the Convention
may be refused only where such application would be
manifestly incompatible with public policy (ordre public).
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